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ABSTRACT

Perry, Jeffrey Thomas. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. Protectors of the Peace:
Baptist Church Tribunals and the Construction of American Religious and Civil
Authority, 1780-1860. Major Professor: Yvonne Pitts.

This dissertation argues that Baptist churches served as important legal sites in the transAppalachian West from the Revolutionary period to the outbreak of the Civil War. By
looking at how members and non-members approached their local churches for matters of
dispute resolution over time and space, it illuminates a local legal culture transforming
under the pressures of legal, economic, religious, and cultural change. Legislative
enactments and new understandings of the family gradually weakened churches’
authority over their members’ domestic relations. An expanding market-economy
necessitating predictable and presumably neutral dispute resolution led many to decry
their churches’ factionalist-produced decrees. Some churches refused to get involved
with messy economic disputes and sanctioned members’ resort to state-based law.
Others emerged as sites through which whites strengthened the region’s consolidating
racial hierarchy, disproportionately focusing their disciplinary proceedings at their black
brethren. Furthermore, religious dissension wrecked trans-Appalachian Baptist churches
during the 1820s and 1830s, leading to a decline in disciplinary activities. Divided by
doctrinal schism, some opposing church factions engaged in lengthy legal contests and
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opened the door for state authorities to meddle in ecclesiastical affairs. In the end, this
dissertation contends that the persistence of churches’ law-producing operations during
the post-Revolutionary period—and the practice’s later diminishment during the
antebellum era—shaped the contours of American religious and civil authority and held
repercussions for the process of separating church from state.

1

INTRODUCTION

“[O]ur only object…is to bring our difficulties to a close & to restore peace &
good feelings with the members as well as with the neighbours [sic].”1
“I think it’s a mistake for any country,” Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
insisted in January 2015, “to allow the development of areas within their country,
whether it’s neighborhoods or other areas, where the same laws, the same values, the
same rules, simply don’t apply.” Speaking to a conservative think-tank in London, Jindal
was referring to “no-go zones” purportedly set up by Muslim extremists in the United
States and Britain in an effort “to colonize Western countries.” Such “no-go zones,” the
author Steven Emerson had told Fox News nine days prior to Jindal’s comments, barred
non-Muslims and relied on religious authorities to enforce faith-based laws. Claiming
there was “no credible information” to support Emerson’s claims, Fox News ran an on-air
retraction just days later. Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron simply responded by
calling Emerson a “complete idiot.” This did not sway Jindal. He insisted the “huge
issue” was that such groups “want to come to our country but not adopt our values,” that
they desired “to set apart their own enclaves and hold onto their own values.” Jindal’s

1

An 1834 “Remonstrance” to Pastor James Fishback signed by John Curd and his fellow dissenters from
the Mt. Vernon Baptist Church in Woodford County, Kentucky. See, Bennett et al Trustees of the Mt.
Vernon Church vs. Curd et al (1836) Folder 2, Box 69, Case 7914, Court of Justice, Woodford Circuit Case
files, 1833-1837, Kentucky Department of Library and Archives, Frankfort, Kentucky.
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comments only add to recent debates over sharia law’s influence in American
communities.1
Yet Jindal’s remarks also echoed fears expressed over two hundred years ago by
Virginia’s colonial authorities as they faced the growth of the Baptists, a group whose
first churches in the Old Dominion had been planted by outsiders. In the late 1750s,
Regular Baptists from Pennsylvania and Separate Baptists from New England migrated
south and began proselytizing in the countryside of Virginia. Over the next two decades,
these preachers set up dozens of churches, religious enclaves that challenged the existing
social and religious order. While extending spiritual equality to all members regardless
of their race or sex, Baptists also eschewed the dancing, pre-occupation with social rank,
and the ostentatious dress of the Virginia gentry. Moreover, Baptists’ “bizarre” practices
of full-body immersion and internal discipline stoked animosity among all ranks of their
Anglican neighbors.2 One historian notes that pockets of “rather thick Baptist dissent”
appeared in areas where the preachers gained a foothold.3 As their ministers shunned
civil authority by preaching without a license, and as their churches attracted a greater
number of adherents, state authorities and Anglican Church leaders often labeled the
upstart Baptists as “disturbers of the peace.” One irate magistrate even charged a group
1

For quotes see, Carlo Angerer, “Bobby Jindal Says West Allows Muslims to Set Up 'No-Go Zones',” NBC
News, 19 January 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/bobby-jindal-says-west-allows-muslims-setno-go-zones-n289011. Accessed January 20, 2015; Associated Press, “Jindal: Muslims Form 'No-Go
Zones' Outside Civic Control,” New York Times, 19 January 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/19/us/politics/ap-us-gop-2016-jindal.html?_r=0, Accessed
January 20, 2015; On recent statutes against Sharia law, see, Kimberly Karseboom, “Sharia Law and
America: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts,” 10
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 663 (Summer 2012).
2
Christine Leigh Heyrman, Southern Cross: The Beginnings of the Bible Belt (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1997), 15-22.
3
Jewel L. Spangler, Virginians Reborn: Anglican Monopoly, Evangelical Dissent, and the Rise of the
Baptists in the Late Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 77-78, 81-83,
105 (quote). There were doctrinal differences between Separate and Regular Baptists, though they were
largely set aside in 1787 with the formation of the Baptist General Committee.
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of Baptist preachers with “carrying on a mutiny against the authority of the land.”4 Many
dissident Baptists joined other Euro-American migrants during the 1770s and 1780s and
settled the region that became the states of Kentucky and Tennessee. By the time
Thomas Jefferson’s religious freedom bill became law in Virginia in 1786, transAppalachian Baptists had already begun constructing an expansive institutional network
of churches and associations which sought to regulate their budding communities through
the ritual of discipline.
This study examines Baptists’ practice of church discipline in Kentucky and
Tennessee from the Revolutionary period until the outbreak of the Civil War. Individuals
used their churches as legal sites, and participated in a capacious legal culture that
extended beyond state institutions to local church meetinghouses. Baptists practiced
discipline at their monthly Saturday business gatherings. After prayer, the moderator
enquired into the “peace” of the church, opening the door for members to air grievances
or bring another’s (or their own) moral transgressions to light. This transformed the
assembled brethren from a worshiping community to a church tribunal, law-producing
actors pursuing their neighborhoods’ harmonious social relations. While churches
punished moral transgressors for drunkenness, fornication, and profane swearing, they
also arbitrated more serious civil disputes over slave sales, business contracts, and
probate matters. Members formed investigative committees to “labor” with the involved
parties or interview relevant witnesses. Churches required transgressors to make
“satisfaction” for their offences or face suspension or exclusion from the church body.
At times, in breach of covenant and trespass cases, churches decreed monetary awards or
4

Quoted in, Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1982), 175.
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commitments of future service to the offended party. They also provided authoritative
recourse for groups, including women and blacks, who lacked legal standing or
personhood in the eyes of state law. Although over time, such opportunities were
dampened as whites used church discipline to help solidify the region’s racial hierarchy,
Baptist churches still served as instrumental legal sites through which members, and at
times non-members, created law for their communities.
In the last two generations, legal historians, focusing largely on small New
England communities, argued that during the colonial and immediate post-Revolutionary
periods, the courthouse became the primary arena for dispute resolution. The
professionalization and formalization of the colonial legal system—facilitated by an
expanding commercial economy and an increase of disputes which stretched across town
and county borders—led Americans to seek recourse through courts rather than
churches.5 Alternatively, social and religious historians, of the South and West, while
disagreeing over whether or not discipline served as a social-control mechanism, have
pointed to the persistence of church-based arbitration, especially among evangelical

5

Bruce H. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1987); William E. Nelson, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in
Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981);
David Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts, Essex County, 1629-1692 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law,
& Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Peter
Charles Hoffer, Law and People in Colonial America: Revised Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998); Legal scholar Christopher Tomlins has argued that during the early-nineteenth
century, law became the “modality of rule” for Americans. See, Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the
Early American Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Historian Mark D. McGarvie, in
his investigation of the process of disestablishment, agrees with Tomlins’s assertion, arguing that law, as a
modality of rule, led to the triumph of common-law contract doctrine over Christian ethics, and the judge
and court replaced the minister and church tribunal as social arbiter. See Mark Douglas McGarvie, One
Nation Under Law: America’s Early National Struggles to Separate Church and State (Dekalb: Northern
Illinois University Press, 2004), 69.
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groups, well into the nineteenth century.6 These studies only passingly note change over
time in disciplinary procedures, and generally do not delve into church-state issues.7
Recent scholarship has insisted that we examine the separation of church and state not as
a clean break, but rather as a process rooted in law and culture. This literature contends
that disestablishment was entangled with a broader, cultural re-conceptualization of
churches as private institutions apart from roles of civil government. Primarily focusing

6

Strict disciplinary practices persisted in the South and West “long after New England Congregationalists
abandoned the practice in the mid-eighteenth century.” See Randy Sparks, On Jordan’s Stormy Banks:
Evangelicalism in Mississippi, 1773-1876 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 146-147; Scholars
disagree as to whether church tribunals were sites for social control. See, for example, Monica Najar,
Evangelizing the South: A Social History of Church and State in Early America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008). Najar looks at church disciplinary proceedings in the Upper South—Virginia,
North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee—focusing especially on how church bodies exerted their
authority within individual households (thus challenging the authority of the household head) but also how
church discipline “eased the progress of the market economy” for members and provided a “version of
‘citizenship’” for women and free and enslaved blacks. See p. 90 for quotes; Janet Moore Lindman, in
Bodies of Belief: Baptist Community in Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2008), 91, examines Baptist churches in the mid-Atlantic region, noting that “as a means of social control,
the church courts set standards of conduct for all members.” Lindman focuses less on the opportunities
church tribunals presented to subordinate groups, and more on the top-down imposition of church rules,
insisting that church elders decided upon and enforced church regulations; In Religion and the Making Of
Nat Turner’s Virginia: Baptist Community and Conflict, 1740-1840 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2008), 169, Randolph Scully contends that among southeastern Virginia Baptists during the earlynineteenth century, “despite white male control over the institution of church discipline, the process never
became a straightforward application of social control,” as all members fell under the church’s jurisdiction;
Similarly, Sparks, in On Jordan’s Stormy Banks,164-168, devotes a full chapter to the disciplinary
practices of evangelical churches in Mississippi and argues that no member, black or white, free or
enslaved, was exempt from church disciplinary proceedings, although blacks were “disciplined at a rate
higher than their percentage of membership in some churches.” Instead of solely a matter of social control,
Sparks concludes on page 148, church discipline was “an effort to foster self-control, a crucial attribute in a
republican society”; Gregory A. Wills, in Democratic Religion: Freedom, Authority, and Church
Discipline in the Baptist South, 1785-1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 9-10, 117, notes
that in some areas of Georgia where his study is focused, discipline continued into the early twentieth
century. He also argues that church discipline was less about social control and more about ecclesiastical
control.
7
An exception is Monica Najar’s Evangelizing the South, which seeks to demonstrate how Baptist churches
in the Upper South reshaped gender and race and “assisted in reformulating the lines between the
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ realms with significant consequences for religion, slavery, and the emerging
nation-state.” See p. 4. Najar’s examination, however, does not move past the first decade of the
nineteenth century.
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on court rulings and legislative actions to highlight disestablishment’s process, it does
not, however, consider how churches’ legal operations contributed to this development.8
Indeed, previous approaches confine “law” to the province of the state and ignore
or depreciate the alternative legal systems rooted in church-based arbitration. They
overlook how many early-nineteenth-century Americans participated in an expansive
legal landscape. This study argues that for church members, and even some nonmembers, church discipline was the practice of law. It illuminates a broader legal
culture—how, when, where, and why individuals interacted with one legal site rather
than another—in the early United States, and demonstrates how transformations in law,
economy, and religion led individuals’ to re-conceptualize their churches’ role in matters
of dispute resolution and moral regulation. Thus, it shows how the cultural process of
separating church from state evolved amidst the more routine disciplinary actions of local
churches and through legislation and court decrees emanating from statehouses.9
Church meetinghouses served as sites of legal contestation, and records of such
disputes provide glimpses of how individuals at the local level interacted with governing
authority and constructed their legal culture. Historians have recently shifted the focus
from “mandarin” texts of the legal elite and away from statehouses, highlighting how law
arises in a variety of sites and through myriad social interactions. Legal Scholar Ariela

8

McGarvie, One Nation Under Law; Sarah Barringer Gordon, "The First Disestablishment: Limits on
Church Power and Property Before the Civil War," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 162, no. 2
(January, 2014), 309, 311. For a recent discussion of the process of disestablishment in the nineteenth
century, with a particular focus on legislative enactments, see, Steven K. Green, The Second
Disestablishment: Church and State in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010); Thomas E. Buckley, Establishing Religious Freedom: Jefferson’s Statute in Virginia
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013).
9
My understanding of “legal culture” derives from Lawrence M. Friedman, "Legal Culture and Social
Development," Law & Society Review, 4 no. 1 (Aug., 1969): 34.

7
Gross describes this approach as “cultural-legal history.”10 Viewing trials in local courts
as opposing narratives, performances that highlight underlying social or cultural tensions,
this scholarship is still overwhelmingly focused on formal legal sites rather than legalities
rooted in community consensus, such as church tribunals.11 As slaves used church
tribunals to punish their own for theft, they called into question the ability of chattel
property to make claims to property. When church members charged slaves with
adultery, they implicitly recognized slaves’ ability to form binding contracts, but often
overlooked the social realities pulling slave spouses apart, whether it was separation by
sale or an intransigent master forbidding one from seeing the other. When disputing
Baptists ridiculed their churches’ legal procedures and turned instead to courts for
resolution, they bucked one authority and embraced another. Their participation in this
marketplace of authority helped construct the authoritative bounds of the religious and
secular in the United States.
Church disciplinary activities constituted what historian Laura Edwards recently
termed “localized law.” In her study of the post-Revolutionary Carolinas, Edwards
contends that despite the increased professionalization and formalization of law at the
state level, the primary objective of local law was to maintain the “peace” of a

10

Ariela Gross, “Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery,” Columbia Law
Review 101 (April 2001):640-690; On “mandarin” legal texts, see, Robert Gordon, “Critical Legal
Histories,” Stanford Law Review, 36 no. ½, Critical Legal Studies Symposium (January 1984): 57-125.
11
Yvonne Pitts, Family, Law, and Inheritance in America: A Social and Legal history of NineteenthCentury Kentucky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7-8; For examples of such an approach,
see, Ariela Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the Antebellum Southern Courtroom (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2000); Joshua Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood: Sex and Families
Across the Color Line in Virginia, 1787-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003);
Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1999); Laura F. Edwards, “Law, Domestic Violence, and the Limits of Patriarchal Authority in the
Antebellum South,” The Journal of Southern History 65, no. 4 (1999): 733-770. Edwards does briefly look
to church actions, see page 739.
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community. The role of the conceptual peace was to uphold the social order, the
particularities of which the local populace determined. Whereas state law by the 1820s
and 1830s increasingly sought to sustain liberal individual rights (for white men), local
courts continued to look to the nuances of each case, at times elevating the community
peace over abstract legal conceptions of individual rights. Grounded in communities’
local knowledge, the quest for the “peace” relocated “the legal process into social
relations, so that law both guided and emerged from the dynamics of people’s lives.”12
Although subordinate groups had little access to the state-based legal system, Edwards
demonstrates that women, slaves, and free blacks all influenced, albeit at times indirectly,
the practice of law at the local level. Similar to the workings of localized law, church
discipline served to protect the “peace” of the church fellowship and the surrounding
neighborhood. 13
Incorporating church tribunals’ actions into the post-Revolutionary West’s legal
culture necessitates rethinking our definition of law. In the last half-century,
anthropologists and socio-legal theorists have argued that all societies are legally plural.14

12

For quote see, Laura F. Edwards, “The Peace: The Meaning and Production of Law in the PostRevolutionary South,” UC-Irvine Law Review 1 no. 3 (Feb., 2011); For persistence of localized law in
general, see, Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in
the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Edwards, though
reacting to formalist and instrumentalist tendencies of legal historiography, is also building on the work of
William Novak and others who have charted the extensive reach of local governments in subverting the
individual to the needs of the community. See, William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation
in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); For various
“legalities,” of British North America, see in general, The Many Legalities of Early America, eds.,
Christopher Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
13
In, The People and Their Peace, 83-84, Edwards does briefly examine disciplinary mechanisms of the
Baptists, Presbyterians, and Methodists, but her examination is geared toward transformations of local law
as practiced in courthouses, not church meetinghouses.
14
This scholarship does not address church discipline in post-Revolutionary America. For an overview
see, Leopold Pospisil, "Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies," The Journal
of Conflict Resolution 11 no. 1, (March 1967): 2-26. See also, Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A
Comparative Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 98-99; Legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry

9
Although scholars of legal pluralism cohere around their disregard for legal centralism—
arguing that law manifests itself through a variety of institutions or social interactions—
there is still little agreement upon both the power and place of the state in such studies
and where law ceases and social action begins.15 For the purposes of this dissertation,
however, I define law, quoting from legal scholar Brian Tamanaha, as “whatever people
identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law’.”16 Baptists, though delineating
between state-based and church-based law, often identified church discipline as a legal
practice. Obtaining “legal” membership in a Baptist church also required individuals to
keep “watchcare” over their fellow brethren, and to take the proper legal steps (the
“gospel steps”) with transgressors or those with whom they disputed. Failure to do so
could itself lead to a charge from the church. The Pleasant Grove Baptist Church, for
instance, resolved in 1840 that it was “the imperious duty of every member to watch over
each other,” and to bring unresolved conflict to the church. Those “who shall neglect to

notes that some institutions, such as corporations, factories, civil associations, and universities “include
written codes, tribunals, and security forces” which replicate “the structure and symbolic form of state
law.” Furthermore, in any society, various “informal systems”—from the family, labor group, or
collective—establish rules and seek to gain compliance with them. A variety of legal systems are found in
almost all societies—not only in the colonized—and central to the investigation of law is the relationship
between official state legal regimes and all other forms of social ordering which are separate yet still
dependent upon state authority. See, Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22 no. 5 (1988),
870-874.
15
For instance, the critical legal pluralists decry “social-scientific conceptions” of legal pluralism, such as
the one advanced by Merry above, and their continued “appeal to the primacy of the institutionalized State
legal order.” Instead, Critical legal Pluralists attribute more agency to the legal subject, endowing him or
her “with a responsibility to participate in the multiple normative communities by which they recognize and
create their own legal subjectivity.” See, Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick A. Macdonald, "What is a
Critical Legal Pluralism?" 12 Can. J. L. & Soc. 25 (1997): 35, 37-38; On the pitfalls of classifying all
normative ordering systems as “law”, see in general, Brian Z. Tamanaha, "A Non-Essentialist Version of
Legal Pluralism," Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 2 (June, 2000): 296-321; For a recent review on the
state of legal pluralism within the field of history, albeit directed at Empires and not religious groups, see
the Introduction to Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (eds.), Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850
(New York: New York University Press, 2013).
16
This position is put forth by Tamanaha in “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,” 313. Italics
in original. “Thus, what law is,” Tamanaha continues on page 314, “is determined by the people in the
social arena through their own common usages, not in advance by the social scientist or theorist.”
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reprove and try to reclaim” a fellow member should “be dealt with for a neglect of
duty.”17
Churches expected members to refrain from suing one another at local courts,
asserting that members keep their “legal doings” within the fellowship. Though churches
did not possess the ability to inflict bodily punishment, church sanctions—whether
through admonishment, suspension, or excommunication—could have social
ramifications, and for the true believer, eternal consequences. The state holds no
monopoly upon means of coercion. As one rural church-goer remarked, “To be excluded
from the only group that was really meeting and had any influence in the community was
right much of a jolt to anyone.”18 Thus, by acknowledging that individuals produced law
outside of state institutions, we can illuminate a more fluid trans-Appalachian legal
culture, one in which individuals possessed an expansive vision of law, authority, and
governance.
Both historians and contemporary observers have noted that church disciplinary
practices receded during the antebellum period. Historian Donald Mathews, while
acknowledging that discipline continued in southern churches through the Civil War,
laments that “the meaning of these patterns of discipline, with their recurring cycles of
intensity, is not yet totally clear.”19 Other scholars note a similar disciplinary declension,
but have not offered a sufficient explanation for its occurrence. 20 Likewise, the Rev.
17

Pleasant Grove Baptist Church Records, December 1840, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky
(hereafter FHS).
18
Quoted in, Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19 th-Century South
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 121-122.
19
Donald G. Mathews, Religion in the Old South (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 46.
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Eleazer Savage claimed in the 1840s that “[s]ome churches are so lax in discipline, so
indulgent with delinquent members and even flagrant transgressors, because of property,
or standing, or connexions [sic] as to become a very dunghill in society.” Indeed, he
concluded, “[i]t is a day of most alarming irresponsibility among the members of our
churches!”21 Reverend Warham Walker, writing at the same time as Savage, sounded a
comparable tune in his own exposition of church-based law, decrying that there was an
“almost entire neglect of Discipline in many churches.”22 As matters of governance and
discipline rested with all members, the decline in disciplinary activity disparaged by
contemporary observers and noted by historians, signals individuals’ changing
conceptions of their churches’ authoritative role, a reformulation of the broader legal
culture.
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chapter 4, Scully addresses disciplinary patterns related to the defendants’ race and sex, but not to the
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The congregational form of early Baptist churches presents challenges to making
broad generalizations about change over time within the denomination.23 But in this
study I argue that a confluence of legal, economic, and cultural factors in north-central
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee contributed to churches’ increasing disciplinary
reticence by the antebellum period. Changes in the law of the family that slowly chipped
away at patriarchs’ broad power within the household coincided with emerging middleclass notions of family privacy, hindering churches’ regulatory influence over domestic
relations by the antebellum period. Likewise, as individuals’ engagement in national and
international markets supplanted face-to-face transactions, and as debt transformed from
a moral failing to just another risk of the new economic marketplace, contract-law
doctrine assumed precedence in American legal and intellectual thought. To the
detriment of the communitarian ethos stressed by churches, contract doctrine elevated the
liberal individual bound only by his free-will commitments. The expanding market
economy necessitated a predictable, objective legal system. Many Baptists and religious
treatise writers lamented the prejudiced-produced decrees of church tribunals, and these
sites’ authority over their members’ business lives waned. In the end, rather than
overseeing members’ private and public affairs, some churches directed their disciplinary
focus toward black members, becoming venues through which whites strengthened the
region’s racial hierarchy.
These legal and economic transformations corresponded with the emergence of a
competitive religious marketplace, one increasingly characterized by doctrinal dissension
and church schism. Although Baptists found fertile ground in the West—witnessing
23
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membership growth in tune with the overall population expansion—the very religious
liberty for which Baptists had so intently fought during the Revolutionary period led to
increased sectarian rivalry over both adherents and access to local houses of worship.
During the 1820s and 1830s the region’s religious landscape scorched with dissension as
Baptists argued over a variety of doctrinal matters, but especially as the teachings of
Alexander Campbell and Barton Stone gained prominence and adherents. Campbell’s
calls for the supremacy of the individual over the collective will of the congregation,
along with his denunciation of creeds, confessions of faith, and any religious body not
deriving from the scriptures, found fertile ground among the region’s Baptists. With
member relations strained by the influence of the Stone-Campbell movement (the two
joined forces in 1832), discipline rates in many Baptist churches receded. The failure of
church tribunals to contain doctrinal dissension, too, propelled opposing church factions
to invoke state authority to secure their temporal claims. In some cases, land grantors
and donors utilized legal instruments to exclude non-Protestant and “disorderly” religious
groups from public meetinghouses, or entwined property rights with adherence to specific
doctrinal stances. Other groups battled in court over rights to local meetinghouses,
insisting they were the “true” church. Highlighting the continuing process of separating
church and state, this explicit deference of authority to local courts provided
opportunities for judges to subtly meddle in ecclesiastical affairs.
Investigating the disciplinary practices of Baptist churches allows us to illuminate
the workings of localized law amidst a changing religious and legal landscape. In
contrast to many of their religious counterparts, Baptists’ ostensible highest earthly
authority was the local church, not an ecclesiastical board such as the Methodist’s
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Judicial Council or Presbyterian’s General Assembly. Decisions on governing forms and
disciplinary matters were decided by full-church members (largely defined after 1800 as
white male, converted believers), by family, friends, and neighbors.24 Furthermore, the
building of permanent Euro-American settlements in Kentucky and Tennessee coincided
with the separation of church and state throughout much of the Republic. Baptist
churches were the first institutions of any kind on the trans-Appalachian frontier of the
1770s and 1780s, and their early arrival and continued development allowed them to
entwine their values into the region’s social structures. Baptist churches helped to
provide order in emerging communities, assuming a variety of civil functions in the
absence of strong state governments.25 Even after statehood, however, their governing
activities continued. Investigating churches’ legal operations over time and space
redirects the examination of disestablishment from the constitutional realm to the cultural
process of separating churches from roles of civil service.
A focus on north-central Kentucky and middle Tennessee also allows us to chart
changes in disciplinary practices—and thus the broader legal culture—in a region that
experienced extensive economic and social transformation from 1780 through the
antebellum period. Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region developed from frontier-station
outposts during the Revolutionary period to a vibrant center of commercialism by 1820.
Surrounded by fertile agricultural lands, the greater-Lexington area greatly benefited
from an explosion in the hemp trade during the 1790s. This not only helped make the
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city the leading commercial and industrial capital of the trans-Appalachian West, but
catapulted Lexington’s population from 1,800 at the turn of the nineteenth century to
4,300 just ten years later.26 Such commercial growth gave rise to a middle class
propagating their ideas of respectability and sensibility, family privacy and class
distinction. As the century progressed, historian Craig Thompson Friend recently wrote,
“refinement, capitalistic investment, and lines of distinction spread from Lexington
outward,” with individuals of the lower classes finding more “common ground” with a
burgeoning middle class made up of entrepreneurs, merchants, and lawyers.27
Middle Tennessee, or the Cumberland District as it was known during the preand early-statehood periods, also witnessed rapid economic and social transformation
from the Revolutionary era through the first decades of the nineteenth century. When
Tennessee became a state in 1796 the region claimed only 11,500 residents. Twenty-five
years later, the population including slaves had sky-rocketed to just under 290,000, with
many focused on land speculation, agricultural production, and commerce. The
Cumberland River became an important commercial highway, engendering a mercantile
class that looked to farmers for cotton and tobacco to sale in distant markets.28 In 1800,
Middle Tennessee may have “stood at the fringe of white civilization,” as historian
Kristofer Ray has noted, but “by 1812 it had embraced a complex market economy,”
revolving “around land speculation and the production of short-staple cotton and
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tobacco.”29 In both Tennessee and Kentucky, not all residents were completely
integrated into the expanding market-economy, nor did all readily accept the marketdriven social relations arising from such participation.30 Nonetheless, this region proves
a valuable region of study to chart changes in religious and civil authority as it
transformed from fluid frontier communities to more economically and socially complex
societies.
This dissertation is arranged thematically. Chapter One details the settlement of
Kentucky and Tennessee. It focuses on the variety of ways that Euro-American settlers
organized their growing communities, and particularly focuses on Baptists’ institutional
network of churches and governing associations. Following a survey of church
disciplinary practices, it looks to how state governments, despite constitutional separation
of church and state, buttressed churches’ legal operations. Chapter Two examines
churches’ role in regulating their members’ household affairs alongside transformations
in state-based domestic relations law. Actions taken by church members in disciplining
husbands and masters, unruly wives, disobedient slaves, and philandering spouses
elevated the role of churches to prominent leadership positions within their communities.
It argues, in contrast to previous studies, that church regulation of family life was not
necessarily a radical break from the law practiced in local and state courts. Moreover, by
the end of the antebellum period, trans-Appalachian churches devoted less time to
mitigating domestic relations cases, especially divorce and adultery, even though divorce
cases appeared to be on the rise in local courtrooms. Increasingly, scriptural views on the
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perpetual nature of marriage came into conflict with the more liberal divorce legislation
emerging from early-nineteenth century statehouses, legislation which loosened the
compact’s contractual obligations by providing wider legal routes through which to
pursue a separation or absolute divorce, and thus, legislation which chipped away at
patriarchs’ broad power within their households. The “law of the land,” rather than the
“law of God” assumed precedence over domestic matters by the outbreak of Civil War.
The third chapter focuses on churches’ handling of members’ economic and
property related disputes. Churches charged members with breach of contract,
indebtedness, and theft. They arbitrated a variety of property disputes, including those
over land and slaves. Churches also took up disputes between slaves, recognizing, and at
times substantiating their claims to property. Yet, as the region transformed from
backwoods outposts to complex societies during the early-nineteenth century,
individuals’ engagement with national and international markets increasingly supplanted
face-to-face transactions. Meanwhile, a social-relations-by-contract discourse assumed
precedence in American legal and intellectual thought. Elevating the individual bound
only by commitments of his own free will, contract doctrine slowly chipped away at the
communitarian ethos propagated by Baptists and other religious groups. Churches grew
more willing to allow members’ to seek recourse at local and state courts, while others
elevated the objective, predictable jurisprudence of state-based law over the factionalist,
prejudiced decrees emanating from their church bodies. Churches’ reticence to involve
themselves in their members’ business affairs, in some cases, led to an increased focus on
black members’ actions as church tribunals emerged as venues through which to
strengthen the region’s hardening racial hierarchy.
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Chapter Four explores how religious controversy affected individuals’
conceptions of their broader legal culture. Throughout the first decades of the nineteenth
century, disagreements over doctrine and form of church government pervaded transAppalachian Baptist churches. Though it touches on consternation engendered by the
growing influence of missionary societies, as well as debates over the utility of governing
associations, the examination primarily focuses on the rise of Alexander Campbell,
Barton Stone, and their “Reformation” movement. Many churches simply
excommunicated members who adopted the divergent doctrinal practices, while others
split into opposing factions. Amidst a religious backdrop of doctrinal controversy and
schism, afflicted churches witnessed a decline of disciplinary activities as individuals’
ceased to envision their churches as sites for neutral dispute resolution.
The final chapter investigates how this sectarian controversy propelled religious
organizations’ interaction with state authority. The failure of church courts to contain
internal dissension and curtail schism led to contentious court battles over rights to local
meetinghouses. Although neither Kentucky nor Tennessee possessed a legacy of a
church-establishment, state governments still influenced religious groups through
legislative enactments and court rulings. Amidst a presumably “free” religious
marketplace, one increasingly characterized by dissension and church schism, actions
taken by both religious and state actors opened the door for the latter to shape
ecclesiastical affairs. Local meetinghouses also served as physical manifestations of the
contested religious marketplace, and individuals utilized state authority in subtle ways to
promote religious orthodoxy in their communities and exclude those groups deemed
dangerous to the civil and religious order from common spaces of worship.

The
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“democratization” of American religious culture during the post-Revolutionary period,
then, begot a “jurisprudence of disestablishment” fashioned through the legal system, and
significantly shaped the development of church-state relations.31
Issues over the relationship between church and state, of course, remain contested
in the twenty-first century. Indeed, contemporary news cycles are peppered with disputes
over religious symbolism in state buildings or civic ceremonies. Advocacy groups and
politicians weigh the benefits and pitfalls of state-funding of religious groups’ various
charitable endeavors. The politics of LBGTQ and abortion have led to a new installment
of church-state jurisprudence, as churches and businesses point to religious principles
with hopes of side-stepping laws geared toward marriage equality, access to birth control,
or the most basic rights of inclusion in the public sphere. Meanwhile, congregations
divided over gay marriage or doctrinal disagreements are seeking state recourse to secure
their property claims. These issues, far from novel, go back to the republic’s founding.
They are rooted in not only our nation’s experiment with religious liberty, but
Americans’ divergent conceptions of law and authority. One place to begin is to look at
how those once deemed “disturbers of the peace” by Virginia’s authorities, soon after
emerged as protectors of the peace in the new communities of the West.
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CHAPTER 1.“THE WANT OF DISCIPLINE”: BAPTIST CHURCH TRIBUNALS
AND LOCAL LAW IN POST-REVOULTIONARY KENTIUCKY AND TENNESSEE

“This little new church in the wilderness, was far from any establishment of the kind…”1

As Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Virginian Baptists celebrated the
passage of the “Act for Establishing Freedom of Religion” in 1786, Baptists at Bryan’s
Station near present day Lexington, Kentucky, considered “their scattered state and the
want of discipline among themselves,” and formed a church. In July 1787, the new
church debated its place within the wider community, specifically, “the expediency or
inexpediency of [their] Church meetings for Discipline being in private or publick [sic].”
The church body agreed, “that they be altogether in private,” and thus, the workings of its
tribunal would take place in front of members only.2 Bryan’s Station Baptist Church, and
churches throughout the trans-Appalachian West, served as important sites for the
production of law well into the antebellum period. Through their ritual practice of
discipline, churches arbitrated member-disputes and morally regulated their communities.
The members of Bryan’s Station witnessed charges ranging from fighting, drunkenness,
adultery, and slave insubordination, among other accusations, during the church’s first six
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years of existence. Indeed, in the initial years of settlement, when local courts met
infrequently or were located at great distances, church tribunals filled an authoritative
vacuum for frontier communities and continued acting as governing sites even after the
arrival of stronger state-based governing institutions.3
The prevailing scholarship on religion in post-Revolutionary Kentucky and
Tennessee does not adequately address Baptists’ continued legal operations or churches’
persistent interaction with state authority. Most note in passing churches’ role in
instilling moral order during the initial settlement period.4 Others, such as Monica
Najar’s recent work on Baptists in the Upper South, examine churches’ civil functions, or
look to how evangelicals sought to use local courts to disseminate their values.5 None of
these studies, however, incorporate churches into the broader legal culture of the region
from the settlement period through the early-nineteenth century. Nor do they look to the
underlying links between church and state which remained despite disestablishment.
3
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Churches oversaw individuals’ morality and served as legal venues for members,
and at times non-members, to settle disputes. For white women and free and enslaved
blacks, although their power within churches gradually dissipated by the turn of the
nineteenth century, local church tribunals functioned as the most, or only, accessible
venues in which to air grievances or seek resolution.6 In an attempt to maintain
harmonious member-relations, churches expected members to follow the “gospel steps”
when settling disputes, and insisted such conflict be kept within the fellowship. They
relied upon fear of eternal damnation and the social ostracism to enforce
excommunication decrees. On the early frontier, and continuing through the antebellum
period, then, multiple legal systems persisted, at times complementary, but in other
instances in opposition to the prevailing cultural and legal developments of the region. 7
Rather than emanating solely from state-based institutions, law operated in a variety of
locations, including church meetinghouses.
Churches’ law-making activities were backed by state authority despite churchstate separation. Although by 1800 constitutional enactments at the federal level and in
most states provided for disestablishment, the authoritative bounds of religious and civil
authority remained contested through the mid-nineteenth century and beyond. The earlyrepublican and antebellum decades proved a foundational period for church-state
relations, with state governments doing much of the heavy lifting, as one historian notes,
6
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“teasing apart links between religious and political institutions that were old and rusty.”8
Kentucky and Tennessee were no exception. Both states’ constitutions forbade stateestablishment of religion, yet their governments still implicitly buttressed churches’ legal
operations through both legislation and court rulings. Incorporation measures, trespass
statutes, and judicial decrees against those who disturbed houses of worship, all protected
church-goers as they worshiped and when they assembled as a church tribunal.
The Baptists’ early arrival in Kentucky and Tennessee allowed them to entwine
both their institutions and values into the foundation of the region’s emerging societies. 9
Free from official persecution in the trans-Appalachian country, “a flood of Baptist
emigrants”—perhaps one quarter of all Virginia Baptists—migrated to Kentucky,
sometimes as whole congregational bodies, during the Revolutionary period.10 They
were not alone, but simply one segment of a large, trans-montane migration that began in
the 1760s and only gained in numbers over the next four decades. Although preachers
were active in the region from the first years of settlement (the Baptist preacher Thomas
Tinsley regularly preached at the Harrodsburg station as early as 1776), not until the
1780s did Baptists turn their full attention to constructing an institutional presence in the
region. By the early nineteenth-century, Baptists and other evangelical groups—
benefitting greatly from revivalist fervor of the “Great Revival” at the turn of the
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century—had constructed a broad institutional presence in both states, one rooted in local
churches and connected through regional governing associations.11
Baptists’ network of governing institutions did not stand alone, as a variety social
ordering systems persisted in the trans-Appalachian West from the settlement period and
beyond. The development of state-based governing institutions in the territory proved
slow during the Revolutionary period. Virginia’s authority over its western lands, though
“decentralized, inexpensive, and familiar,” was weak in eighteenth-century Kentucky.12
North Carolina’s authority over the Tennessee backcountry was similarly tenuous.
Disgruntled settlers in the eastern district constituted the independent state of Franklin in
1784, and their Middle-Tennessean counterparts flirted with secession to Spain later in
the decade.13 Shortly after settlement, however, Euro-American migrants organized
extralegal governing organizations which served a number of social functions, including
dispute arbitration and regulation of local militias.14 After Kentucky and Tennessee
achieved statehood status in the 1790s, local courts emerged as essential sites of
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governance in the region. Though these venues emerged as the “principle agents” of law
and order in the region, they did little to enforce moral regulations, a task left largely to
churches.15
This chapter briefly details the legal landscape of the trans-Appalachian West
from the beginning of Euro-American settlement in the late eighteenth century through
the opening decades of the nineteenth century. It particularly focuses on the development
of local courts and the Baptists’ institutional network of churches and governing
associations. Then, after a discussion of Baptists’ vision of law and the workings of
church discipline, it takes a broad look at the various offences mitigated by church
tribunals, their relationship with state-based courts, and the ways in which state authority
buttressed churches’ legal operations through legislation and court rulings. Although
legal historians have argued that by the time of American Independence law became
rooted in state institutions, multiple legal systems continued to operate on various levels,
with churches providing a variety of law-making functions for their members and the
surrounding church neighborhood.16 In late 1793, Bryan’s Station Church responded to a
member’s query related to the contours of the church’s authority in the new
commonwealth. “The design of a church,” the clerk recorded, was not only for the
“Glory of God” and advancement of his kingdom across the world, but “secondly her
power extends, to make any rule for her own government consistant [sic] with the word
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of God, and to exercise her power in the Discipline of her members agreeable thereto.”17
Despite the increased presence of state authority, Baptists in the early-statehood West
intended that their parallel legal system would persist as an alternate, authoritative venue
for their communities’ needs. In so doing, they participated in a fluid legal culture, one
in which local and state governments did not hold a monopoly on effective means of
coercion.

On a Sunday in September 1781, a throng of men and women, including children
and slaves, congregated at an isolated meetinghouse in Spotsylvania County, Virginia,
their attention focused on Lewis Craig as he spoke from a temporary pulpit.18 Craig,
pastor of the Upper Spotsylvania Church, was well-known among Virginia’s Baptists for
his multiple arrests stemming from charges of preaching without a license. Some of
those in attendance surely remembered when in 1768 colonial authorities arrested Craig
while he preached in this same Spotsylvania meetinghouse. Some, too, were probably
among those who followed along as the sheriff transported him to the Fredericksburg jail,
and who listened as he continued to exhort from behind his cell’s iron-barred window.
On this day, thirteen years later, with the majority of his congregation preparing for an
arduous journey to the new settlement of Kentucky, he reportedly touched on the
Baptists’ progress in Virginia over the previous two decades. He reminded the audience
that “though already worn and weary from the long campaign” against religious
persecution (a battle still being waged in Virginia), that God would lead them to the “the
17
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rich and illimitable acres of a western Canaan.” The next day a convoy of between 500
and 600 migrants, including around 200 members of the Spotsylvania Church, their
children, slaves, and about a dozen preachers, embarked with Craig for Kentucky, their
Canaan in the wilderness.19
Had Craig and his flock stayed in Virginia much longer, they would have
witnessed their counterparts’ further victories over the Anglican church establishment
which had pestered so many of their brethren during the late eighteenth century. From
outset of Virginia’s settlement in the seventeenth-century, the Church of England served
as the established church of the colony. The colonial assembly sketched the boundaries
of Anglican parishes, appointed lay vestries, raised funds for the church through taxation,
and insisted all parish inhabitants attend Sunday services. The state also restricted other
religious groups’ activities—many of which had gained a foothold in the region during
the Great Awakening of the 1730s through the 1750s—and, as in the case of Craig,
arrested dissenters who preached without a license. Gradually over the second-half of the
eighteenth century, competing sects such as the Presbyterians and Baptists obtained small
measures of religious toleration from the state. Amidst the Revolutionary fervor of the
1770s and 1780s, Baptists were at the forefront of the evangelical assault on the churchstate establishment. They petitioned against the state’s tax support for, and incorporation
of the Anglican Church, and eventually helped mobilize support for Jefferson’s 1786
Statute establishing religious freedom in the Commonwealth. No longer subject to legal
persecution, Virginia’s Baptists were free to worship as they pleased.20
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Yet for many Baptists and other Virginians, their future potential lay in the West.
Craig’s group, since known as “The Travelling Church,” trekked nearly six hundred
miles. They passed in the “shadow” of Jefferson’s Monticello, crossed the Blue Ridge
Mountains through Buford’s Gap, and made it to Fort Chiswell in western Virginia by the
end of September. There, the group dispensed with their wagons, and most of the party
continued on horseback or on foot over the rough-shod trails. They passed solitary grave
markers of travelers who went before them, heard news of the British surrender at
Yorktown, and engaged in a skirmish with Natives. In early December they traversed
through the Cumberland Gap into Kentucky, and two weeks later established “Craig’s
Station,” where on the second Sunday in December 1781, far from Virginian authorities,
the church members gathered to worship around the Bible brought with them from the
Spotsylvania meetinghouse.
Over the next year and a half, members from the Travelling Church spread out
through central Kentucky and organized churches. In the fall of 1783, much of the
congregation relocated to South Elkhorn just miles from Lexington. The ministers
Ambrose Dudley and William Waller, who had journeyed from Virginia with Craig’s
convoy, would go on to constitute churches in Fayette County, including the one at
Bryan’s Station and its arm at David’s Fork. The Baptists institutional network had
sprouted west of the Appalachians. They, along with an expanding number of local
governing institutions, served as primary legal sites for the region’s emerging EuroAmerican societies.
Carolina provided for church-state separation and free exercise of religion in its 1776 state constitution,
though it did limit office holding privileges to Protestants. See, Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms:
Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986), 151-152.
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Craig’s Travelling Church followed on the heels of over two-decades of
continuous white-expedition and settlement in the trans-montane region. “Long hunters,”
such as Daniel Boone, began crossing into the trans-montane region in the early 1760s,
continuing their expeditions throughout the decade despite Britain’s Proclamation Line of
1763 forbidding colonists from traversing the Appalachian Mountains. The first settlers
were typically young, white males seeking adventure, or escape from less-than-savory
familial or social relations in the east. With the end of the Revolutionary War, and as the
region’s Natives became more dependent upon fur-traders and alcohol purveyors,
thousands more Americans, including a greater number of women and children,
journeyed into Kentucky, “slashing and burning” away the landscape to build
homesteads.21 During the 1790s individuals and families of the gentry class arrived with
hopes of disseminating their cultural mores and wielding political and social power.22
Drawn west by the lure of both religious autonomy and economic opportunity,
settlers of all social and religious backgrounds sought to establish orderly communities in
the trans-Appalachian region. Freedom from religious persecution may have propelled
some Baptists to seek refuge in Kentucky, but, as the nineteenth-century Baptist
chronicler, George Ranck, admitted, “pioneer Baptists” were also “attracted by the
magnificent land” of Kentucky’s Bluegrass region.23 Like so many others, Baptists had
heard tales of Kentucky’s expansive lands and its reputation as the best “poor man’s
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country.”24 The West was the Promised Land where one could attain his own plot of
“virgin” land which promised a high yield, and thus secure his agrarian independence.25
Although overtime the demographics of settlement became increasingly diverse, historian
Craig Thompson Friend notes that all migrants understood that in journeying to
Kentucky, they were splitting off “the beaten path of American society,” constructing
societies “anew on what they considered to be the blank slate of the western wilds.”26
Most Euro-American settlers were imbued with Christian spirituality, but not all
Christians actively practiced their faith. Dispersed settlement, a lack of preachers, and
the continued Indian threat led to rather weak religious institutions.27 Almost all the
settlers, faithful or not, however, understood that a certain moral economy was needed in
order to regulate the dispersed and often chaotic settlement of the backcountry. Mutual
respect, individual responsibility to the community, and the meting out of justice to
transgressors of the social peace ordered society during the first years of western
settlement.28
Due to the persistent Native presence in the region, settler-life revolved around
the frontier station through the 1780s, with little formalized legal institutions. Stations—
log houses connected by a high wooden wall which acted as a fortified structure—served
as whites’ primary defense against Native attack. A dozen or more families would live
near each station, retreating behind its walls when attacks became eminent.29 This
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“search for stability” stunted the growth of the region’s governing institutions, including
churches.30 Settlers at Craig’s Station attended worship services with their rifles, while
armed sentries stood guard outside the building.31 The Baptist minister William Hickman
recalled church-goers traveling in groups, with the men acting as an armed escort, to
Sunday services in the 1780s. And small frontier congregations’ very survival could be
jeopardized because of an Indian attack. Cooper’s Run Baptist Church in Kentucky had
five of its members killed by Natives in its first year of existence.32
The “Kentucke” region was part of Virginia, but as population numbers swelled
legislators in the east created new county governments in order to secure their authority
over the sprawling backcountry settlements where residents had already turned extralegal governing institutions in hopes of ordering their communities. In 1775, the
Transylvania Land Company, led by Judge Richard Henderson and his associates,
negotiated with local Natives to acquire much of present day Kentucky. A number of
stations were established in the region, including Boonesborough—named after Daniel
Boone who briefly worked for Henderson by clearing paths and leading settlers into
central Kentucky. In May of that year, representatives from nearby stations assembled at
Boonesborough and drew up a rudimentary government which, among other things,
stature in militia elections. Later, as immigration to the region increased in 1780s and migrants pushed
deeper into western Kentucky and Tennessee’s Cumberland region, constructing local governments as they
went, power wielded in stations and militia companies eventually translated to leadership roles in the new
communities. Ray, Middle Tennessee, 5-9.
30
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established courts and set proper punishments for criminal activity. The short-lived
Boonesborough government primarily focused upon issues such as courts’ operations, the
militia, and fees for local officials (but, among its first measures passed was “An Act to
Prevent Profane Swearing and Sabbath Breaking”).33 Many settlers were not pleased with
the Company’s high land prices, however, and believed, rather than with the
Transylvania Company, that their titles would better be secured under Virginia’s
authority. Virginia’s General Assembly shared the settlers’ discontent with Henderson’s
extra-legal actions, and in December 1776, sliced out the territory west of the
Alleghenies, designating it Kentucky County. With governing authority now extending
from Richmond, the legislature created by the Boonesborough Covenant never
reconvened.34
Permanent white settlement in Tennessee began in 1768, and over the next two
decades white settlers organized various governing institutions to maintain the social
order and facilitate economic exchange. In 1772, eager to protect their land claims,
settlers politically organized themselves through the Watauga Association. The “first
constitutional government west of the Appalachians,” the Watauga Association was a
five-man court primarily responsible for adjudicating disputed land claims and upholding
individual rights. It also created local offices, such as sheriff, and presided over mundane
business similar to local governments in the East—legalizing marriages, punishing
33
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criminals, probating wills, recording land claims or sales, and overseeing militia duties.
At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, settlers in East Tennessee, believing they
resided on the fringes of Virginia’s claims, organized a Committee of Safety whose
authority overlapped with the Watauga court, and petitioned Virginia for annexation.35
Finally realizing they were within the boundaries of North Carolina, not Virginia,
inhabitants of eastern Tennessee appealed to North Carolina for protection and
representation. In response, North Carolina legislators organized their western lands into
the Washington District (which became Washington County in 1777), established a court,
and promised the backcountry settlers representation in the state assembly.36
Over the course of the 1780s, as Euro-American settlers trekked deeper into
Tennessee, frontier leaders sought governing assistance from both North Carolina and the
Confederation Congress. James Robertson, John Donelson, and a group of land hunters
were among the first white settlers of Middle Tennessee. Following the Tennessee River
nearly 150 miles west from the original towns and settlements of the eastern district,
Donelson and his cohorts established a new settlement in the Cumberland region, not far
from present day Nashville.37 Upon arrival, they repeated the familiar process of setting
up rudimentary governments—with what historian John Finger called “an aura of
legality”—organizing in May of 1780 the Cumberland Compact. This extralegal
association elected twelve men to serve as arbiters for disputes over land claims,
regulators of the land office, and dispensers of local justice. Nominally part of
Washington County, the closest court was still nearly two hundred miles away, and thus,
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all legal authority resided in Cumberland judicatory. Men who refused to sign the
compact were excluded from utilizing the court.38
Gradually, however, as trans-montane settlers acquired local governance through
the county form, the rudimentary governments of the early settlement phase morphed into
state institutions backed by a constitutionally-based government. Throughout the late
1780s, Tennessee settlers had organized compacts similar to the Watauga and
Cumberland agreements, establishing quasi-governing committees for community
protection and law enforcement. But, as with the case of Kentucky’s Boonesborough
Covenant, their authority receded with the arrival of official state authority. After fighting
with Great Britain ceased, North Carolina’s Assembly created Davidson County. The
Assembly later designated Nashville the county seat, integrating middle-Tennessee
settlements into the region’s established system of courts, and further diminishing the
Cumberland Compact’s authority. The operations of the new, state-backed courts
primarily focused on protecting property, keeping records, facilitating economic
development, and creating an “orderly, moral system of control”.39
The creation of new counties went a long way in bringing local government to the
growing trans-montane populace and signaled settlers’ desire for more immediate and
hopefully effective governing institutions. In response to a population influx in the late
1770s, the Virginia Assembly in 1780 laid out three new counties: Fayette, Jefferson, and
Lincoln.40 County courts recorded everything from property transfers to powers of
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attorney. They also regulated local roads, taverns, riparian rights, as well as probate
actions involving wills, guardians, and executors. In both Kentucky and Tennessee, most
legal affairs, public and private, were handled by local justices of the peace. Justices
regulated ferries, taverns, and mills. They appointed road supervisors, registered
livestock marks, and even created a basic public welfare program which provided
assistance to orphans, the mentally incapable, and the poor.41 Though they did little to
regulate morality, in most economic matters, such as constructing market houses and
roads, regulating taverns, and litigating lawsuits, local courts were largely effective.42
Inhabitants’ pleas for more responsive county governance, historian Ellen Eslinger
argues, demonstrated that settlers “desired more rather than less local government.”43
During the 1790s, amidst population growth, political animosity, market
competitiveness and rising class tensions, white men in early Tennessee and Kentucky
sought to quell the rising tide of disharmony and order their increasingly heterogeneous
societies. This desire for stronger communal ties led many to join one of the growing
number of voluntary associations, such as the Free Masons or agricultural societies.
These associations became sites in which men could make business, economic, and
political contacts with a wide range of individuals.44 The faithful bound together into
their own inclusive, sectarian communities in the early trans-Appalachian West.
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Although during the early years of settlement Anglicanism weighed heavily on Virginia’s
religious and social landscape, dissenting groups like the Baptists found fertile ground
west of the mountains.45 And, while the region’s settlers—many church-goers
included—looked to state-based governing authority for protection against the Native
threats, security of property, and regulation of the social peace, Baptists sought to
maintain their relations through the ritual practice of discipline—a legal system rooted in
covenanted communities and free for all converted individuals regardless of sex or social
status.

In June 1794, the Baptist preacher John Taylor helped organize the Bullittsburgh
Church “on the margin of the Ohio River” in what was then Campbell County (later
Boone). “This little new church in the wilderness,” Taylor reminisced, “was far from any
establishment of the kind,” and none of its original eight members, or others in the small
community, were “free from Indian danger.” The church soon joined the Elkhorn
Association of Baptists, and Taylor and his family gained membership the following
year. By that time, the church had grown to thirteen members, “all of whom,” the
preacher claimed, “I was well acquainted with.”46 Despite its short membership roll, the
little church flexed its disciplinary muscles in the fall of 1795, excluding Benjamin Bryan
in October for disorder, lying, and “keeping persons out of their property.”47 Like Taylor
and his brethren at the Bullittsburgh church, Baptists throughout the trans-Appalachian
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West claimed authority over their neighborhood’s social peace, regulating moral
transgressions and mitigating civil offenses.
His assistance in constituting the Bullittsburgh Church was not Taylor’s first or
last foray into church organization. Born in Fauquier County, Virginia in 1752, and
baptized in the early 1770s, Taylor eventually preached at the South River Baptist Church
in Virginia before removing with his family and slaves to Kentucky in 1783.48 Prior to
relocating, South River Baptists warned he “was going to a country of strangers, and
Savage rage.” But upon arrival Taylor quickly embarked on extending the Baptists’
institutional network and converting strangers to neighbors. He briefly joined a church on
Gilbert’s Creek and later gained membership at the South Elkhorn Church pastored by
Lewis Craig. In 1784 he moved to Woodford County where he helped organize the Clear
Creek Church in 1785.49 Over the next decade leading to founding of the Bullittsburgh
Church, Taylor traveled and preached throughout Kentucky, baptized scores of converts,
and delighted in any advance in the Baptists’ cause. For Taylor, membership in a Baptist
Church of Christ was one of the “greatest privileges on earth.”50
Much like residents petitioning for closer, more effective state governance, as
churches grew and members moved further from their house of worship, they sought a
more immediate church presence in their neighborhoods. The experience at the
Bullittsburgh Church demonstrates this process. Within three years from its founding, a
number of the new arrivals, many of them “Baptists of the first class,” joined the
Bullittsburgh Church and pushed the membership total up to “about sixty members.”
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Taylor praised the new members, as “many of them [were] good old peaceable
disciplinarians.” The church continued to attract converts through the 1790s, eventually
claiming “about two hundred members,” all “very compactly settled with their meeting
house in a central place.” Only a few members “were a little scattered off.” It was not
long before the twenty or so dispersed members “began to contemplate a new
constitution,” and petitioned the Bullittsburgh Church for assistance in organizing a new
church. Soon after, Taylor reported, the new church was “perhaps equal in strength” in
both “number” and “property.”51 Within both churches at Bullittsburgh, and in
meetinghouses across the region, members adhered to the governing authority of the
church majority. Rooted in the Scriptures and maintained by a rigorous discipline,
churches exerted state-like powers in claiming jurisdiction over members’ personal and
public matters.
Churches claiming authority over both the secular and spiritual was nothing new
in the Upper South, as prior to the late late-eighteenth century, the Anglican Church in
the Chesapeake had often assumed civil functions, combining with the local courthouse
to serve “as twin centers of power and authority.”52 Indeed, as Rhys Isaac notes, the
Anglican Church “was an integral part of the fabric of colonial Virginia society and its
systems of authority.” Parish boundaries often lined with those of the county, and
church leaders worked to identify disorderly behavior, assisted the government in
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providing care for the poor and orphan, and even helped settle property boundaries.53
Beginning in the mid- to late-eighteenth century the established church’s role in the
Upper South slowly changed. In the 1740s and 1750s, county courts assumed authority
over civil matters and grand juries replaced church leaders in presenting criminal charges
to the county courts. The North Carolina Assembly placed county courts in control of
orphans and their estates the following decade.54
The reformulation of religious and state authority over civil matters progressed on
two levels and did not initially affect Baptist churches in the same way. As Monica Najar
notes, legislatures instigated much of the change, but the “gradual realignment” also
“occurred on the local level as parish and county governments shifted jurisdictions.”
Disestablishment during the Revolutionary period quickened the realignment’s pace.
Poor relief and the setting of property boundaries increasingly fell under the jurisdiction
of local governments. County governments assumed “a more centralized civil authority”
and churches sphere of influence in the now republican-states narrowed to focus upon the
“religious.” But this process did not occur in the same way for evangelical sects such as
the Baptists.55 Their congregations continued to relieve the poor, especially destitute
women, through member contributions of food, cash, or at times, individual labor, and
churches persisted in mitigating civil disputes and charging members with moral
transgressions. Trans-Appalachian Baptists, like their counterparts to the east, funneled
such civil functions through two institutional structures: the local church and the regional
governing association.
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For Baptists, their congregational organization provided that the local church was
the highest earthly authority. Final resolutions resided with full members, not with a
pastor or ecclesiastical hierarchy.56 In most churches, majority consent or a unanimous
vote directed matters of doctrine, governance, and discipline. Baptist churches—
especially those of the Regular order—subscribed to a written confession of faith
outlining their doctrinal principles, rules of conduct, membership obligations, and
strictures of discipline.57 Written church covenants created and maintained the
fellowship’s purity (for, as the Baptist Silas M. Noel exclaimed in 1825, “A nuncupative
creed, is not calculated to quiet disturbances, or to exclude corruption.”).58 Converts had
to accept the covenant’s expressed terms, and many churches required these founding
documents to be read at their monthly church gatherings in order to constantly remind
members of their obligations. John Taylor recollected that prior to joining the Baptists, he
heard a local church’s covenant read aloud at a group baptism, and concluded, “that no
man on earth could comply with it.”59 But once an individual professed adherence to a
church’s covenant, the baptized—white or black, slave or free—became, as Taylor noted,
“legal” members of the fellowship.60
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The differences between membership and non-membership proved more
important to post-Revolutionary Baptists than did distinctions based on gender, race, or
class.61 Especially during the settlement era, Baptists extended membership privileges to
those groups who generally lacked legal personhood in the eyes of state law. Taylor
noted that when the Bullittsburgh Church claimed sixty members in the late 1790s, only
“about twenty [were] free male[s],” meaning at least two-thirds of the church body were
women or enslaved.62 The appellations of “brother” and “sister” extended to each
baptized convert, regardless of his or her status. This partly stemmed from Baptist
theology which heralded the equality of all souls, but frontier conditions, coupled with
the “shapelessness of slavery” in the region also infiltrated church walls, providing
women, free blacks, and slaves power in matters of church governance and discipline.63
When the Clear Creek Church called a new pastor in 1785, for instance, Lewis Craig
asked “every member of the church, male or female, bound or free, who do you choose
for your pastor[?]”64 Some churches granted preaching licenses to male slaves and free
black men, and even granted them votes in business matters appearing before the church.
Slaves charged one another with disorderly conduct, theft, and adultery. White women
charged others with drunkenness, profane swearing, and at times leveled accusations
against husbands and patriarchs for mistreatment or negligence. These individuals’
actions within the disciplinary sphere—as plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, and even
investigators—directly affected how law developed in the congregational community,
and thus helped to define the contours of church authority in maintaining the social peace
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of a church neighborhood. By the turn of the nineteenth-century, though, Baptists
churches increasingly equated full membership with the status of free white male. All
members, bond or free, male or female, however, remained subject to discipline and were
expected to follow strictures laid out in church covenants or rules of decorum. 65
These autonomous churches were connected through regional governing
associations. Compared to many of their denominational counterparts, Baptist churches
were remarkably independent. But congregations still communicated with their “sister
churches,” subscribed to (and encouraged subscription of) Baptist periodicals, and sent
messengers to annual association meetings. The “basic unit in Baptist polity for
intercongregational relationships,” associations served as information networks, sites of
socialization and, at times, they connected geographically remote congregations. The
association was not a permanent body. Churches were free to separate from associations
as they pleased. But the fluid nature of associational affiliations should not mislead us to
think that the governing body had no influence upon an individual church’s practice.
Questions over doctrine, ordinance, and discipline were routine at association meetings.66
For instance, not long after the Bullittsburgh Church joined the Elkhorn Association in
June, delegates to that body took up a query over the “devine [sic] Authority” for the
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Association’s very existence. Two years later, churches asked Elkhorn to illuminate the
scriptural basis for funeral preaching and the justification for Baptists’ retail in liquor.67
An association was expected to respect the autonomy of its member churches, yet,
as Baptist historian Albert Wardin Jr. notes, “for all practical purposes” an association
acted as an “ecclesiastical court.” Indeed, some associational bodies accepted their role
as their region’s ecclesiastical-appeals court. In 1805 the Long Run Association
determined that an excommunicated member of one of its affiliated churches possessed
the “right to Appeal to an Association” for redress if their former brethren failed to
receive their pleas. Furthermore, if the governing body deemed a church’s doctrine
unsound, its practices unbiblical, it possessed the power to remove the church from the
fellowship. This was not a small matter, as excluding one church could lead to division
not only within that particular congregation, but in the association as a whole. And in a
time of increased religious competition, when the religious landscape of the transAppalachian West burned with schism over matters of doctrine and proper church
governance (and disputes over the necessity of written church covenants), an unstable
association’s authority could be further weakened if one church’s exclusion led to a series
of congregational withdrawals. Thus, if a central responsibility of the association was to
cultivate harmonious relations between isolated congregations, its failure to do so could
potentially disrupt or alter the ritual of individual churches.68
By the mid-1780s Kentucky Baptists had already begun constructing such an
institutional presence in the West. “The religion of [the early 1780s],” state historian
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Mann Butler penned in 1834, “most necessarily [had] suffered amidst the pressing
privations surrounding the inhabitants,” for “it could not have been greatly cultivated
amidst the struggles with want, and the battles with Indians.”69 Remembering his own
time in Kentucky during the mid-1780s, John Taylor agreed, noting that “there were a
number of Baptists scattered about,” but that “every body had so much to do that religion
was scarcely talked of even on Sundays.”70 Despite these conditions, church-building
picked up momentum over the course of the decade. In June 1781, eighteen Baptists
gathered “in the wilderness under a green sugar-tree” and constituted Severn’s Valley
Church, the first in Kentucky, and according to an early church historian, the first “in the
entire West.”71 They were followed later in the year by members of the Travelling
Church who constituted a new church at Craig’s Station. Within four years, there were
eighteen Baptist churches in Kentucky. In 1790, on the eve of statehood, 3,105 Baptists
and 42 churches were present in Kentucky. Ten years later, Kentucky Baptists had
organized six associations, housing just over one hundred churches with a total
membership of 5,110. The religious fervor emanating from the 1801 Cane Ridge revivals
swelled Baptist ranks over the next three years, more than doubling the number of
churches to 219, and tripling the denomination’s membership in Kentucky to 15,495.
The number of Baptists in the state increased to 31,689 members in 1820, when the
population of Kentucky, including slaves and free blacks, was 564,135.72
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Kentucky Baptists’ counterparts in Tennessee witnessed similar developments in
the decades following their arrival in the region during the 1770s. Baptists first settled in
the northeastern region of the state, migrating from Virginia and North Carolina during
the 1760s. There may have been two churches established in eastern Tennessee in the
early 1770s, only to be broken up during the War for Independence.73 In any case, the
first Baptist churches preceded those of their Methodist and Presbyterian counterparts,
and by 1781, there were five or six Baptist churches in eastern Tennessee.74 In 1780,
Baptist settlers traveled through the Cumberland Gap and established churches in Middle
Tennessee.75 Baptists in Middle Tennessee witnessed slow growth until the early 1790s
when churches appeared “in rapid succession” during the years immediately before and
after statehood in 1796.76 Continued migration and assistance from associations to the
north and east furthered the Baptists’ cause in Tennessee. Visiting ministers, including
some from Kentucky, traveled through Middle Tennessee and successfully organized five
churches, forming the Mero Association in 1796. Five years later Mero housed eighteen
churches from both Kentucky and Tennessee.77 The Mill Creek Church, a member of the
Mero Association, emerged as “a center of Baptist strength in Middle Tennessee,”
influencing the establishment and growth of other congregations in and around
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Nashville.78 The Mero Association dissolved in 1803, and churches in Middle Tennessee
coalesced into the Cumberland Association, which by 1806, was home to thirty-nine
churches and nearly 2,000 members. By 1817 the General Missionary Convention of
Baptists claimed eight associations representing churches with a total population of
9,186, over 6,000 of which were in Middle Tennessee.79
Like the members of the Bullittsburgh Church—where a congregation of 200
“were very compactly settled with their meeting house in a central place”—many
Kentuckians and Tennesseans’ social, economic, and religious lives revolved around their
local congregation.80 Merchants, budding entrepreneurs, and farmers brokered deals on
meetinghouse lawns as their congregations assembled for Saturday business meetings. In
some areas, the church connected all the neighborhood residents. Taylor noted that in the
1790s all residents within “a circle from a center of three miles” radiating from his Clear
Creek Church were members, and that one could use the appellation “brother” with
everybody that you met.81 Detailing his church’s role in the Mt. Vernon Kentucky
community during the 1820s, Pastor James Fishback insisted the church proved so central
that “scarcly [sic] one family in the neighborhood” did not have “one or more members
of the Church in it.” And, thanks to the church, Fishback concluded, “no neighborhood
enjoyed more uninterrupted peace, kind feelings and good order & happiness, than did
the one about Mt. Vernon.”82
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A church’s centrality in the neighborhood assisted members in enforcing church
disciplinary decrees and ensured that legal actions taken at the meetinghouse were wellknown throughout the area. Many of two-hundred-plus members of the Bullittsburgh
Church, along with numerous other congregants, probably watched in September 1800 as
Lewis Conner answered a charge for trespassing into a another member’s orchard and
stealing apples. Some served on the investigative committee, and all full members would
have served as the jury which voted to maintain Conner in the fellowship. Five months
later, in February 1801, the same members acquitted John Murfey for “having an afray
[sic] with a Certain man.”83 This communal supervision of individuals’ conduct was
intrinsic to church discipline. Relying on the scriptures, most church covenants provided
for the fellowship’s discipline. When first organized in 1820, for example, members of
the First Baptist Church of Nashville agreed—along with a pledged “to keep, and
maintain, a regular Gospel Government—to “give ourselves to each other, in the Lord, to
watch over, and perform each relative duty.”84
As purveyors of good order, Baptists and others throughout the trans-Appalachian
region envisioned churches as law-producing sites and the practice of discipline as a
viable legal system. Baptists certainly perceived a difference between state-based law
and church practices, but the latter’s operations emerged from the immediate social
relations of the congregational community, and thus, could be a more responsive, familiar
legal venue. Individuals’ conceptions of their churches’ law making powers can be seen,
especially, in how they discussed disciplinary procedures. In June 1808, the preacher
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Carter Tarrant explained to the Mount Gilead Baptist Church that witnesses on his behalf
would not appear “without [being] legally call’d for by the Church.”85 Looking back at
his time with the Buck Run Church in the early 1820s, John Taylor insisted the members
were in peace as “but one legal complaint” had come before the church, and that “against
a poor negro.”86 As late as 1866, in discussing a dispute between two members of his Mt.
Olivet Church, the clerk noted that the complaining brother had prepared “the case
legally for the church.”87 Others routinely referred to discipline as “ecclesiastical law” or
“Baptist jurisprudence.”88
The system of Baptist jurisprudence that observers often referred to stemmed
from Baptists’ duty of keeping “watchcare” over their fellow church members. The ritual
practice of discipline derived its authority from the New Testament, especially the Gospel
of Matthew and Paul’s letter to the Corinthians. Baptists did not regard all transgressions
as equal, and prescribed different procedures and ramifications according to the
seriousness of the offence. In 1844 the Reverend Eleazer Savage broke down his various
categories of offences. He admitted, however, that these categories were not absolute, as
some offences overlapped the prescribed groupings. Minor offences constituted those
which were inherent in some members’ disposition—such as levity, irritability, an
inclination to speak, act imprudently, or shirk responsibility, etc.—and, he insisted, the
church should bear the burden of these, their weakest members, rather than gratify
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themselves through their exclusion. If one witnessed another member’s transgression, he
was to follow the gospel steps as laid down in Matthew 18:15-17, speaking with the
offender in private and only bringing the matter to church if reconciliation could not be
forged. Baptists sought to deal with such conflict privately because, as Alexander
Campbell noted in 1828, the “practice of telling all private scandals, trespasses, and
offenses, to the whole congregation” was “replete with mischief” and could potentially
alienate members.89 For personal infractions, too, those “when one brother injures
another in his person, reputation, or property,” and sufficient evidence existed, churches
encouraged members to labor in private for reconciliation before coming to the church
for recourse. Public violations were treated slightly different. They were transgressions
that “equally injure[d] all the members of the church,” and included breach of peace,
covetousness, heresy, drunkenness, railing, and profane swearing. The church
membership as a whole worked with such offenders for satisfaction, resorting to
exclusion if that effort failed.
No matter the type of offense, church discipline sought to uphold harmonious
member-relations through the threat of excommunication. Churches tribunals did not
have the authority to corporally punish their offending brethren, but their decrees carried
social weight.90 Especially on the mobile, fluid frontier of trans-Appalachia, church
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discipline provided an impetus for an individual to practice restraint while far removed
from traditional institutions of discouragement, such as the family or local government. 91
Social ramifications arising from a tribunal’s decision, one historian recently asserted,
“carried enough moral suasion to change actions and attitudes.”92
Even well after Kentucky and Tennessee achieved statehood and a more stable,
less mobile society, exclusion from church fellowship could affect one’s standing in the
wider community. Revered Savage reminded Baptists of their duty for the strict
“avoidance of free and familiar” intercourse with excommunicated individuals. After
one’s exclusion, Savage penned, “he should be made to feel the amazing weight of the
solemn sentence, by a corresponding conduct, on the part of every member of the
church,” even “every member of every church.”93 News of disciplinary activities often
spread through church neighborhoods and could affect one’s business transactions and
personal reputation beyond the confines of the church fellowship. Hemp-dealer William
Collins, after being excluded from the Elizabeth Baptist Church in Bourbon County,
Kentucky, found that news of his contract dispute and excommunication had dispersed
into surrounding counties, well before he took the matter to the local courts.94
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Although Collins eventually sought recourse with the Bourbon County Circuit
Court, churches sought to contain member-disputes within the fellowship. In a way this
served to protect a church’s reputation within the surrounding area. Some congregations,
such as Tennessee’s Red River Baptist Church, insisted that no member should “divulge
the infirmation [sic] of one another or till [sic] them to such as are not of our communion
by any means, when it can be lawfully avoided.”95 Demanding members refrain from
“going to law”—suing one’s brother before infidels—was another means to maintain
harmonious member-relations and avoid potential “cross swearing among the members of
the church” at court.96 Members suing each other at local and state courts not only aired
members’ dirty laundry in a public setting, but litigation held the potential to exacerbate
the conflict, even provoke schism.97
Churches leveled charges against disputing members who sought out state
authority without their sanction.98 In July 1825, for example, Brother John Sturgeon of
the Flat Rock Baptist Church in Shelby County, Kentucky asked, “will the church
approbate a Bro. to go to law with [another] Bro. in any case or not[?]” When the church
answered that it did not, that it in fact disapproved of the practice, Sturgeon entered a
charge against himself for “going to law with Bro. Isaac Keller.” Sturgeon insisted that
he filed suit against Keller “in a friendly way,” and made proper acknowledgements to
the satisfaction of the church body. Sturgeon was not alone in his courthouse-actions,
however, as the church then formed a committee made up of “six Brethren” to investigate
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“Sister Deborah Bohannon in defending a law suit against Bro. James Bartlett.” In
August, the committee reported that Sister Bohannon had indeed “erred in agreeing to a
friendly suit” that had been “brought against her.” Yet, like Sturgeon, her
acknowledgements satisfied the church body. The church ruled that Bartlett, too, had
“erred in going to law” with Sister Bohannon. Unfortunately, the clerk of the Flat Rock
church never recorded Bartlett’s fate in this particular case.99
Baptists’ insistence of keeping “watchcare” over one another opened the door for
churches to regulate nearly all aspects of their members’ lives, though one’s race, sex,
and secular legal status may have made them likely to face certain charges. Men were
overwhelmingly the targets of disciplinary procedures, garnering 73% of all charges.
Intoxication charges—making up 14% of all offences—were directed almost exclusively
at male members (94%). Other prominent charges, such as fighting or rioting, totaling
7% of all charges, were also primarily male-focused (81%). These numbers are rather
unsurprising, as white-male recreation in the slave states often revolved around drinking
and defending one’s honor through physical combat.100 Churches recognized this reality,
and often retained men who fought only when provoked. For example, when the Pleasant
Grove Baptist Church charged Richard Nash with fighting, they restored him to
fellowship after Nash insisted he only fought because he had been “compelled to resist
and defend himself.”101 For other transgressions as well, charges against men
predominated. As married women generally could not agree to contract or represent
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themselves in court, it makes sense that 96% of breach of covenant cases and 84% of
“going to law” with another Baptist charges went against males.
In other matters, however, women made up a great percentage of the accused.
Twenty-four percent of falsehood, slander, and lying charges went against women.
Likewise, 40% of dancing/fiddling charges were leveled against female members. One
striking aspect of charges against women is that 65% of cases dealing with a member’s
interaction with another religious sect or denomination involved female defendants.
This may be due to women’s willingness to assert their religious autonomy in a
competitive religious marketplace, or a sign that churches more rigorously policed
women’s religious activities. In any case, being charged with straying from the
fellowship was a virtual guaranteed exclusion from the church, as 93% of those facing
such an accusation were excommunicated. As historian Susan Juster demonstrated in her
study of Separate Baptists in New England, by the post-Revolutionary period churches
increasingly saw women as disorderly, disproportionately charging them for crimes of
sexual nature and for holding the church in contempt.102 But not quite same dynamic
appears to have played out in trans-Appalachian churches during the early-nineteenth
century, as the bulk of disorderly conduct charges went against men, as did those of
slander (76%) and profane swearing (85%). This may have been due to the presence of
slaves within many western and southern churches. As we will see in the next chapter,
sexually-related transgressions, such as fornication and adultery, were primarily directed
toward women, especially black women.
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Top Five Charges

Male (% within charge)

Drunkenness
Disorderly Conduct
Meeting Non-Attendance
Fighting or Rioting
Interaction w/ other sect

326 (94%)
223 (71%)
245 (78%)
148 (81%)
47 (35%)

Female (% within
charge)
21 (6%)
91 (29%)
67 (22%)
24 (19%)
89 (65%)

Total Charges (% of
total)
347 (14%)
315 (13%)*
313 (13%)*
173 (7%)*
136 (6%)

Figure 1.103 *One unknown sex
More than simply a dispute resolution mechanism, however, church discipline
helped create and maintain the church community, delineating the boundaries and
privileges of membership. Even when churches were not vigorously meting out
discipline or resolving disputes, members actively constructed the contours of their intracongregational system of law, and thus the sphere of church authority. Between 1807 and
1810, the Fox Run Church in Shelby County recorded only four cases, three for
drunkenness and one for “gaming.” Despite this apparent lack of disputation or moral
regulation, concerns about the ritual of discipline remained prominent. In June 1807
members voted that church business should “be transacted in a private manner; that is,
that no persons not of our community should be present.” This resolution was followed
by a query on whether it was the duty of the church “to declare to the World” the
exclusion of “Members for disorderly conduct.” In July the church voted that they had
no such duty, that disciplinary procedures should remain internal matters. A year later,
in March 1808, the church agreed that “in the future all matters of private grief” between
members should be “transacted in a private manner when brought before the church,”
while all other difficulties were to be transacted publicly. Two months later, Fox Run
took up a proposition on the extent of women’s authority in matters of church
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governance, and voted in favor of the proposal, exclaiming that “in the future [female
members] have a vote in all things that may come before the Church.” In July, however,
the church opened the floor for more debate on this resolution, finally deciding in August
1808, “after maturely considering” the matter, that women did not have a “ruling voice in
the church.” And finally, in October 1809, a member queried as to whether the scriptures
provided any mode for bringing complaints to the church other than the “18th Chap of
Matthew.” The church laid over the query until July 1810, when it agreed that members
could bring complaints directly to the church rather than striving to first settle the dispute
in private.104
These resolutions dealing with the procedure of church discipline—alternate
modes for bringing complaints, to what audience would matters be aired, the duties of the
church, and who possessed the power to vote—signals a church body grappling with the
contours of the disciplinary system itself. Many Baptists, especially white male
members, may have still been uneasy about their social status amidst the changing
religious and secular landscape of early Kentucky. Allowing non-members, those who
had not experienced a re-birth through Christ, to watch as churches disciplined their own
for various moral shortcomings surely gave many members pause, as they knew that
gossip networks extended well beyond the confines of the church community and that
accusations at the meetinghouse could affect their business or other social transactions.
Moreover, the fact that church bodies subjected white patriarchs to the same disciplinary
actions as free blacks, slaves, and women, directly challenged their civic identities as
sovereign, independent heads-of-households.
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Their central neighborhood location, not only ensured that gossip networks
carried news of their proceedings through the community, but meant that at times nonmembers took active roles in cases appearing before church tribunals. Some outsiders
even initiated suit at the meetinghouse. In September 1808, for instance, the Red River
Church of Robertson County, Tennessee heard a complaint from a non-member, William
Stratton who “desired [ that the Red River] church to take it into consideration & try to
settle the matter of dispute between” himself and Brother Nicholas Darnall.”105 The
young lawyer and future Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky, Robert McAfee, reported in
1803 that he had visited “the Holeman’s [B]aptist Meeting House, to settle a dispute
between two men.” Although he further reported that “nothing was done,” his brief
mention of his intended role in the dispute does complicate our understanding of church
autonomy, or rather, the role of outsiders in mitigating differences between church
members. McAfee, a lawyer, saw nothing unusual in dispute resolution within the
church, as he mentioned the church matter as casually as he did cases he was pleading in
the local court. Other non-members testified in matters heard by local church bodies. In
the mid-1840s, four individuals, “not members of any church” testified on behalf of the
Reverend Gilbert Mason who had been charged with embezzlement by the Mayslick
Church.106
Although Baptist churches were autonomous units, claiming jurisdiction over
their own members, they relied upon a network of “sister” churches which provided
information and often assisted in difficult disputes. Churches back east required members
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alert the church body of their intention to move, gain letters of dismission, and settle any
standing grievances or debts. Trans-Appalachian churches examined these dismissal
letters meticulously. If much time had passed since an individual’s former church had
vouched for their conduct, or if a new arrival claimed to be a Baptist but had no letter,
their new church inquired into their recent doings. In January 1833, for instance, the
clerk for Nashville’ First Baptist Church was ordered “to write the church on Mill
Swamp, Isle of Wight County, Virginia, concerning Anthony, a servant formerly a
member of said church.”107 Some churches placed expiration dates on their dismission
letters and reminded departing brethren that the letter could be revoked if they did not
speedily join another church. The Franklin Association related to its affiliated churches in
1827 that dismission letters should “be considered as credentials for one year only.” If
more than a year lapsed, and the dismissed had not joined “some sister Church in the
vicinity of their residence, they be considered as having violated covenant obligations,
and become liable to censure.”108
Others served as information networks that worked to spread the godly discipline
across the mobile region. In June 1804, for example, the David’s Fork Church sent a
letter to the Indiana Creek Church with reports on the conduct of the latter’s Sister R.
Jones, “in order that it may be settled among themselves.”109 Even when a member
traveled far from the bounds of the church, he or she carried the reputation of the
congregation with them and were still answerable to the church body for transgressions.
The Flat Rock Baptist Church of northern Kentucky excluded John Hansbrough in 1814

107

First Baptist of Nashville Records, January 27, 1833, SBLA.
Records of the Franklin Association of Baptists, 1827, p. 6, SBTL.
109
Records of the David’s Fork Baptist Church, June 1804.
108

58
after a church in Knox County, Indiana Territory “informed by Christian proof” members
at Flat Rock that he “had been guilty of profane secularizing and other profane
conduct.”110 This vast network of Baptists, rooted in local communities but extending
across county boundaries, state lines, and mountain ranges, helped serve as an important
mechanism for ordering the mobile society.
Of course, Baptists did not shun the secular legal system. Indeed, they could not
if they wanted to secure title to their land or file a will. And from the beginning of
Kentucky settlement, Baptists played integral roles in civil governance.111 In 1785, for
instance, James Garrard, a Baptist who settled in the western country two years previous,
returned to Virginia as the new representative to the state Assembly from Fayette County.
Garrard later became a justice of the peace Bourbon County, as did at least five other
Baptists who had migrated with him to Kentucky.112 Likewise, Leonard Young, a
member of the Bryan’s Station Church, was also Fayette County’s Justice of the Peace,
and thus was intimately involved in producing law in both legal venues. In 1803 he
entered rape charges against Richard Tomlinson at the November church meeting,
charges he had been informed of by the victim in his role as county magistrate.113
Moreover, as will be discussed in greater length in Chapter Three, some churches
sanctioned members to seek recourse at local courts.
But for much of the first decades after settlement, there remained no truce
between an evangelical religious culture rooted in communitarian ethos and a burgeoning
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liberal legal regime. As historian Stephen Aron notes of Kentucky after the turn of the
century, “lawyers jeered evangelicals” and “evangelicals scorned lawyers.” Church
discipline itself, was a way for churches to “maintain order” without the assistance of
lawyers, as the accused acted as the arbitrator and the members as jurors. Indeed, church
discipline served as an important venue for dispute resolution because courts were
“clogged by land litigation” and seemingly governed by greed. Church tribunals, “swift,
simple, and seemingly democratic,” Aron notes, were “everything disheartened
Kentuckians wished their legal system to be.”114 By the end of the antebellum period,
many trans-Appalachian church-goers claimed just the opposite, elevating the workings
of state-based courts while claiming that faction and prejudice governed their churches’
legal operations.
It is also impossible to completely disentangle the legal system of the church and
that of the state. Early state constitutions, including those of Tennessee and Kentucky,
said little of religion or God, yet neither did they articulate notions of free thought or
religious equality. Instead, they incorporated provisions which favored Protestant
Christianity over other faiths, and required religious oaths for office and court testimony.
Furthermore, although clergy were generally barred from holding office, most state
constitutions noted the importance of organized religion for society’s morality and virtue,
and all states retained or enacted laws protecting the Sabbath from desecration, as well as
other moral regulations pertaining to bastardy, fornication, profane swearing and
blasphemy.115 Tennessee politicians secured Christianity’s place in their state, insisting
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that “no person who denies the being of God or a future State of rewards and
punishments” could hold any civil office.116 Tennessee did not successfully regulate
alcohol consumption through the legislative arena, but the religiously-inclined did pass
measures for regulating Sabbath observance, gambling, and dueling during the first
decades of the nineteenth century. Churchgoers, particularly female members, often led
the charge in passing such moral regulations.117 In Kentucky, Baptists and other
evangelicals utilized state courts as forums through which they critiqued the larger
culture. Historian Christopher Waldrep has shown that during periods of revival,
evangelicals tried to extend their influence over grand juries, only resorting to church
tribunals when they felt their power waning alongside declining revivalist fervor.118
But, in the end, Baptists dispensed discipline and produced law in their
communities in the shadow of state authority. State-chartered acts of incorporation
empowered churches in constructing and maintaining their communities. Any number of
individuals could voluntarily congregate for a common purpose, but incorporation
imbued these associations with the authority to create their own laws and to hold
members accountable to their strictures.119 Kentucky’s general incorporation statute only
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extended that legal privilege to Christian denominations. In an 1842 decree, too, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals legitimated churches’ disciplinary actions by deferring to
ecclesiastical authorities in cases which involved individuals’ membership status.120
Likewise, the Tennessee legislature passed a law in 1801 to protect churches’ worship
services, exclaiming that "any person [who] shall interrupt a congregation assembled for
the purpose of worshiping the Deity, such person shall be dealt with as a rioter at
common law." Fourteen years later, in 1815, the legislature, noting that some citizens
were "wickedly and fatally bent to disturb” those committed to worshiping the Deity,
claimed the 1801 law was ineffective. Its strengthened reincarnation prohibited
interrupting worship or violating "any rule or regulation, which may have been adopted
by [the churches] for their own government, and good order." In 1824, legislators banned
trading in "ardent spirits" within one mile "of any place of public worship, and forbade
"offering to sell, within view of any worshiping assembly on the Sabbath day any article
of traffic whatsoever, in such a manner as to disturb such worshiping assembly."121 In a
similar vein, the Kentucky General Assembly authorized grand jury indictments “for any
trespass, damage or injury done to any church, meeting house, or encampment, erected
for religious worship.”122
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During the early days of settlement, bringing one’s dispute to the local church was
not abnormal. Law existed “everywhere and nowhere,” as courthouses were not always
available. Although local governments increasingly assumed greater responsibility for
regulating the public order after statehood in the 1790s, “there was no single location for
law.”123 Circuit courts met in any building that could accommodate the proceedings,
locations that otherwise served a variety of purposes. This process continued throughout
the trans-Appalachian West’s developmental stages, as the legislature carved new
counties out of older ones, and new institutional seats of judicial power were imagined,
designed, and built.124 Churches, too, often lacked official meeting places.
Congregations assembled in members’ homes, in shared community (“republican”)
meetinghouses, or, on occasion, at the local courthouse. Nonetheless, churches served
such important roles in community life that as towns grew and individuals dispersed from
neighborhood centers, they—as in the case of the Bullittsburgh Church—demanded their
church institutions followed suit.
Even after the north-central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee emerged as a more
economically and socially complex societies during the second decade of the nineteenth
century, churches continued as central legal sites.125 It was not unusual, then, for Baptists
to invoke their churches’ authority when settling domestic or property-related disputes.
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In 1809 Brother Boyce asked his fellow Baptists at Bryan’s Station “If a member of the
Baptist order have a claim on two persons jointly bound by a written contract,” and one
of them was a Baptist and the other was “under no church government,” but both
“refuse[d] to comply with their contract, to what tribunal” should the aggrieved party
seek recourse?” Boyce’s query at once illuminated his expansive vision of law and a
growing uncertainty over his church’s legal authority amidst a changing legal, economic,
and religious atmosphere.126
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CHAPTER 2. CHURCHES, THE STATE AND THE “PERPLEXING DIFFICULTIES
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

“Oh that the church could be freed from such perplexing difficulties…”1

In 1813, members of the Big Cedar Lick Church in Wilson County, Tennessee
heard thirteen separate charges against their fellow brethren. Peppered between such
transgressions as profane swearing, drunkenness, and disorderly conduct, the church took
up matters related to the most intimate matters of the household. A query in January
asked whether it was “agreeable to the gospel for a female member who is the wife of a
male member of the Church to become a witness for her husband.” The church answered
in the affirmative, that a husband could call his wife for testimony “in any case that he
may think will be in his favor.”2 Five months later Sister Chandler charged Brother
Small with telling “an untruth” for claiming she had encouraged her children to abuse
Small’s children and destroy his property. In October, the church excluded a slave
member, Brother Reuben, for “lying and disobedience to his master.” Soon thereafter, on
testimony from two members, the church excluded Charles Shoemaker for being “guilty
of the acct [sic] of Buggary [sic].” Big Cedar Lick members concluded their year with an
Inter-church dispute between a member of the Cedar Grove Church, David Allen, and
1
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one of their own, Elder Moore Stephenson. Allen had accused Stephenson of
drunkenness, and Stephenson’s son, John, with turning “his mother out of doors” and
whipping his sister. A committee visited the Stephenson women, and each insisted that
Allen’s allegations were “false and without foundation.” Two other women and three
men testified about the accusations of Stephenson’s intemperance. The church eventually
voted in early 1814 to charge Allen with slander, appointing a committee to visit the
Cedar Grove church and support their “charges by Gospel Evidence.”3 These instances
demonstrate how Baptist churches in the early-republican Trans-Appalachian region
extended their authoritative reach into member homes and served as forum through which
domestic relations were contested and defined.
Churches, while not shying away from crossing the threshold into the patriarchal
jurisdiction of the household, saw their role in domestic regulation change over the lateeighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries as new cultural and legal understandings of the
family percolated through American society. Indeed, husband-wife, parent-child, and
master-slave relationships were all fair game in early church proceedings. Members’
disciplining of husbands and masters, unruly wives, disobedient slaves, and philandering
spouses elevated churches as prominent sites for family regulation. In some domestic
relations cases that reached the courtroom, too, judges looked to actions taken by
churches and the larger community, relying on observers’ statements and church rulings
to uncover the character of the disputing parties. By the mid-nineteenth century, transAppalachian churches devoted less time to mitigating domestic relations cases, especially
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divorce, and adultery, even though divorce cases appeared to be on the rise in local
courtrooms. This resulted partially from new Victorian notions centered upon household
privacy, but also from the gradual reworking of domestic relations law as state lawmakers
forged direct connections with dependents. Increasingly, scriptural views on the
perpetual nature of marriage came into conflict with divorce legislation, legislation which
loosened the compact’s contractual obligations by providing wider legal routes through
which to pursue a separation or absolute divorce, and thus, legislation which chipped
away at husbands’ and fathers’ broad power within their households.
The prevailing scholarship fails to fully consider the often complementary roles
played by both legal and religious venues in governing the household.4 Historians of
early-American religion have documented the role of evangelical churches in nurturing
stable households, especially in the developing communities of the frontier.5 Scholars
have not sufficiently examined how churches interacted with members’ household
relations alongside the transformation of state-based domestic relations law in the postRevolutionary period and beyond. For instance, historian Monica Najar recently claimed
that through committee investigations of household matters and the punishment of
patriarchs for transgressions against their dependents, “church discipline embedded
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religious authority and, more specifically, the church structure in the architecture of the
evangelical family.”6 She insists that this served as a “countercurrent” to wider legal and
cultural reformulations of the household, reformulations which granted male heads of
household broad power over domestic affairs.7
Najar and others, however, do not fully account for local law’s authority over the
household which at times quelled the household-head’s actions. Enmeshed in
neighborhood- and kin-networks, the family unit was often viewed as a microcosm of
American society in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, and state
governments undoubtedly possessed an interest in promoting stable households. The
white-male household head’s responsibility was to ensure that domestic order did not
lapse. In him state law vested broad authority over dependents—women, children,
slaves, and wards. But his rule was never absolute, and the family’s discipline was
entwined in web of social relations spun through local and family relations, church
affiliation, and business networks. All these local factors held the potential to thwart or
6
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uphold a patriarch’s power within his household. Churches, in seeking to regulate
members’ family life, were simply one site among others that circumscribed householdheads’ power within the domestic sphere.8
Churches went much farther than local and state courts in challenging the will of
the household head over his domestic affairs and in regulating members’ daily activities,
yet during the first-half of the nineteenth century, state governing authority was making
inroads to the American household. Local courts would probably not take up charges
against a household head for “permitting his house to be used for theatrical
performances” as the Cane Run Baptist Church did in 1833.9 But courts would, if a
spouse entered a divorce or alimony petition in chancery, investigate allegations of a
household head’s drunkenness and family abuse, just as the Red River Baptist Church did
in 1814, when such accusations were entered against Brother Nathaniel Bostick.10 Local
courts, though far from the unabashed ally of household dependents, could and did
punish abusive or negligent fathers and husbands.11 Furthermore, over the course of the
antebellum period, state courts and legislatures across the republic reached deeper into
the domestic realm. They constructed direct legal relationships with household
dependents, and in the process gradually undercut patriarchal authority. These actions
8
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did not completely overturn the common law marriage doctrine of coverture, and
certainly did not elevate women or dependents to equitable status within the home—
indeed, in many cases the state’s goal was to buttress legal prescriptions by punishing
those who neglected their responsibilities as patriarchs—but during the early nineteenth
century, state law assumed control over domestic relations in unprecedented ways.12
To posit Baptist practices as “countercurrent” to state legal practice, as Najar
does, not only ignores developments in domestic relations law, but misconstrues how
local law—both church- and state-based—operated in society.13 In some practices,
churches diverged from state legal practices, most prominently in their institutional
recognition of slave marriages.14 By acknowledging slave marriages, churches departed
from practices of the secular legal system, yes, but fell in line with the wider culture’s
acknowledgement of informal marriage and, in particular, the validity of slave marriages
12
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through public ceremonies.15 Moreover, law, whether practiced at the local courthouse or
church meetinghouse, emerged from the community’s social relations. Churches
investigated the private lives of their members only when transgressions came to light,
and especially so when reports thereof circulated through the surrounding neighborhood
and possessed the potential to damage a congregation’s reputation. Local courts, too, only
examined the particulars of a household’s familial dynamics when one of its members
petitioned for an absolute divorce, a legal separation, alimony, or when rumors of
extreme abuse reached the ears of a local justice of the peace, constable, or court official.
Examining how both religious and state venues operated in defining the marriage
compact and in litigating cases of adultery and divorce, this chapter uncovers a more
complete and nuanced portrait of the legalities of domestic relations of the postRevolutionary West. It also illuminates a subtle shift from religious to civil authority in
regulating the household by the outbreak of the Civil War. Early-nineteenth century
legislative enactments revolving around marriage, divorce, and alimony, for instance,
demonstrated that the marital contract, the core relationship of the household, “[f]ar from
being an institution fixed by God,” was “in the hands” of state legislatures.16

A member of the Clear Creek Baptist Church in Kentucky, “Old Brother
Castleman,” and his family gave preacher John Taylor great joy. By the early 1820s,
15
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Castleman and his wife had been married “perhaps fifty years.” The two had been
baptized together not long after their matrimony, and “raised children, a number of them”
professing Baptists. Their grandchildren, too, were attached to Baptist churches “in
different parts of [the] Commonwealth.” Indeed, Taylor reported, “[t]he family at home,
is a pretty respectable church among themselves.” But the family at home included more
than simply Castleman’s children and grandchildren. The family owned “many black
people” and “a number of them” had also been baptized. In January 1823, two of
Castleman’s young slaves, one “about ten years old, the other about eight,” were received
by experience into the Clear Creek Church. Despite their age, “what they related to the
church could not be objected too,” and the boys followed in the path of their fourteenyear-old sister who had obtained membership in the church the previous month. Two
other slaves belonging to Castleman were even licensed preachers. Castleman had also
“long kept a great Tannery,” where he trained “numerous” apprentices, many of whom
had become “professors of religion.” This extended household, Taylor concluded, “has
been a great nursery to the Baptist church for near a half of century.”17
When the recently-married Brother and Sister Castleman were baptized in the
early 1770s, many of their kin and neighbors may have lamented the couple’s new found
religious affiliation. Unlike Taylor writing in the 1820s, during the colonial and
immediate post-Revolutionary period, many southerners viewed evangelical culture as a
threat to the family institution, not a nursery of piety and good order. For detractors,
evangelical sects too closely resembled marginal religious groups such as the Quakers
and Shakers. They seemed to lure individuals away from family connections, and
17
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extended power within churches to women and blacks. This, along with their questioning
of slavery, their cultivation of the spiritual family based upon church membership (the
equality of all souls which ignored gender, racial, and social status), and intrusive
disciplinary methods, convinced outsiders that evangelicals were a threat to the entire
social order.18
By the turn of the nineteenth century, however, evangelicals were not as marginal
to southern society as they appeared a generation earlier. Most Upper-South Baptists had
shed their more iconoclast leanings in regards to slaveholding and gender relations by the
1810s, increasingly granting full membership rights only to white men, while restricting
the power of women and blacks in directing church matters.19 Disciplinary practices
continued, but, rather than promoting doctrine and practice that seemed to subvert the
orderly household, evangelicals largely fell in line with mainstream culture, heralding
patriarchal authority within the home.20 The relation between the orderly church and
stable families was cemented by the character traits necessary of a preacher. Specifically,
a preacher must “ruleth well his own house, having children in subjection; (for if a man
know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God?).”21
The contractual church, the foundation of the godly society, was contingent upon wellordered households.
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Evangelicals’ gradual move toward the center of southern society during the postRevolutionary period coincided with a legal and cultural re-ordering of American
domestic relations. Not long after Separate Baptists began widespread proselytizing in the
Upper South during the 1750s and 1760s, first stoking apprehension in the Anglican
establishment, American colonists up and down the Atlantic seaboard were questioning
their relationship with the mother country, a process that necessitated a reformulation of
household governance as well. Eventually their questioning of political authority led to
outright rebellion, as colonial militia squared off against British regulars in the spring of
1775 and colonies declared independence the following summer. Influenced by John
Locke and other theorists who argued that men voluntarily consented to government,
colonial leaders justified their political split through familial analogies, especially that of
parent-child.22 For many American Revolutionaries, Great Britain, “the haughty Parent
Country” had provoked the colonies, and as one observer remarked, “when the nurturing
season is past, the young of all kinds are left to act for themselves.”23
This questioning of political authority, alongside increasingly shrill calls for
individual liberty, engendered the need to legitimize a husband’s authority within a
household.24 Thus, Locke’s ideas on political consent were remolded to serve the
household.25 The white-male patriarch, though invested by the state with broad authority
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over his dependents, was expected to provide and protect those under his care. Women
voluntarily consented to the governance of her husband upon marriage—her legal
identity, through the common law doctrine of coverture, merged with her husband’s—
and, just as white men voted for leaders in the political sphere and expected protection
through state laws, women, upon entering the marriage contract, could assume sanctuary
under their husbands’ rule. Children, slaves, and other dependents had a duty to obey the
household head as well, only displaying disobedience if the father, master, or guardian
proved abusive or negligent in his responsibilities.26
Initially, this contractually-based, “republican family” did not make as great of
inroads into slaveholding states as it did in the North. Republican ideology infiltrated
nearly every aspect of life during the post-Revolutionary period. Its aversion to
illegitimate authority and government encroachment, its elevation of property ownership,
self-governance, individual virtue, and a social-relations-by-contract vision for society,
cemented the republican polity with the republican household. Republicanism served as a
continuing “frame of reference” for northern domestic relations law as the competitive,
atomizing effects of market capitalism infiltrated the northern household. This
transformed household relations as dependents carved out their own identities and
immediate relationship with the state. Although, as historian Michael Grossberg insists,
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“[m]ale authority remained supreme throughout the nineteenth century,” law slowly and
subtly re-worked power within Northern households.27
In the South, slavery—and the centrality of the master-slave relationship in
buttressing the region’s social order—proved a deterrent, though not complete obstacle,
to the transforming effects of market capitalism and the contractual ethos of the liberal
political- and economic-order. Prior to the Civil War, relations of hierarchy and
dependence—not egalitarianism and consent—largely governed Southern households.28
The state connected to dependents through the household-head. Slaves, women, and
children, observers believed, had no other government than that of the family. By
subordinating white women and slaves through this patriarchal ideology, white men in
the South constructed a political realm in which they functioned as equals. “The
discipline of the family,” one antebellum observer noted, “is that which renders the work
of the government easy. When that discipline is perfect, the reign of order and of virtue
in the state is established,” and when domestic governance lapsed, it threatened the
stability of the entire social order.29 Unsurprisingly, southern state-lawmakers sought to
bolster white-male authority, only intervening into the domestic sphere when the
household head abused his powers or failed to adequately provide for his dependents, a
transgression which undermined the whole system of patriarchal domestic relations.30
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Patriarchy in law and practice was not firmly entrenched during the first decades
of trans-Appalachian settlement. Most settlers inherited legal traditions from the
Carolinas and Virginia, but the frontier experience tested the cultural- and legalpatriarchal order. Marriage in much of the settled colonies was viewed as a contractual
relationship between man and woman, with the husband serving as household head,
responsible for and sovereign over, his wife, children, servants, and slaves.31 In the
newly-settled western regions, however, the reality of frontier conditions led to more
tenuous kinship networks and a less solidified patriarchal order. The continued threat of
Native attack spawned fluid gender identities and provided white women—as well as
free- and enslaved blacks—greater opportunities than was customarily available in the
more stable coastal societies. Prior to statehood, Kentucky’s legal system remained weak
and enforcement of and engagement with Virginia law was lax. “It was not uncommon
1780s,” historian Craig Thompson Friend writes, “to see a woman filing a warrant at the
land office or attending court as an administrator of her husband’s estate.”32
Such autonomy for women and other dependents increasingly retracted with the
arrival of the gentry class in the region during the 1790s.33 Although increased
immigration brought gentry values regarding the proper place of women (specifically as
an emotional partner of her husband), many whites welcomed some cultural
prescriptions, and rejected others. Frontier Tennessee women generally accepted the
morality of legal marriage, historian Cynthia Cumfer notes, yet “persisted in viewing
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their domestic role as more akin to that of a vocal participant than a submissive
helpmate.” Furthermore, many white women in Tennessee continued to go against legal
norms by asserting their property rights after marriage.34 By the 1810s, a more solidified
patriarchal order had hardened in the region, and with the War of 1812, Kentucky had
emerged as an Old South state, Craig Thompson Friend argues, “fully controlled by and
rooted in the honor-driven culture of white southern manhood” which benefitted “white
men by negating opportunities for blacks, Indians, and white women.”35 At the same
time, white men in Tennessee crafted a government that limited the meanings of
citizenship for blacks and women.36
Even after the region’s culture of patriarchal-hierarchy hardened during the first
decades of the nineteenth-century, the household-head’s rule was not an absolute
monarchy in which he dispensed justice with little outside supervision or repercussion.
Local courts were generally not dependents’ first stop when seeking protection from an
abusive patriarch. Although treatise writers and advice columnists in the turn-of-thecentury trans-Appalachian West stressed the household as an autonomous unit, women
especially, sought to posit their homes within a larger community, constructing “bonds of
sociability, forged in communal networks, gossip, and churches.”37 In close-knit frontier
communities of the trans-montane region, men and women constructed a world in which
one’s personal character was extremely important in maintaining economic and social
relations, and, as historian Cynthia Cumfer notes, relied on gossip networks to “enforce
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norms about sexuality and honesty.”38 When disputes arose within the household,
husband and wife could seek outside assistance from churches, friends, neighbors, and
kin before pursuing the authority of the secular legal system. In the more formal legal
settings of local courtrooms, too, gossip networks proved important in establishing a
witnesses’ credibility or the disputing parties’ personal character.39 Neighborhood
churches were central sites in a community’s gossip network, and these churches, much
like local courts, sought to enshrine their own conceptions of domestic relations within
members’ households.

Baptists posited a clear linkage between the household, church, and social order.
Their initial understanding of family was not the traditional unit formed by bloodlines
and marriage, but rather a more encompassing view which stressed acceptance of
Protestant values, and one in which slaves, free blacks, and white women were included
as spiritual equals. Similar to Locke’s contractual theory stipulating that individuals
voluntarily submitted to the state, giving up some rights in order for protection, Baptists
willingly entered religious society, relinquishing some “worldly” affairs in exchange for
spiritual shelter. Baptists valued church membership—a commitment to the church’s
communal goals—over “earthly” distinctions based on race, class, or gender.40 Thus,
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kinship did not need to determine familial connections. The use of “brother” and “sister”
when addressing fellow church members signified the ability to construct family bonds
without bloodlines, and by extending these appellations to subordinate groups, Baptists
and other evangelical groups endeavored “to extend orderly moral community into both
farmhouses and slave quarters.”41 Indeed, the familial relations of all members, black
and white, slave and free, fell under the jurisdiction of the local church. No matter their
race or gender, all Baptists were “children of the same Father,” just as Jesus Christ “was
the head of his family, and his apostles [members of] his household.”42
Each contracting member—each individual who professed conversion and
accepted the church’s covenant—was bound to inherent obligations. Joining a Baptist
church entailed individuals’ submission to church authority over all matters, including
those of the household. Churches sought to regulate anything that threatened domestic
peace—which, if not quelled could damage the fellowship’s harmonious relations. They
punished instances of verbal and physical abuse, drunkenness, extravagance, and sexual
deviance.43 They encouraged mothers and fathers to avoid “sending [their children] into
all the gay fashionable and often vicious scenes of amusement and dissipation.”44
Members were furthermore expected to “abstain from contributing, going to, or

Friend, ed. The Buzzel about Kentuck: Settling the Promised Land (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1999), 217-240.
41
Friend, Kentucke’s Frontiers, 170; In their 1826 circular letter, the Elkhorn Association of Baptists
equated the use of “the appellation of Mr. and Mrs. instead of the scriptural style of brother and sister” with
a “conformity to the world.” See, Elkhorn Association of Baptists Records, 1826, 7, STBL.
42
For “children of the same Father,” see Records of the Elkhorn Association of Baptists, 1830, 5-6; and for
Jesus as head-of-household, see, "The Pulpit: The Duty of Family Worship," Tennessee Baptist, 8
November 1851.
43
Heyrman, Southern Cross, 137-138.
44
Records of the Elkhorn Association of Baptists, 1826, 5-7, SBTL. For a similar example emanating from
a local Baptist Church, see Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church Records, Vol. 1, February 1820, SBTL.

80
countenancing public dinners or barbecues got up for political purposes.”45 This policing
of family relations was extended to slave members. The David’s Fork Church in the mid1830s, for instance, excluded a slave member, Ann, “for acting the harlot,” and acquitted
a male slave, John, of a charge for “rangling [sic]” and “quarrelling with [Ann] as his
wife.”46
This communal supervision over all members’ lives could impede a householdhead’s authority within the home. Indeed, whereas heads-of-households in the South
legally possessed a great deal of authority over their dependents, in practice, many had to
contend with the prying eyes of neighbors, kin, fellow church members. Householdheads, Baptists believed, should not be tyrannical in their governance; rather they were
expected to be benevolent patriarchs. If they strayed from the reciprocal duties of their
marriage contract, or failed to adequately provide for their dependents, then they faced
admonishment or exclusion from their local church, not to mention potential punishment
from the state. In 1822, the Flat Rock Church of Shelby County, Kentucky excluded
Brother James Vaughan for “unmerciful treatment of an orphan child.” Similarly, a year
later, the church excommunicated Brother Joseph McCarly for attempting suicide and
“for mistrting [sic] children that [were] under his care.”47 In other cases, dependents’
utilized their churches to air grievances against their household head, as when Sister
Frances Pride demanded either her excommunication from the Fyke’s Grove Primitive
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Baptist Church or a committee appointed to settle a difficulty she had with “her father
and his wife.”48
Baptists also at times diverged from secular prescriptions of domestic relations by
insisting men as well as women were responsible for children’s educational and moral
development. In the decades following the Revolution, historian Linda Kerber insists,
America’s secular sphere relied upon “righteous mothers…to raise the virtuous male
citizens on whom the health of the Republic depended.”49 Although surely Baptists
expected wives and mothers to inculcate republican virtue in their young, they also
articulated a vision of the household in which each spouse was dependent upon the other
and created a family unit of shared responsibility. This was especially true in relation to
promoting the cause of religion within the household. In 1803, the David’s Fork Baptist
Church in Lexington appointed three members to labor with Brother Lewis Berry “in
order to shew [sic] him his duty in family worship night.”50 In 1831, leading Baptists in
Kentucky reminded “heads of families,” to bring their “children up, in the nurture and
admonition of the Lord,” reading them Scripture and providing them with “good advice.”
51

The following year, Elkhorn Association’s circular letter warned that “we fear [prayer]

is too much neglected by heads of families.”52 Furthermore, at least one Baptist
governing association, referred to both spouses as “‘heads of households’ with
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responsibility for maintaining religion within the family and household.”53 For Baptists,
the patriarchs’ duties included instilling religious values in the household.
But nineteenth-century Baptists’ focus on constructing households of shared
responsibility was tempered by the injunctions that women should be submissive to their
husbands and that servants and slaves obey their masters. These prescriptions for
evangelical family life largely aligned with those emanating from other cultural and legal
sources during the post-Revolutionary period. A patriarch’s duty to instill moral values in
the household did not necessarily lead to any greater deference shown to his dependents.
In 1831, for instance, the Elkhorn Association reminded area Baptists that women should
be “keepers at home” who “love” and remain “obedient to their husbands.” Servants,
Elkhorn’s circular letter continued, should “be obedient unto their own masters,” not steal
or talk back, and display “good fidelity” in all things. And, despite Revolutionary-era
churches offering women some sliver of “citizenship,” to women as Monica Najar
contends, nineteenth-century churches largely upheld the proper roles of husband and
wife disseminated throughout the wider legal culture. For instance, in 1828, when Sister
Hannah Morton composed and sent a letter of grievances against her pastor to the
Bryan’s Station Baptist Church, she only did so with the “sanction” of her husband.54
Likewise, when the Buffalo Lick Church brought up a white member for “using the rod
on a black brother,” members voted he had not violated any church rules.55
Churches also charged female members for their actions within the domestic
sphere, relying upon male members to investigate and rule on such matters. The Long
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Run Baptist church leveled charges against Sisters Esther Casey and her daughter Evelin
for “keeping a disorderly house,” appointing a committee of ten men to investigate, who,
“after a short retirement” called for the women’s exclusions from the fellowship.56 In
1820 the Harrod’s Creek Church charged Nancy Carder with “quarreling with a
neighbour [sic]” and “disobedience to her husband,” and four months later charged Eliza
Dunnagin for “neglecting her famely [sic] conserns [sic]” and “for not being in
Subjection to her own husband.”57 Two years later, the church excluded Sister Edmons
“for threatening to whip her husband and after words [sic] puting [sic] her threats into
circulation.”58
Churches did, indeed, take up charges against household heads for overstepping
their authoritative role, but these instances appear spottily in church record books, and
did not always work out in the dependents’ favor. The Elk Lick Primitive Baptist Church
leveled a series of charges against Brother Farier in August 1812, including wife abuse,
intoxication, and profane swearing. Farier admitted that he abused his wife and drank too
much, but denied he ever used coarse language, to which the church voted satisfaction
and retained him in fellowship.59 Similarly, in 1823, J. Gardner admitted to the Red River
Church that while out of town on business he had drank to excess. His wife claimed that
upon his return “he abused her & one of the children, and made use of foul language.” In
response, Gardner claimed “he did not remember it,” but “did not deny it, not knowing
what he did or said” since the alcohol had “made him almost beside himself.” He
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apologized for his alleged, though unrecalled, behavior and the church restored him to
fellowship.60 Neither Sister Farier nor Sister Gardner of Red River found protection from
their abusive spouses at their local churches. Instead, their churches served as institutions
through which patriarchal prerogatives were substantiated.
Despite these broad actions to regulate household relations, antebellum observers
often lamented churches’ decreased authority over familial matters. By the 1830s, church
leaders in the slave states began to more enthusiastically disseminate northern ideals of
domesticity. Like Castleman’s nursery of piety, the home became a church, “a sanctuary
tended by wives and mothers.” Most importantly, it restored moral authority to the
home. This, historian Christine Heyrman, notes, led to a “withering of congregational
discipline” as many families sought greater privacy in domestic matters.61 In the 1840s,
one religious periodical in the region even advocated to “avoid going from house to
house for the purpose of hearing news, and interfering with other people’s business,” a
far cry from the strictures of “watchcare” advanced earlier in the century.62 Increased
notions of family privacy, however, served as only a part of the cause for receding church
discipline over household matters, as these ideas merged with gradual transformations of
family law that restructured the legal household in the first-half of the nineteenth century.

For some time prior to the fall of 1809, Eliza Bainbridge had taken up residence
with Capt. Norborne Beall in Spring Station, her children in tow. In August, Eliza’s
husband, Absalom, sent a letter to their daughter, Juliet, demanding she return home
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immediately lest he had to “whip [her] home.” Juliet’s mother might have been satisfied
with “going to hell herself,” but Absalom was determined the rest of his family would not
follow her. “Do not you know,” he implored to Juliet, that “I am by the Laws of God &
man Lord & master of my Family & that I have a right [to] Chastise every one [sic] in it
if they do not obey me in all things reasonable?” Bainbridge noted to his daughter that he
was sure Capt. Beall wished that he had never meddled with her mother.63 Yet, the
following month Absalom sent Beall a formal notice accusing him of “harbouring [sic]
and detaining my wife Elizabeth Bainbridge contrary” to his consent. “Unless [Eliza]
speedily returns home, Absalom asserted, he would “resort to legal redress” against Beall
and apply for a divorce from his wife.64 Eliza apparently did not quickly return, for in
December, Absalom sent a letter to her at Spring Station, cryptically warning that he
would spend all the money he could raise “& every drop of blood in my body” to attain
satisfaction against Beall. “Should I die before him if God will permit me[,] I will haunt
him & every white person on the plantation.” Beall, Bainbridge concluded, was “a target
I shall allways [sic] keep my eye on.”65
Bainbridge’s words and actions in regard to his wife’s apparent abandonment—
and perhaps adultery—signify both the hardened patriarchal ideology guiding Kentucky’s
culture in the early-nineteenth century, as well as the practical reality of its limitations.
White-male patriarchy, as noted above, remained weak, and gender roles more fluid, in
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frontier and early-statehood Kentucky. In 1809, with Kentucky arriving at the threshold
southern values, however, Bainbridge interpreted his rights as a father and husband
through both the laws of God and man, insisting he held broad authority, in all matters
“reasonable.”66 Legally speaking, as the head of household, Bainbridge did possess the
right to induce the obedience of all his dependents. Yet Eliza Bainbridge’s actions
demonstrated her own willingness to buck his authority and find refuge elsewhere, and
perhaps force his hand in filing for a divorce, just at the time when the Kentucky
legislature was tinkering with the stipulations—the reciprocal duties of husband and
wife—of the legal marital contract.67
Religious groups in Kentucky and Tennessee often deplored the ease with which
the state governments granted divorce, at times pressuring their legislatures to reform the
laws. By the end of the antebellum period, despite the growing frequency of divorce
cases in local courts, Baptist church record books and observers’ comments demonstrate
that churches were growing more reluctant to discipline their members’ marital
transgressions. This did not necessarily mean that trans-Appalachian Baptists became less
faithful or less zealous in their interpretation of the Scriptures in regard to domestic
relations, but it does signal a re-envisioning of religious and state authority, as churches’
lack of such discipline implicitly deferred power to civil governance in handling such
affairs.
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Churches decreased role in household matters was rooted in changes in American
law and culture that re-worked household relations in the decades following the
Revolution. As noted above, these changes took hold in the industrializing North much
quicker than in the slave states. By the 1850s, however, historian Peter Bardaglio argues,
the North’s individualistic, contractualist philosophy for family life began infiltrating
southern culture. State governments exerted even greater influence within southern
homes after the Civil War than in the decades preceding it. But the sectional strife did
not mark a clear line between continuity and change, as shifts in domestic relations law
during the antebellum period regarding slaves, married women’s property rights, divorce,
and child-custody, signaled the infiltration of liberal social relations in the prewar
South.68 Southern state legislatures, especially in newly settled in-land areas, enlarged
married women’s property rights over the course of the late antebellum period. These
legislators were not revolutionaries seeking to establish equal gender relations; rather,
they were reacting to a changing economic and cultural landscape. In 1839, for instance,
amidst the financial fallout of the Panics of 1837 and 1839, Mississippi enacted measures
allowing married women to hold property in their own names, and subsequent legislation
in that state provided for wives to profit off such land, enter into contracts, and sign
deeds, all without interference from their husbands.69
Other state legislators felt pressure to reform because of the widening domestic
role Victorian society attributed to women, assigning them greater responsibilities within
the household. Much of this stemmed from the awareness that married women needed
greater legal recourse to secure their economic standing in case their husband failed to
68
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support the family or wagered all in the unstable market and lost.70 This line of thought
was not lost in the trans-Appalachian region. As early as 1843 Judge William B. Turley
of the Tennessee Supreme Court, distinguishing America’s system of domestic relations
from the uncivilized feudal systems which preceded it—systems which looked to the wife
and children as property of the husband—described such dependents “as having equal
rights to all the enjoyments of life, and as safe and adequate protection for them, as the
husband and father.”71
The marriage compact was central to the colonial and post-Revolutionary
American household. Its conceptualization as a private contract stretched back deep into
the English legal tradition. In their efforts to define marriage in the new republican legal
order, nineteenth century lawyers pulled from colonial statutes and common practice, two
sources which themselves were grounded in diverse intellectual strands such as Calvinist
thought, English ecclesiastical law, and the common law. Although differing in many
respects, these sources agreed that marriage was a private contract with public
repercussions and thus requiring communal supervision and regulation. Over the course
of the colonial period, community supervision waned, but state law still emphasized the
civil, or public, nature of the marital contract.72 After the Revolution, however, many
American observers and lawmakers reacted against this emphasis, envisioning marriage
instead as largely a private contract among consenting parties, and one that could be
terminated by the spouses. Yet, tensions between marriage’s public and private nature, as
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well as the inherent inequality of the consenting parties, simmered over the course of the
antebellum period.
Observers and legal theorists during the nineteenth century struggled to neatly
define the marriage contract. United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story noted in
1841 that marriage was “something more than a mere contract.”73 Justice George
Robertson of the Kentucky Court of Appeals waxed similarly in 1838. Marriage is, “in
one sense, a contract,” as it is a “concurrence of two competent minds,” but, “unlike
ordinary or commercial contracts, [it] is publici juris, because it establishes fundamental
and most important domestic relations.” Robertson continued that all organized societies
were interested in the harmony of its member-relations, and that marriage, as the most
basic and useful of social relationships was “regulated and controlled by the power of the
State, and cannot, like mere contracts, be dissolved by the mutual consent only of the
contracting parties.”74
As something more than a mere contract, its regulation fell under the sovereign
will of the state. The marital contract, Kentucky courts exclaimed on more than one
occasion, was “subject to the public will, and not to that of the parties.”75 Indeed, for
some lawmakers, civilization’s progress depended upon policing marriage relations. As
Judge Jacob Peck of the Tennessee Supreme Court exclaimed in the 1830s, the
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“refinement of a people, and the purity of their morals, are perhaps better tested by the
regard which the laws have to the enforcement” of the duties arising from the marital
contract, more so “than from any other source.” Taking a tongue-in-cheek jab at his
state’s divorce laws, Peck continued that “it may be safely said, that when a people
become lost to the binding obligation of the marriage contract, they are verging to a state
that threatens the social compact.” When the marriage contract was looked down upon,
or even with simple indifference, it was a sure sign that the community was
“retrograding.”76
In the Revolutionary-era trans-montane region, however, there was little
institutional control over the marriage contract. Due to a lack of licensed preachers in the
region and the sheer distance of state institutions, frontier residents often married
illegitimately, without religious or state sanction.77 Institutional control over marriage
remained inchoate at best in early-statehood Kentucky, as the persistence of illegitimate
marriages through the 1790s forced religious and state authorities to address the issue. In
1795, the Bryan’s Station Baptist Church excluded Elizabeth Ross for living with a man
as her husband and not being “lawfully” married.78 Three years later, in 1798, Kentucky
lawmakers consolidated the Commonwealth’s marriage laws. The state assembly
"returned marriage to local church authority" by requiring marriages to be performed by
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licensed Christian ministers. Formalizing the terms of the marital contract, individuals
had to navigate the religious sphere in order to attain state recognition.79 Similar
conditions existed in eighteenth-century Tennessee. The Anglican minister Charles
Woodmason journeyed through the backcountry of the Carolinas during the 1760s, often
making note of the marital practices of frontier inhabitants. He lamented the lack of
ministers in the region, and claimed that through the “licentiousness of the People, many
hundreds live in Concubinage—swopping their Wives as Cattel [sic], and living in a State
of Nature, more irregularly and unchastely than the Indians.”80 As with Justice Peck after
him, Woodmason entwined civilization with proper gender relations funneled through the
marriage contract.
Although initially the fluid frontier conditions of early Tennessee, as in Kentucky,
weakened state authority over marriage, by the turn of the century, government had
increased its role in defining the marital terms. Judicial efforts to enforce marriage rules
in the late-eighteenth century often stumbled when the matter resided with a jury of
peers, and sexual relationships remained unsolidified, with little push back from either
secular or religious authorities. In many cases, local courts only intervened in cases of
needed support for illegitimate children.81 State legislatures throughout the young
republic, however, eventually monopolized the formal power to regulate marriage,
directing who could marry whom, the procedures and validity of such nuptials, the legal
responsibilities of the each party, and, the conditions for divorce, alimony, and the modes
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for pursuing these actions.82 Each state had its own legal peculiarities when it came to
policing marriage. Legislation specified the type of divorce allowed, the grounds for
divorce, what constituted “abandonment,” and what rights women held over property
brought to the union and money made off that property during the marriage.83
Baptists and other evangelicals did not deny the importance of the state in
regulating the marriage contract, rather, like many of their judicial counterparts, they saw
it as both a religious and secular compact. “Marriage is a civil as well as a religious
institution,” Baptist reformer Alexander Campbell wrote in 1828. “It is, therefore, a
proper subject of civil legislation.”84 As a public and private contract, evangelicals
agreed marriage necessitated the backing of civil authority. The issue of property
transmission certainly played a major role in this need, but so too did moral issues. One
Tennessee Baptist, referring to a couple who was married by someone who was not a
magistrate or a licensed minister, asked rhetorically “[c]ould their children, by the old
English law, inherit the property? By no means,” he gathered, for, in “the eyes of the
law, no marriage existed.” If such “informal marriages” were pronounced lawful, the
writer concluded, then “[a]ll order would be abolished, and the greatest immorality and
libertinism [would] succeed” throughout society.85 Indeed, stable marriages were seen as
so important to the social fabric that some observers and lawmakers went to great lengths
82
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to promote the institution and allowed for rather extensive state regulation of marital
relations. The Methodist circuit rider and editor of the Tennessee Whig, William
Brownlow, praised Alabama lawmakers who in late 1839 proposed a bill taxing
unmarried white males over the age of twenty five. “We should like to see such a law
passed in Tennessee,” he asserted, but with an additional clause “that all who court, or
make marriage contracts” with no intention of seeing their pledges through should be
imprisoned, while those “who have married one wife,” yet continue “prowling about their
neighbor’s houses” should be sent to the penitentiary for at least one year, and no more
than ten.86 Though Tennessee and Kentucky legislators did not go as far as fining
bachelors, they did implement a variety of laws centered upon the marriage institution.
Beginning in 1799 and continuing throughout the early-republican and
antebellum-eras, Tennessee expanded its divorce laws and proved an easier place to seek
and obtain a martial dissolution than many other southern states.87 Imbued with
Revolutionary-era ideals of individual liberty and facing the realities of a mobile pioneer
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society, Tennessee set down rather progressive divorce laws.88 In 1799, the Assembly
passed, “one of the most liberal divorce statues in the country,” allowing local courts to
decree a divorce if the parties met simple statutory conditions.89 In order to obtain an
absolute divorce (divortium a vincula), a party had to prove their spouse’s guilt relative to
adultery, bigamy, desertion, or impotence.90 A push back from religious groups led to the
Act’s repeal in 1807, only to see it reinstated in 1809 after a flood of divorce petitions
reached the legislature. From 1796 to 1810 alone, at least eighty-eight petitions for
divorce reached the state assembly, 50% of which were instigated by women.91 In 1825
legislators passed a measure designed to relieve women whose husbands had abandoned
them, setting aside any property she had attained since the separation from seizure to pay
for her husband’s debts. Over the following decades, the Tennessee Assembly continued
to remold the contours of the household, constructing measures which, while not
completely disempowering the patriarch, provided greater access for his spouse to
interact with the state.
The 1830s and 1840s witnessed even more extensive legislation in Tennessee
which allowed women greater autonomy when seeking to exit a marriage. In 1831, the
Assembly voted to allow women to have no-cost divorces (provided their bill was
successful) and dispensed with, for women at least, the required four-week successive
publication of the divorce in the local press. An 1835 amended divorce bill went further,
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allowing for married women to sue for divorce in their own names and stipulated that
divorced spouses could re-marry without any waiting period, as if the first marriage had
never taken place. Furthermore, a wife could obtain a divorce and gain a right to alimony
if, after being charged by her husband with adultery, could prove that her husband
allowed her to work as a prostitute, “or exposed [her] to lewd company.” Women acting
as complainants in a successful divorce bill, too, were entitled to “the absolute enjoyment
of such real estate and to the entire dominion and control of such goods and chattels”
which they may have received from their husbands, acquired through their own industry,
or inherited from a relative dying intestate. The bill did note, however, that husbands
who successfully obtained a divorce, and possessed a right or interest in any of his former
wife’s lands or tenements or hereditaments, retained such rights of interest. Moreover, a
wife found guilty of adultery could not claim a dower in her former husband’s estate, was
not entitled to alimony, and her husband retained rights in any property she may have
held.92 Despite these latter stipulations which sought to control female sexuality, the
1835 Act, by expanding divorced wives’ rights after the dissolution, allowing them to sue
in their own names, and assume sole control over any property they had acquired,
certainly provided greater recourse, or at least greater incentive, for an unhappy wife to
seek a legal divorce. In 1840, the legislature allowed married women of good character
who had resided in Tennessee for at least two years the ability to sue for a divorce on any
legal grounds, even if the offences had occurred while she lived in a another state.93 Two
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years later, the legislature passed an act which allowed for absolute divorce in all cases
which had previously met standards for a legal separation and empowered courts to grant
divorced wives “such part of the real and personal property of the husband as they shall
think proper.”94
Kentucky’s divorce legislation, though not as progressive as Tennessee’s, still
chipped away at patriarchs’ expansive power within the household. Two years after
passing “An Act for the Solemnization of Marriages” in 1798—which imparted the
power to officiate wedding ceremonies, among other things, to ordained Christian
ministers—Kentucky passed its first alimony law. Empowering all courts of quarter
sessions with jurisdiction in alimony cases, the Act provided women an opportunity to
seek financial assistance from husbands who had abandoned them for more than one year
in succession, had lived in open adultery with another woman for at least six months, or
“in cases of cruel, inhuman and barbarous treatment.” Upon a decree for alimony, the
husband’s power over the wife, his legal authority over her through the common-law
form of coverture, ceased, and she was free to buy, sell, and transfer property without any
hindrance from her husband, “in the same manner as if she was a feme sole.95 This act
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did not actually provide for a legal divorce, but acknowledged that circumstances arose in
which it was better off for the woman to have maintenance provided her by her estranged
husband, and that she should have her legal identity restored.
Nine years later, however, the Assembly did pass a law stipulating the conditions
for a divorce. “An Act Regulating Divorces in this Commonwealth” granted circuit
courts the authority to decree a divorce to a husband if his wife was living in open
adultery, had been convicted of a felony in the United States, or if she had abandoned
him for the space of three years. Similarly, women could attain a divorce if their
husband was living in open adultery, had abandoned her for more than two years, had
been convicted of a felony anywhere in the country, “or where his treatment of her [was]
so cruel, barbarous and inhuman as actually to endanger her life.” Section Six of the Act
specified that, upon a decree for divorce, the offending party, say the adulterous husband,
was not released from his duties as husband, and “he shall nevertheless remain subject to
all the pains and penalties which the law prescribes against a marriage” while his former
wife was still alive. The injured party, in this hypothetical case, the wife, was enjoined
from marrying again within two years from the divorce decree.96 Over thirty years later,

decisions in the hands of the chancellor. See, C.S. Moreheard and Mason Brown, A Digest of the Statute
Laws of Kentucky, of a Public and Permanent nature, From the Commencement of the Government to the
Session of the Legislature, Ending on the 24th February, 1834, with References to Judicial Decisions, in
Two Volumes (Frankfort: Albert G. Hodges, 1834), I, 124-126.
96
William Littell, The Statute Law of Kentucky, 1808-1811, Volume IV (Frankfort: Printed For William
Hunter by Robert Johnston, 1814), 19-20. Although this law granted authority to circuit courts to hear
divorce petitions, the state assembly still issue divorces through this period. In 1816, the assembly passed,
“An Act to amend the law concerning writs of error,” which forbid the Court of Appeals from reversing
“the decree of any court of equity hereafter obtained, granting a divorce from the marriage contract” if
brought on a writ of error. This did not stop the Court of Appeals from taking up cases where the lower
court granted a divorce and a division of the couple’s estate in the same decree, though their actions were
limited to judging the latter not the former issue. For example see, Thornberry v. Thornberry (1823), 14
Ky. 251. Nor did it stop the Court of Appeals from ruling on cases brought by a party “aggrieved by an
erroneous decree” by a lower court, such as a dismissal without prejudice. See, Boggess against Boggess,
34 Ky. 307, Lexis 71, (1836); For the 1816 law, see, Acts Passed at the First Session of the Twenty-Fourth

98
in March 1843, the General Assembly amended the 1809 divorce act, laying out new
requirements for a divorce. A husband could now attain a divorce if his wife was
pregnant by another man before the marriage without the husband’s knowledge, in cases
in which his wife was malformed to the extent it rendered “sexual intercourse
impossible,” and in cases of her adultery or abandonment of one year. For married
women, too, the court broadened the terms necessary for a divorce. It shortened the
requisite length of a husband’s abandonment from two years to one, and provided divorce
for in cases of a husband’s impotence, his habitual drunkenness, and his cruel treatment
meant to “destroy her peace and happiness.” Furthermore, sections four and five of the
act released both parties from the marriage contract upon a divorce decree in favor of
either party. No longer would husband or wife have to uphold the obligations of
marriage despite their legal divorce.97
Like other states that enacted divorce statutes during the post-Revolutionary
period, Kentucky and Tennessee’s legislation was an effort to reassert state authority over
divorce. The practice of “self-divorce”—widespread through the United States and often
given local, informal sanction by communities—thwarted the ability of the state to
regulate the public aspect of the marriage contract, did little to ensure that a female
divorcee and her children would receive financial support, and complicated the
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transmission of property. In passing such divorce bills, legislators sought not to weaken
the marriage institution, but to perfect it by clearing out ruptured contracts.98 Legislators
not only accepted the actuality of marital relations—that adultery, bigamy, and desertion
occurred in their states—but believed that by eliminating patriarchy’s worst abusers, both
the marriage institution and society as a whole would be more stable.99
In reality, however, these enactments possessed the potential to destabilize
household-heads’ authority by granting more avenues for their dependents’ interaction
with the state. Post-Revolutionary divorce laws were unprecedented in Western society.
By noting barbarous or cruel treatment as a condition for divorce, state legislatures, not
only made it easier for unhappy wives to seek a divorce, but removed the legal protection
for husbands’ corporeal punishment of their wives.100 Like Kentucky and Tennessee,
most states gradually expanded divorce laws during the post-Revolutionary period, a
sign, historians have noted, which gives “compelling evidence that the contractual
ideology of the Declaration of Independence resonated through [legislators’] thinking
about spousal relations.”101
Judges still expressed misgivings when mitigating divorce suits as they tried to
rectify the sanctity of the marital contract with the states’ liberalizing divorce laws.
Justice Robertson, in Logan v. Logan (1841), expounded his view of the marriage
contract as well as the power of state courts to dissolve the marital relation. Both parties
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of a matrimonial compact, he averred, needed to understand that having bound
themselves together “in the most sacred and endearing of all earthly relations” both
“human and divine law” required they forebear each other with kindness. “If this cannot
be done,” the Chief Justice continued, then both parties “‘must suffer in silence.’” Courts
were not forums through which individuals found the “cures for all the miseries of life,”
and unless there was evidence of cruelty, a Kentucky court did not have the authority to
separate “those whom ‘God hath joined together.’”102 Couples seeking a divorce in the
post-Revolutionary and antebellum-United States understood that by breaking the terms
of their mutual contract, they offended “the larger community, the law, and the state, as
much as offending” each other.103
The local community, over the course of the first-half of the nineteenth century,
served as the most effective disciplinary forum for regulating marriages, and
neighborhood churches emerged as key institutions through which communities policed
spousal relations.104 Trans-Appalachian Baptists often dealt swiftly with charges
pertaining to divorce or separation. The Flat Rock Baptist Church noted in April 1813
that Peter Young and his wife Polly had separated, “and each of them beings talked to
express that they have no idea of living together again.” Such expressions earned their
immediate exclusions from the fellowship.105 In other instances, churches refused
individuals membership because of their domestic situation. In January 1810, George
Nation attempted to join the Tick Creek Baptist Church of Shelby County, Kentucky, but
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objections arose “in consequence of his first wife’s leaving him and refusing to live with
him.” He had subsequently married another woman, and the church body concluded that
his reception into the church was not justified, and Nation remained outside of the
fellowship.106
Churches’ decisions in divorce cases did not occur in a vacuum, and state
authorities often looked to members’ actions when deciding such matters. For instance,
when William Babb petitioned the Tennessee State Assembly for a divorce from his wife,
Elizabeth, in 1822, he did so with the backing of his fellow church members, 79 of whom
signed a supporting statement.107 Some judges also reviewed churches’ disciplinary
activities when mitigating spouses’ quarrels. In 1834, Archibald Logan and Eleanor
Robb, “both nearly 70 years of age” married in Lexington, Kentucky. By 1838, “their
domestic peace was disturbed by intemperate complaints and upbraidings [sic]” made by
Eleanor. For his part, Archibald did little “to soothe the deeply moved feelings of his
discontented and irritated wife.” It did not take long for their marital woes to attract
public attention, which, “instead of stifling” their discontent, as Justice Robertson
exclaimed, “seemed only to inflame [Eleanor’s] heated passions.” As both were
members of local Presbyterian Churches, Archibald sought the intervention from his
fellow church-goers. But this too only “added fuel to the fire.” Eventually, Archibald
left their home, the necessity of which, he later insisted, was “the only alternative
consistent with [the couple’s] honor and happiness, the decorum of their neighborhood,
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and the interests of the church.”108 Logan, by going to his neighbors and fellow church
members for aid, along with Justice Robertson’s apparent perplexity over the church’s
failure to pacify the discontented Eleanor, demonstrates that the relationship between
religious authority and that of the state was envisioned as more fluid and less
dichotomous than has been previously suggested.
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Nathan Green followed a similar course in his
1844 decision in the case of Payne vs. Payne, turning to church members for assistance in
determining the disputants’ character. Eliza Payne sought a divorce from her husband,
W.L. Payne, for “gross abuse” and threats of “physical violence.” Green noted that both
were members of the local Methodist Church. “The ministers of that church, and other
members, speak of the [Eliza’s] Christian character in the highest terms; but that of the
defendant in equivocal language.” Most disturbing to Green was witness testimony
which claimed W.L. Payne, “at family devotion, prayed the Lord to deliver him from his
wife, in whatever way he might think best.” Although both were church members, Green
concluded, Eliza surrounded “the family alter [sic] as a matter of duty and pious
privilege,” while her husband “profanely call[ed] upon God” in order to threaten his wife,
and thus, her remaining in the marriage would be “intolerable.”109
Although courts resorted to strenuous investigations of each spouses’ behavior,
and the overall domestic situation which led to the divorce petition, most Baptists still
decried the ease of civil divorce. In 1825, the Long Run Association of Baptists, one of
Kentucky’s largest such bodies, received a query from a member church on whether “a
man who puts away his wife” or vice versa, was an adulterer if he then married another.
108
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The Association responded that according to the Scriptures, any man who put away his
wife, except for the cause of her adultery, himself committed adultery. “And we came of
opinion,” the body concluded, “that an act of the Legislature of the State cannot justify a
course of conduct” that God condemned. Anyone, then—even with a legal divorce from
the state—who married a second time was guilty of adultery and should be held to the
discipline of his or her church.110 Over two decades later, area-Baptists still lamented the
law of the land regarding divorce. The Baptist Banner exclaimed in the late 1840s that
Kentucky’s law of marriages was “not a bit more binding upon the parties than jumping
over the broom-stick.” Virtually “any pretense,” the paper insisted, could be brought up
by husband or wife and the “Legislature and courts” would find it sufficient for a divorce
decree. More than a blemish upon the marriage institution, such practices were
“destructive to the morals and purity of society, a disgrace to the parties” and their
extended families, and “a foul stain upon the escutcheons of the Commonwealth.”111
Despite these laments, when churches did take up matters of domestic strife, they
were likely to find that the interested parties did not appreciate the intrusion. Church
cases revolving around domestic relations held the potential to cause a larger fissure in a
church’s social fabric and could signify individuals’ weariness over their neighbors and
fellow brethren prying into their private affairs. The Elk Lick Primitive Baptist Church
in Scott County, Kentucky excluded James Neale for adultery in August 1846. Five
members, however, voted against exclusion, two of which, Jacob Neale and Penelope
Jones, refused to fall in line with the church majority on the matter. A committee was
110
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formed to labor with the dissenters. They reported in September that Neale and Jones
remained unreconciled with the church’s actions. When a vote was taken whether to
continue them in fellowship, a majority voted for their excommunication. Five more
dissenters voted against this action, which led the majority to sanction their exclusions as
well. In all, charges against James Neale for adultery led to eight exclusions and months
of intra-church strife.112
Similarly, in November 1845, the Pleasant Grove Church brought up Brother and
Sister Netherton for separating. The case wore on for nearly four months as the church
sought explanation from the disputing couple. Brother Netherton, after being censured
by the church, eventually made satisfaction to the charge and immediately thereafter
requested a letter of dismission. Netherton may have requested dismissal from the church
because he did not appreciate his fellow church members’ prying into his private affairs.
Sister Netherton, making clear her thoughts on the church’s role in the case, however,
“refus[ed] to hear the church” on the matter and was excluded in March 1846. The
church clerk, in a rare candid moment expressed what surely many Baptists felt when
such cases swept through their congregations: “Oh that the church could be freed from
such perplexing difficulties.” In the following years, the church did free itself of such
difficulties involving its white members. Of the five cases centering on adultery,
seduction, or marital separation that the Pleasant Grove Church heard from 1846 through
1860, all of the charges were directed toward black members. 113
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Throughout the period, trans-Appalachian Baptist churches disproportionately
disciplined the sexual and family lives of their black members, especially their enslaved
brethren. Baptists and other Protestant groups of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth
centuries encouraged slaves to marry, holding them to the same standards of martial
fidelity as white church members.114 Charges against enslaved members’ fornication and
adultery fill post-Revolutionary church minute books. For instance, the Harrod’s Creek
church quickly excluded “Sister Fanny belonging to Br. Evins for the sin of fornication”
in August 1820.115 At other times, the church court became a venue in which to punish
large numbers of slaves at one time, as was the case in November 1804 when Asa
Tompson, a member of the Bryan Station’s Church and future sheriff of Fayette County,
Kentucky, charged five “black members for the sin of adultery.” Three of the accused
belonged to Asa Tompson, one to Clifton Tompson, and another to a “Tandy” and it is
unclear whether the last was a church member or not. Asa and Clifton Tompson insisted
that they had “dealt with” the accused and that “they all confest [sic] the fact.” Despite
this alleged confession, not one of the accused adulterers answered the church’s citation
and all were excluded from church fellowship, which may signal that some slave
members did not welcome church authority over their sexual lives.116 Ultimately,
however, membership in a church, and its institutional recognition of slaves’ marriages
was conditional, and seen as a privilege by church bodies, perhaps more so for enslaved
members who had been deemed by the wider society as naturally immoral and unfit for
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the marital compact. To become a church member was to fall under the jurisdiction of a
higher authority. Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church succinctly relayed this vision when in
1820 its brethren excluded slave-member Milly for her alleged adultery, not only from
the church fellowship, but from “the privileges of the Laws of God.”117
Free and enslaved blacks were not always passive victims of Baptists’ quest to
instill monogamous marriage practices, as they too stepped into the mix, utilizing the
mechanism of church discipline to articulate their own visions of spousal relations. Bro.
Austin, a member of the Red River Baptist Church and the property of Josiah Fork “made
known to the church” a difficulty between him and a female member in October 1814.
After an investigation, it appeared that Austin was dissatisfied with Sister Rachel,
because he thought her “conduct toward her husband did not comport with that of a
Christian.” Two male slaves testified to the same, and the church body excluded Rachel
in April 1815.118 Likewise, in 1824, John, a slave and member of the David’s Fork
Baptist Church entered a charge against his fellow slave brethren, Polly and Condorus,
the property of a non-member, for the sin of adultery. The church excluded the
transgressors the following month.119 More than simply a tool for social control, or a
way of disseminating their own values of marriage upon their slaves, church discipline
served as a instrument for slaves to police their own communities. John’s charges against
the slaves of another master and Brother Austin’s accusations against Rachel show slaves
taking advantage of their churches’ governing authority to regulate their fellow
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bondsmen’s familial relations. The slave neighborhoods’ gossip networks could prove as
central to instilling godly discipline as white’s accusations.
Although Baptists stressed the importance of faithful marriage for their black
members, and placed much weight on charges brought by slaves against their fellow
bondsmen, church bodies were intimately involved in regulating slaves’ marital relations
and did not tolerate slave members’ acting without the authority of the church body.
When James, the property of a non-member, “exercised a gift contrary” to the order of
the Bryan’s Station Church, and had “likewise undertaken to marry Negroes,” a
committee was formed to investigate. The case was laid over for nearly a year until July
1792 when James confessed to holding “Publick meetings” and “marrying black people.”
The church acquitted him after he agreed to cease his transgressions.120 James’s actions
directly challenged the authority of the church by preaching without its authorization, and
the fact that he married black people compounded the situation. In a similar October
1795 case, Sam, also a slave and member of Bryan’s Station Church was charged for
holding “disorderly” meetings and “marrying black people.”121 The members of Bryan’s
Station Church were not against slaves getting married. Indeed their promotion of slave
marriage can be witnessed through their continual charges of adultery leveled on their
slave members. Between their constitution in 1786 and 1860, Bryans’ Station Church
leveled thirty-two charges of adultery upon black brethren, while in turn, only charging
one white member with the same crime.122
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Early Baptists did not always exclude slaves convicted of adultery, and at times,
implicitly recognized the difficulties the slave institution created for maintaining marital
relations. In order to preserve the peace of the fellowship, some churches simply
acquitted slaves in adultery cases, avoiding the necessity of rectifying slavery with
notions of Christian monogamy.123 In July 1810, the Tick Creek Church of Shelby
County, Kentucky cleared “Henrey [sic] belonging to Brother Dupey and Rose belonging
to Brother Hansborough” of adultery. Henrey and Rose already had spouses, but despite
this, the church thought that “they had better live together as husband and wife than to
part.” The church clerk did not record the details of the case. Perhaps both of their
spouses had been sold off to distant regions, and Tick Creek members realized that any
familial stability for its enslaved members was better than isolation. Or, just as likely,
Brother Dupey and Brother Hansborough worked out the particulars themselves, and
encouraged the rest of the church to let the matter rest.124 In any case, examples such as
the underlying tensions inherent in a system that at held slaves accountable for fulfilling a
lifelong contract while simultaneously denying their ability to voluntarily enter into any
other contract.
A church’s authority over its enslaved members was subsumed by the master’s
authority over his bondsmen. Not only did churches often seek a master’s permission for
a slave to become a member, but one’s marriage was subject to his will as well. At times
churches also served as institutions for punishing those acting without their owner’s
sanction. This proved the case in May 1806 when the Red River Baptist Church
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suspended “Sister Bess for marrying a man against her master’s will.”125 Despite this
however, some Baptist churches sought to stabilize slave marriages. Tick Creek
members resolved in September 1810—most likely in response to the case of Henrey and
Rose—that “We believe it is contrary to scripture and good Order for Masters who have
Servants to part them from their Husbands and wives,” but also parted slave spouse
should not “marry again whilst their former companion is living.”126
Churches’ quest to regulate slave marriages proved even more difficult when
marriages crossed the line between slave and free. In July 1821, a report came to the Red
River Church that Bro. Luke, a slave, was “married to a free woman.” After forming an
investigative committee for the matter, the church took up a query from a member
inquiring whether it was “right for a slave member of the Baptist Church to marry a free
woman?” The church voted, concluding, “that is not right.” The following day, the
male members present withdrew to hear the report of the committee regarding slave
Luke’s transgressions. Luke had not “sinned by marrying as reported,” the committee
stated, but he had committed fornication, “for he had copulation with a girl which we do
not conceive he had any right to claim as his wife.” Luke’s actions, they continued, were
not “even agreeable to the customs of slaves.” The church subsequently
excommunicated Luke from the church fellowship.127 The church’s comments do
indicate that some Baptists acknowledged the difference between their visions of
marriage and “slave customs” regarding family life. Yet their actions also demonstrate
the peculiarity of slave marriage itself. As the husband, Luke, upon marriage, would
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theoretically assume the duties of household head. But how could one who is a slave
assume patriarchal duties of a husband? How could he provide for his household, a
household he may not even be able to live in?
Churches navigated similar situations when a free black male married an enslaved
woman, and these cases too illuminate the tension between the marriage contract, the
slave system, and church authority. When Caleb, a free black man, was charged by the
Fox Run Baptist Church with adultery in October 1824, he claimed that he had only
married another woman because his first wife was “in [the] possession of Br. Oswald
Thomas” and Thomas had forbidden Caleb from seeing her. “After a thorough
investigation,” the Fox Run Church collectively agreed “on a view of the whole
circumstances of the case” to acquit him.128 Even as a free black man, Caleb could not
assume the patriarchal responsibilities of a husband, could not even visit her, as his wife
already fell under the authority of Thomas. The forced separation of married black church
members occurred often enough that Baptist governing Associations received queries
from affiliated churches on the matter while other evangelicals took to the press in search
of answers. As early as 1786, Kentucky’s first Association received a query asking
whether it was “lawful for a slave being an orderly member and compelled to leave his
wife and move with his master about five hundred miles, then to take another wife?”129
In1812, the Long Run Association, urged its member churches to “act prudently and
tenderly toward that afflicted people” when “a black member, having his wife taken from
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him and removed to a distant part” married another. Interestingly, the Association said
nothing of how to deal with a female slave if the roles were reversed.130
Similar debates appeared in the religious press during the antebellum period as
evangelicals sought to delineate churches’ role in recognizing and maintaining slave
marriages. One anonymous writer, Onesimus, insisted in 1830 that God had “placed the
essential principles of marriage within [slaves’] power.” Being “human” and thus
“rational creatures” slaves were fully capable of understanding the “obligations of a
voluntary pledge.” A slave was “on equal ground with his master” in regards to marital
responsibilities and was “equally bound to fulfil his engagement.” The church, however,
had “nothing to do with it,” even when slaves were forcibly separated from their partners.
“The guilt,” Onesimus insisted, resided with “the man” who separated the spouses, “and
the misfortune to the slaves.” Churches had the right to punish masters who sold their
slaves for covetousness or “cupidity.” But even so, they should “sympathize with the
suffering party, and encourage his submission” to his contractual obligations. Separation
did not end the marital contract, Onesimus concluded, claiming there was “just cause to
doubt [a slave’s] religion” if he or she “violate[d] a pledge of this solemn kind for a
temporary gratification.”131 Onesimus, though holding slaves accountable for marital
fidelity, believed that owners were central parties in their slaves’ marriage contracts and
thus could also be punished by the church for separating spouses.

130

Book of the Records of the Long Run Association (Typescript), 1812, p. 56, SBTL; The Red River
Church of Robertson County, Tennessee sent a similar query to their association in September 1801, asking
“Whether a negroe [sic] that was sold from his wife in some of the Eastern States & brought to this country
and has taken another wife can be rec’d into fellowship?” See, Red River Church Minute Book, September
1801, SBLA.
131
Onesimus, "Marriage and Divorce," Columbian Star and Christian Index (Atlanta, GA), 7 August 1830,
Volume 3, Issue 6.

112
Unsurprisingly, this was not a universal view. Corinthinus, responding to
Onesimus in early 1831, disagreed, and pointed to state law’s failure to recognize slave
marriages. If “there be no legal marriage with our slaves, there is no marriage at all,” and
“consequently, [slave marriages] are not under the letter of the gospel discipline.”
Indeed, slaves’ “orderly or disorderly” conduct should be subject to church discipline, but
to insist that slave marriages were lawful was an attempt “to change the original order
and design” of the marriage institution. If Onesimus desired to recognize slave marriages
based upon consent or affection, that was one thing, but forbidding separated slaves to
find other partners upon separation, was not within the jurisdiction of the church.132 Too
much stress had “been laid upon masters who separate slaves from their companions.”
Corinthinus did not proclaim such masters blameless, conceding instead that blame was
“divided” amongst any number of people depending upon the situation. The importance
of Corinthinus’s argument, however, lies in his deference to state authority over slave
relations. Workings of church tribunals in relation to slave marriages were subject to the
jurisdiction of civil law. Since there was “no legal way to marry” slaves, churches could
not punish slaves for adultery or masters for forced separations, because, he concluded,
“there can be no true evidence of crime” in circumstances where a crime “could not be
committed.133
Despite this view by some, churches continued to treat slaves’ family life, and
marriage in particular, as “under the letter of gospel discipline.” For instance, like its
sister church at Bryan’s Station (who leveled 32 charges against black members for
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adultery and only 1 against white members from 1786-1860), the David’s Fork Baptist
Church focused its discipline toward its black members. From 1803 to 1860, church
members took up 57 adultery charges. An overwhelming 55 of those were against black
members. Likewise, of 10 fornication charges, 7 were leveled against blacks. In other
household matters, too, the church exerted greater authority over its black relations than
white. The church recorded charges of spousal separation or abandonment against 3
blacks and only 2 whites, while 7 blacks and 3 whites faced charges of mistreatment of
family. 134 This churches’ disproportionate focus is made even greater when we consider
the timing of these charges. After 1830, 100% or adultery charges within the David’s
Fork Church were directed toward black members. Likewise, black members were the
only ones to be accused with mistreating their family through the late-antebellum period.
Not all churches directed their disciplinary focus solely towards black members,
as the churches making-up my complete data set actually saw a brief period where the
percentage of adultery charges against whites grew after 1830. From 1800 to 1830, 77%
of adultery charges went against black members. That number retracted to only 64%
from 1831 to 1860. But this rate fell almost identically with an across-the-board decline
in excommunication rates—a sign of growing tolerance, or at least hesitation over church
involvement in the matter. From 1800 to 1830, 75% of those facing a single charge of
adultery were excommunicated from their churches, while only 64% of accused
adulterers faced the same fate from 1831 to 1860. Meanwhile, in cases of divorce,
separation, or abandonment, the excommunication rate fell from 50% between 1790 and
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1830, to 45% from 1831 through 1860.135 As churches either ignored such transgressions
all together or treated them more moderately, religious observers took notice, decrying
the weakened state of discipline’s authority over the marital contract.

In 1856, the Tennessee Baptist dedicated a number of columns to the issue of
divorce and second marriages. Having received “several queries touching [upon] the
marriage of persons divorced” editor J. R. Graves published an anonymous piece
lamenting the shortcomings of churches in disciplining their members’ marital relations.
Referencing the gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, Graves noted that any man who
divorced his wife and married another, committed adultery. The same went for the wife.
If she married again, then she was guilty of adultery. “Here,” the writer lamented, “is one
instance where the laws of our land are in open conflict with the plain word of God.”
The editorial did not lay out plans to change state law, but rather reminded churches that
they “must exclude the brother or sister who marries after a divorce.” Much more was at
stake than the transgressors’ eternal salvation or even the sanctity of the church body. “If
men and women could marry, and upon tiring of each other, procure a divorce and marry
again…without being considered guilty in the eyes of God or men,” then “the marriage
institution” might as well as be “at once abolished, and Free Love be the order of the
day.”136
The article provided enough stir that it was re-published in The Western Recorder,
along with a critical response from the anonymous writer, “Z”. Z exclaimed that if
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churches acted upon the author’s advice—to exclude members guilty of remarrying—it
“would be so destructive of the peace of the churches” and “the happiness and usefulness
of many of its most pious members.” Z agreed that adultery was a valid cause for
divorce, and that the innocent party should be able to remarry. He went further, however,
proclaiming that spousal desertion—a sign of an “alienation of affection” which “defeats
all the designs of marriage”—was also a valid condition for a second marriage. Anything
less acted “as a restraint upon the natural liberty of the innocent.”137 Underlying this
exchange (like the between Onesimus and Corinthinus) was the issue of church authority
versus state law. In Tennessee, spousal desertion proved a valid condition for divorce, a
fact some religious observers lamented. Replying to Z, the anonymous writer admitted
that adultery was the one justifiable cause for a second marriage after a divorce, and that
“[n]o earthly laws can trample down the laws of God, or make that right which has
[been] solemnly pronounced [a] wrong.”138
Bubbling tensions between legislative enactments and scriptural injunctions
continue to fester in the pages of the Tennessee Baptist through 1856. One editorialist,
Amicus, noted that the subject of divorce and remarriage was of vast importance.139 “The
fearful increase of divorce cases in our State, particularly, calls loudly for repudiation,”
he exhorted, noting that at least two hundred divorce cases, mostly over “trifling causes”,
had appeared “before our Court [in] the last two sessions.” Amicus allowed that the
“word of God” stated that only adultery was a justifiable cause for absolute divorce. But
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for him that was not reason enough to dispense with the prevailing legislation. The
“laws of our land”—indeed, all states with the exception of South Carolina—provided for
divorce and remarriage for causes other than adultery. Although in some cases these
laws conflicted with God’s laws on the subject, this did not render state legislation void.
“These laws are backed by no small authority,” he asserted, “and are recognized as valid
by the Lord Jesus Christ himself,” and, as professing Christians, “we are expressly
commanded to obey [state laws].” Echoing the common consensus on the institution,
Amicus reasoned that marriage was both a moral and civil contract, and in cases of
desertion, especially, the “moral part of the contract” had already been “nullified.” The
“civil part of the contract” fell “under the jurisdiction of the civil law.” Individuals who
sought “divorces for ample legal causes,” were “legally clear and by no means chargeable
for adultery” by church tribunals. And they certainly should not “be turned out of the
church for marrying after a fair legal investigation and absolution by the decree of the
court.” Amicus made clear that the guilty party in the divorce, whether in cases of
adultery or desertion, were sinners “of the deepest dye,” but that some concessions had to
be made. Reality demonstrated that divorces “have, do, and will forever occur,” and
thus, “they must be disposed of in the very best way possible,” and that did not include
excommunicating the innocent party for remarrying.140
Amicus’s editorial clearly lifted the authority of the state above the laws of God in
matters of divorce and second marriage. The state enacted such laws “for the wise
140

Amicus [illegible last name], “Divorce and Second Marriage,” The Tennessee Baptist, 13 December
1856. Amicus was no crusader for liberal divorce laws. He concluded this piece by asserting that he was
hopeful “to see the day soon, when it shall be made a penitentiary offence for life, for husband or wife to
depart each other—save for such causes of as are deemed all sufficient in law and equity to justify it: and,
as money is so frequently the cause of such separation, I long to see the law passed that, for all lawless
desertions, the property of the deserter shall be confiscated [and conveyed] to the innocent party.”

117
regulation, the safety, and welfare” of their communities, as well as “for the protection of
[Tennesseans’] individual rights and interests.”141 Upon taking up divorce cases,
churches should defer to legislation and court decrees. Of course, not everyone agreed
with Amicus. An “Old Fashion Baptist” lamented in 1858 that many men divorced their
wives for less than Scriptural reasons, that “American legislators and learned judges
justify the marriage of parties divorced,” and had thus legalized adultery. It was to the
“everlasting shame” of those individuals who strove to “induct [divorce and remarriage]
into Baptist churches” by claiming it was “a very harmless institution.”142
After the Civil War, some Baptist observers still lamented the state of affairs
when it came to divorce, second marriage, and adultery. If anything, their comments
buttress the argument presented here that church bodies had grown lax in policing their
members’ domestic relations, conceding the “legislation of Christ to the legislation of
man.”143 In two essays published in late 1868 and early 1869, Jirah D. Cole, D.D.,
decried the state of marital affairs that had developed in the Western states over “the last
quarter of a century.” A number of groups, he insisted, had been waging war on the
marriage institution, and their effects were visible through “the growing laxity of
opinions regarding the sacredness of marriage” manifested not only through “legislative
enactments” making divorce more easily obtained, but churches’ retention of such
members who were “guilty of a palpable infringement of the law of marriage” as set
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down by the Gospel.144 “The evils of human legislation on the subject of divorce,” he
insisted, “have invaded the Christian churches of the present day, and entrenched
themselves therein.” It was widely known and discussed that there were “in very many
of our Churches, in these Western States especially, members in good standing” who had
separated or divorced from their spouse and married another. “They have secured the
sanction of human laws to a so-called divorce,” but one which “the law of Christ
repudiates.” In receiving, and then retaining, these transgressors’ as members of their
fellowship, church bodies were “continually encouraging the whole train of wrongs, from
the incipient domestic disagreements to an adulterous life under the name of a second
legal marriage.” By raising the “legislation of man” above that of Christ’s teachings,
Cole concluded, the faithful had “silently submit[ted] to the usages of the times.”145
Churches’ deference to the “usages of the times” was a constant concern for
preachers, editorialists, and many Baptists throughout the trans-Appalachian West and
across the United States. Although many observers in the late-eighteenth century
believed that the upstart Baptists threatened the southern household and the entire social
order, over the course of the first-half of the nineteenth century evangelical culture
moved toward the mainstream of southern society. Baptist churches still insisted upon
broad authority over their member’s actions. But in regards to household relations,
church discipline, rather than serving as a countercurrent, largely mirrored local statebased law when taking up cases between quarreling or adulterous spouses. Even in their
recognition of slave marriage, churches’ authority was often overshadowed by
slaveowners’ prerogatives and further hindered by slaves’ legal incapacity to enter
144
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contracts. Furthermore, changes in cultural and legal understandings of the household led
to a disciplinary decline after 1830. During the post-Revolutionary and antebellum
periods, as state governments delved deeper into American households, they formed
immediate legal relationships with many dependents and gradually undercut the
household-head’s power in domestic matters. Divorce legislation, especially, tinkered
with the terms of the marital contract and clashed with Baptists and other evangelicals’
scripturally-based views that marriage was an indissoluble endeavor. This, along with
the growth of a middle-class propagating Victorian values of domesticity and family
privacy, combined to weaken churches’ disciplinary authority over members’ domestic
relations.

120

CHAPTER 3. PROPERTY DISPUTES AT CHURCH AND AT LAW: ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION AND THE SEARCH FOR DISPASSIONATE ARBITRATION

“Did he sue his brother before infidels or not?” 1

In November 1831, Jacob Creath Jr. became guardian to the infant son of the
recently-deceased Sydney Bedford. He also agreed to manage Bedford’s estate, which
included four slaves. Henry Foster and two other men entered as securities on Creath’s
behalf, all agreeing to serve as such until the ward Bedford came of age in 1848. Foster
belonged to the David’s Fork Reformed Church outside of Lexington, where Creath
regularly preached. After hearing that Creath planned to relocate with his wife, ward,
and slaves to Missouri, however, Foster made clear in October 1839 that he would
withdraw from the contract if Creath left Kentucky. Creath refused to release Foster
from the bond, as the ward would not be of age for another nine years, and claimed that
the original agreement made no stipulations about his remaining in Kentucky. Seeking
release from his security—and a return of the money he put forth in the original
agreement—Foster sued Creath and others at the Fayette County Circuit Court.2 The
David’s Fork Church soon took up the dispute as well, deciding that Foster had
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committed no wrong. Having already moved to Missouri, Creath exclaimed “If I was
[still] in the neighborhood, I would live and die out of religious society, before I would
trust my character and property with [the church] again.”3
Creath responded to the matter with a sixteen-page pamphlet touching on his prior
relationship with Foster, complete with his version of the dispute and explanations for
Foster’s actions. He charged Foster with gambling, speculating, and slander, insisting that
the whole affair stemmed from Foster’s covetousness nature. In the end, though, Foster’s
turn to secular law, and the subsequent failure of the David’s Fork Reformed Church in
resolving the dispute (at least to his liking), upset Creath just as greatly as Foster’s
covetousness or his slanderous utterances. “Foster put legality above morality,” Creath
lamented, “I put the divine laws above human laws. I complied with the spirit of the laws
of man—he trampled the divine laws under his feet.”4 Indeed churches such as the one at
David’s Fork called upon their brethren to respect civil law when it did not conflict with
Scripture. The Baptist preacher George Waller noted in 1818 that professing Christians
must “strive to fulfil the law of Christ, through which we shall not dishonor the laws of
our Government.”5 Creath may have “complied with the spirit” of secular law, but Foster
had committed the sin of suing “his brother before infidels.”6
Creath’s accusations against Foster and the David’s Fork Church reflect a broader
reconceptualization of churches’ roles as legal venues during the post-Revolutionary
period. Throughout the early-nineteenth century Baptist churches and their counterparts
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across the West and South sought to contain property-related disputes within church
walls. They insisted members refrain from “going to law” and assumed jurisdiction over
a range of disputes typically considered matters for common law, equity, and criminal
courts. Church record books are peppered with disputes over trespass, land, probate,
slave-sales, and theft. More than simply sites for white members to pursue recourse,
churches also took up disputes between slaves as enslaved men and women leveled
charges of theft against each other and sought an authoritative, public site to secure their
property claims. Of course, masters and non-slaveholders also utilized church tribunals
to enforce Kentucky and Tennessee’s consolidating racial order of the post-Revolutionary
period. So, from the initial settlement of the trans-Appalachian region in the late
eighteenth century, churches worked as important institutional-sites for legal production.
By the 1830s, however, individuals looked less to their churches for dispute resolution
and moral regulation. Historians such as Christine Heyrman, Randy Sparks, Christopher
Waldrep, and Gregory Wills have noted the decrease in recorded disciplinary proceedings
in southern evangelical churches after the 1820s, with further diminishment thereafter.7
But none have looked to how the changing economic and legal landscape of the earlyrepublican and antebellum-periods weakened church authority over property-related
disputes.
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This chapter is concerned with those disputes in north-central Kentucky and
middle Tennessee. Like many places in the United States, both areas witnessed extensive
economic and social change during the first decades of the nineteenth century.
Individuals’ engagement with national and international markets increasingly supplanted
face-to-face transactions. Debt, once considered a moral failing, developed into another
condition of the marketplace. By 1840, too, when Creath penned and published the
account of his dispute with Foster, a social-relations-by-contract discourse had assumed
precedence in American legal and intellectual thought. Contract-law theory recognized
individuals (white males) “as reasonable, rational, and equal,” and served as the
foundation for all social relationships. Rather than stressing communitarian ethos, such
as those disseminated by some religious groups, contract doctrine elevated liberal
individuals bound only by “commitments as expressions of their own wills.”8 Antebellum
legal thinkers heralded law’s dispassionate and predictable outcomes, and throughout the
early nineteenth century, state law—with its devotion to liberal individual property rights
for white men—assumed precedence over legalities rooted at the local level, such as
church disciplinary practices.
These legal, economic, and social transformations—compounded by the region’s
growing gentry-class that propagated middle-class values and notions of family
privacy—undercut churches’ authority over their members’ economic matters. Within
this changing atmosphere, some churches, rather than insisting upon their jurisdiction,
often sanctioned members’ recourse to state-based legal venues in order to avoid
implicating the fellowship in messy economic disputes. Moreover, when churches did
8
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litigate members’ property disputes, their actions were at times entangled with local
courts’ operations, while others directed their proceedings to restoring brotherly
affections instead of decreeing an award. Like Jacob Creath, many church-goers
expressed dissatisfaction with church rulings. They pointed to faction, jealousy, and
covetousness as the prime movers in church-based arbitration, a far cry from that
practice’s central purpose of maintaining harmonious member-relations. In contrasting
their churches’ legal activities with those of the state, these same individuals implicitly
raised the workings of courts’ perceived objective, predictable jurisprudence over the
particular, prejudiced rulings of their local churches.9 Religious treatise writers lamented
such passionate disciplinary actions, and like contemporary legal theorists, sought to
formalize churches’ legal operations by publishing tracts devoted to its authoritative
scope, proper procedures, and punishments. Despite this attempt to reinforce “Baptist
jurisprudence,” many church bodies had already ceded authority over property-matters to
local and state courts, largely reformulating their tribunals from law-producing sites to
venues through which to protect member-relations and help solidify the region’s
hardening racial hierarchy.

Over the past two generations, legal historians, focusing largely on small New
England communities, have argued that during the colonial and immediate postRevolutionary periods, the courthouse became the primary arena for dispute resolution.
The professionalization and formalization of the colonial legal system—facilitated by an
9
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expanding commercial economy and an increase of disputes which stretched across town
and county borders—led many Americans to seek recourse through courts rather than
churches. During the early republican era, legal scholar Christopher Tomlins asserted two
decades ago, law, as opposed to other organizing discourses such as republicanism,
evangelical Christianity, or political economy, emerged as the young nation’s “modality
of rule.”10 Yet as historian Laura Edwards points out, although southerners embraced
law as the “modality of rule” in the early nineteenth century, “they still saw it as their
modality of rule, a view supported and sustained by the legal system’s localized
institutional structure, which kept it in close proximity to most people’s lives.”11 For
church members and other neighborhood residents across the South and West, this local
institutional structure included both courthouses and houses of worship.
Despite the strengthening of state-based legal institutions that Tomlins and others
have demonstrated, Baptist churches in central Kentucky and middle Tennessee provided
recourse for members disputing over a variety of offenses typically assumed to be under
the jurisdiction of state authority. When moderators opened the floor at routine business
gatherings, church meetinghouses transformed to church tribunals. These tribunals’
operations mirrored the procedures of local courts.12 After a member leveled an
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accusation against another individual, the church “legally” cited the latter to their next
meeting.13 Silas Evans reported that he received such a citation from his Louisville
church as he walked the city’s streets. The written document, dated and signed by the
church clerk, notified him that “certain charges” would be “preferred” against him that
night “at the regular Monthly Meeting of the Walnut Street Baptist Church.” The citation
encouraged him to attend, for he would “have an opportunity” to respond.14 In cases of a
difficult nature, the church appointed investigative committees to converse with the
parties and witnesses before reporting back to the church body. Church records and
observers statements are dotted with legal-language—“trial,” “plaintiff,” “defendant,”
“witnesses,” “testimony,” etc.—and signal law’s discursive permeation of presumably
spiritual spaces and rituals.15
Becoming a church member required the baptized to keep watchcare over their
fellow brothers and sisters and refrain from suing one another at local courts. This
insistence paved the way for church bodies to assume jurisdiction over a variety of
criminal or property-related matters. In January 1806, for instance, the Mount Pleasant
Baptist Church excluded Brother Davies for “killing [sic] a hog supposed to be Br.
Masey’s property.”16 That same year the Long Run Baptist Church heard complaints
from Brother Collins against Brother Chimmith for “detaining his property from him
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illegally” by “attempting to keep one of his negro girls.”17 The Cane Run Church
excluded William Harris for “failing to comply with promises with respect to some land”
in 1815.18
In the first decades after settlement, local and state courts in Kentucky, especially,
were overwhelmed with land disputes. From the initial settlement period and beyond,
local courts in Kentucky and Tennessee often found their dockets bogged down in land
quarrels emanating from the chaotic settlement of the region. Overlapping claims and
fraudulent surveying practices, combined with a lingering animosity between individual
settlers and a speculating, often absentee, elite engendered large amounts of litigation,
leading one historian to claim that by the mid-1780s “lawsuits entangled almost every
tract in central Kentucky.”19 To sum up the land situation a decade later in 1797,
Kentucky’s surveyor general reported that grants for nearly twenty-four million acres had
been approved. The state, however, contained only around twelve million acres.
Needless to say, litigation abounded well after statehood in 1792 and into the early
nineteenth century.20 The overwhelming number of land-dispute cases in early Kentucky
highlighted an uncertainty of legal authority among Kentuckians, as politicians, jurists,
lawyers, and observers argued over the proper legal mode and site for resolution of such
disputes. With the sheer volume of litigation increasing during the early-statehood era,
individuals across the social spectrum questioned the ability of finding justice in the legal
system.
17
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The eventual triumph of a more privatized property regime backed by the rule of
state law during the early-republican period did not rule out other forums for litigation.
For many settlers, the rule of law “was synonymous with the misrule of lawyers.”21 This
suspicion drove some to seek land-dispute mitigation elsewhere. Although legal scholars
such as Morton Horwitz have argued that extra-judicial arbitration in the antebellum
United States succumbed to the increasingly formal and professional legal system early in
the nineteenth century, the practice persisted in Kentucky much longer.22 After statehood,
as disputed land suits inundated local and state courts, the Kentucky legislature passed
measures which strengthened extra-judicial arbitration, serving as a foundation for
subsequent enactments through the antebellum period.23
Mired in their own throng of land disputes, ordinary Tennesseans often distrusted
local justices and sought alternate venues for recourse. Like Kentucky, speculators in
late-eighteenth-century Tennessee often engaged in fraudulent practices, overlapping or
padding property boundaries which led to confusion over land titles. In 1800, the court
system had hardly changed since the state’s territorial period. The county court, the most
prominent symbol of government authority, registered land sales from the federal
government and marked boundaries between tracts. The Justices of the Peace who made
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up these courts often came from the ranks of the wealthiest in the county. Even those
justices not directly involved in large-scale land speculation tended to guard larger
claims. Moreover, hindrances such as the distance and high-costs of initiating a suit at
law, exacerbated by the use of technical legal jargon, often swayed many small-holders
from seeking relief through the courts. Although these latter factors spurred on calls for
legal reform during the first decade of the nineteenth century, they certainly also
convinced many post-Revolutionary Tennesseans to seek recourse elsewhere for their
land disputes.24 For church members, their local congregations proved a willing arbiter
of such conflicts, especially when one or both of the disputants were church members.
Kentucky and Tennessee churches mitigated a range of land disputes, including
those revolving around land sales, tenancy, and trespass. Churches, of course, did not
solve all land-disputes and did not possess the state’s authority to enforce their decrees.25
They relied upon the fear of eternal damnation and the social repercussions arising from
excommunication from the fellowship. In 1799, for example, Brother Ashurd of the
Mount Pleasant Church in Kentucky requested that body to investigate a land dispute
between himself and Brother Chilton, a member of a nearby church. The church
appointed two male members to go to Ashurd’s land and determine whether “he did get
half of the Land in Value or not.” On August 24, the committee reported that Br. Chilton
“had the Advantage in Quantity 196 Acres, and the quality entirely superior to that of
Brother Ashurd.” The church took these facts under consideration, but were unsure what
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to do next, since Br. Chilton “had not agreed to choose his Men” to arbitrate, and further
“seemed to [be] astonish’d at it, (or rather at our proceedings) and the Minds of the
members were Severally [sic] divided.” In September, members of Mount Pleasant
admitted that “the Matter had not been rightly manag’d,” and wished “to say no more
about it at present, except one should take the other under legal dealings before either of
the Churches they belong to.”26 Although the dispute had already divided the brethren,
the church body still thought it best that any “legal” actions taken be done so within
church walls.
Resolution through churches often proved less expensive and much quicker than
litigation at local courts. Whereas legal suits at the courts could drag on for years and
rack up considerable legal fees, churches generally dispensed with cases within weeks
and did not charge fees. Some churches, however, did decree monetary penalties. In
March 1814, Sister Humes of the Flat Rock Church charged Brother Christian Young
with “trespassing on her land” and removing timber. The church appointed a two-person
committee to investigate the matter and cite Young to the next business meeting. Within
the month, Young appeared at the Flat Rock meetinghouse “and acknowledged the
trespass which grieved Sister Hume.” He apologized to the church for his transgression
and agreed “to pay in three months to Sister Humes ten shillings and six pence.” He also
pledged “to use no more of her timber.”27 The Harrod’s Creek Baptist church heard a
similar case five years later. Brother Jacob Booker and his wife, Cathy, were charged
with trespassing on another member’s land and cutting “down a large poplar” tree. The
Bookers made acknowledgement to the church at a Friday meeting the following week—
26
27

Mount Pleasant Baptist Church Records, Folder 1, June-September 1799, KHS. My emphasis.
Pleasant Grove Baptist Church Records (formerly Flat Rock), March 1814, FHS.

131
held specifically for adjusting this dispute—but may not have been content with the
church’s role in the matter as they immediately requested dismissal from fellowship. In
any case, as the church granted Booker and his wife letters of dismission, the offended
member must have been satisfied with the church’s proceedings or they could have
objected to the Bookers’ request to exit the fellowship.28
Other cases, however, dragged on much longer, implicated numerous church
members, and required assistance from outside the immediate church body. The Tick
Creek Baptist Church of Shelby County, Kentucky spent nearly a year trying to resolve a
complicated land dispute in the mid-1810s. In August 1815 Brother Roulet Rice
complained against Brother Robert Tyler for his actions in a recent land purchase from a
non-member. Two members of the church, Brother and Sister Neal, occupied the land
bought by Tyler. According to Rice, Tyler intimated that he would let the Neals have the
land outright if they paid him the purchase money and “a reasonable compensation for his
trouble,” which, Rice claimed, “I think [Tyler] stated that 40 or 50 dollars” would be
sufficient. Tyler had also reportedly hinted that he was willing to settle the matter
through negotiation between the parties. Yet when they met, he rejected the
compromises previously reached. Rice reported that Tyler had done the same in another
transaction as well, and also denied disparaging statements he had made in the presence
of witnesses.29 At their following meeting in September, the church voted that Tyler had
been wrong, and admonished him for his actions relative to the Neals. The controversy
continued through the rest of that year and into the next, leading the Tick Creek Church
to request assistance from six nearby churches. In January the committee of visiting
28
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brethren confirmed that Tyler had been wrong, and the church claimed they were
satisfied with their previous admonishment. Rice did not let the matter rest, and in July
of 1816, almost a full year after it heard the initial charges, the church formed a
committee of seven to reconcile Rice and Tyler, and reported satisfaction between the
two in August.30 Tyler’s quest to profit off the land, to the detriment of Brother and
Sister Neal who occupied it, contradicted the communitarian ethos propagated by the
church. Tyler, it seemed, placed speculation and profit above the good of the church
community.
While Baptists did not denounce the pursuit of profits, they did decry members’
contracting debt with little or no means to pay back money owed. Observers, noting that
simple instances of debt or speculation were not necessarily illegal, wished churches
would pay more attention to such matters. As early as 1792, the Bryan’s Station Church
resolved that it was “not agreeable” for a church member “to suffer themselves to be sued
or warranted for a plain just debt while they have property enough in their hand to
discharge” the matter.31 Moreover, the editor of the Christian Baptist prayed that
churches would take greater interest in the financial dealings of their members. If a
member was sued for debt or breach of covenant, whether or not it was with another
professing Baptist or not, it fell within his church’s jurisdiction. “No man can be sued [in
courts] justly unless he have [sic] violated some law of Christ, or departed from the spirit
and design of christianity [sic].” This proved true “under the code of laws which govern
our commercial intercourse in this country,” he continued, and churches possessed the
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responsibility to investigate all instances of speculation, indebtedness, or covenant
breaking amongst its membership.32
Baptist churches in Kentucky, Tennessee, and throughout the Upper South
brought up members on charges of indebtedness during the post-Revolutionary period.
This served to not only punish transgressors, but to resolve the matter and maintain
internal member-relations and, in some cases, to provide a monetary resolution to the
conflict. In 1811, Brother Rucker complained against Brother J. Shepherd at the Buffalo
Lick Baptist Church “for refusing to pay a just debt.” The church formed a committee
which investigated the matter, ruling that Shepherd owed Rucker three barrels “& half a
bushel of Corn.” At the next church meeting, Shepherd expressed dissatisfaction with the
committee’s decision. Yet he did not push for the church to leave the matter alone, or
seek to settle outside of the church fellowship. Rather, he wished “to leave the matter to
Brethren chosen” by himself and Rucker. The church encouraged both members “to
bring forward what testimony” applied “to their case” in order “to settle the matter to
satisfaction.”33 As the church record book made no more mention of the dispute between
Shepherd and Rucker, the self-chosen arbitrators must have successfully mitigated the
dispute.
Other churches simply suspended indebted members until they paid their debts.
A Kentucky Church ordered that Bro. Poindexter, having detained “money after several
promises of payment” would be acquitted if he made “payment on or before our next
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meeting.”34 The Garrison Fork Church of Tennessee did just so in 1816, suspending
member Ransom Pruit from church privileges until he could produce payment receipts
for all his creditors (including at least one who was not a church member).35 Other
churches, too, ordered debtors to pay their creditors. In the spring of 1823, the Red River
Church resolved that Brother Matt Williams owed $9.12 to Bro. Betts for some bacon the
latter had purchased but for which he never paid. At the church’s meeting in June, the
clerk recorded that Williams came forward and paid his debt.36 In these instances, both
reconciling the disputing brethren and resolving the point of contention—by decreeing a
financial liability—proved equally important. Rather than pursue these debts owed at
local courts, risking the admonishment of their fellow brethren, potential delay, and legal
costs, individuals such as Batts, Rucker, and Pruit’s creditors, relied upon church
authority and successfully obtained monetary recompense.
Perhaps more prickly property disputes for Baptists were those involving slaves.
As church members sparred over this peculiar form of property, their local
meetinghouses transformed into venues through which slaveholders and non-slaveholders
confronted slaves’ “double character” as both persons and property, brothers and sisters
in Christ and expendable commodities.37 Historian Monica Najar has argued that by the
second decade of the nineteenth century, Upper South Baptists “ceded the issue of the
morality of slavery to the civil state when it proved too divisive.” Churches continued to
34

David’s Fork Baptist Church Records, September 1819.
http://davidsfork.org/images/David_s_Fork_minutes_1802-1850_PDF.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2015.
35
Najar, Evangelizing the South, 105.
36
Red River Church Minute Book, , Adams, Tennessee, Robertson County, April-June 1823, Southern
Baptist Library and Archive, Nashville, Tennessee (hereafter SBLA).
37
On how slaves in the courtroom forced whites to confront slaves as persons and property, see in general,
Ariela J. Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the Antebellum Southern Courtroom (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1998).

135
take up disputes over slave property, however.38 Such disputes not only highlighted the
strengthening racial hierarchy within trans-Appalachian churches during the earlyrepublican period, it reflected how masters’ religious and social reputations were
intimately bound up with their slaves’ actions.39
In March 1798, for instance, the Red River Church charged Brother James
Waddleton for making false representations about a slave woman he had sold to fellow
member Thomas Finch. The church investigated the matter during the spring of that
year, noting that the dispute between the two brethren “appears to be precarious.”
Initially Waddleton welcomed the church’s investigation, reporting “by Bro. Brown that
he was willing that the Church should take his affair into consideration.” The clerk did
not record specifics, but Mary Finch, Thomas’s wife, testified to the church that
Waddleton had claimed “that the negro girl was set for any business & to go on errands.”
After purchasing the girl, however, the Finches grew dissatisfied with her and apparently
believed that Waddleton had swindled them. The church, “after deliberation,” declared
Waddleton guilty and cited him to appear. Having his character questioned in the front of
the church body, he refused to attend and “expressed his intentions to withdraw from the
Church.”40 The church’s ruling surely percolated throughout the neighborhood,
informing members and non-members alike of Waddleton’s less-than-upright business
practices. The fact that the case stretched on for over a year, too (Waddleton
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continuously ignored the church’s summonses), ensured that the gossip networks of
Adams, Tennessee and the surrounding region caught wind of and spread the matter.
Perhaps even worse, a white woman had pointed out his failings, which were further
symbolized by the female slave’s inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to live up to her
master’s representations.
Baptist churches also took up cases of conflict between their slave brethren.
These cases had the potential to involve both members and non-members in church
proceedings and signify the wider importance of churches as authoritative legal sites for
masters to punish their slaves. In April 1825, word reached one Tennessee church that
Ben, an enslaved member body, “had struck a black woman” and “hurt her very much.”
Ben and the unnamed victim were both property of a non-member, James Carr. An
investigative committee reported that Ben acknowledged that he had “struck the woman
with the helve of the axe,” but that he “seemed rather to justify himself in the act.” One
church member claimed that he had spoken with Carr, who “informed him that the
woman was badly hurt, so much so that she had done but little service since” the
altercation. Upon deeming the evidence against him “sufficiently supported,” the church
excluded Ben.41 Whether Ben faced further punishment from the non-member Carr is
unknown. Yet, in providing testimony to the church, Carr clearly supported its charges
against his slave. Although the church simply excluded Ben from its fellowship, such a
consequence could cut off slaves from their sites of social and religious interaction. For
slaves who were the property of small-holders, especially, church services afforded these
often isolated bondsmen and women valuable social contact with other slaves “within
41
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their neighborhoods.”42 Whites, central actors in slave neighborhoods, understood this
dynamic, leading many slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike to punish slaves’
transgressions through their local church body.
More than passive subjects of discipline, however, slaves used church tribunals to
punish thieves and legitimize their property claims.43 In the eyes of state law, slaves
could not own property. Yet as legal historian Dylan Penningroth demonstrated just over
a decade ago, slaves, though considered by state law to be chattel property themselves,
claimed rights to various forms of property, often with the tacit or outright consent of
their masters.44 Between 1800 and 1880, he contends, “an extralegal economy took shape
in the South,” one whose traces barely made it into statute books or local courts, but
operated “in yards, cities, and back roads across the South.” This economy—which
whites tolerated and at times took part in it—was controlled largely by members of the
black community.45 Utilizing public ceremonies and public spaces, slaves secured
acknowledgment of their property from both their masters and fellow slaves. And, in
cases of theft, some slaves resorted to special committees to ferret out the culprit, while
others resorted to verbal accusations and arguments over alleged thievery.
Theft cases between slaves not only legitimized slave property holdings, but could
implicate multiple masters and ultimately lead the church to extend its authority beyond
the bounds of the immediate neighborhood. In November 1824 a Tennessee church heard
42
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charges against Bro. Luke, the property of Jethro Fork, for acting “disorderly in detaining
an Old bed.” Luke had been given the bed by Violet, the slave of David Smith, and had
agreed to deliver it to Violet’s daughter, who belonged to another man. Luke “converted
[the bed] to his own use instead of delivering it agreeable to bargain,” however, and had
since left the neighborhood. Although Luke had “obtained a letter of dismission, and
moved away,” the church sought to rectify the situation. Members directed the clerk to
“get his letter back.” Luke was subsequently excluded in March 1825. The clerk did not
record who brought the complaint to the church body, but the charges against Brother
Luke most likely emanated from the wronged Violet who had trusted him to deliver the
bed. Having moved, of course, too, Luke may not have had the opportunity to deliver the
bed, and took it with him. In any case, the theft charge leveled at him highlights how
slaves utilized their church bodies as venues to police the slave quarters, and how
churches at times extended their authoritative reach to former members who had departed
from the immediate watchcare of the congregation. Moreover, the church’s hearing of
the case demonstrates the white members’ acknowledgement that Violet possessed a
proper claim to the property in the first place, and that Luke had a responsibility to fulfil
his agreement to deliver that property. Local churches, then, served as sites for slaves to
not only claim rights to property but to punish those who ignored such claims.46
More often, however, church tribunals served as venues through which masters
and other whites exerted their authority by regulating the behavior of their bondsmen.
46

Penningroth mentions that churches “served as forums for settling disputes amongst enslaved people,”
but looks only briefly at cases taken up by an all-black church in Richmond Virginia in the 1840s, and not
at cases of slaves’ theft and property disputes within biracial churches. Penningroth notes, too, that
churches served as sites for slaves to secure their property. Recognition of the Sabbath,” he insists, “was
intertwined with the informal system of display and acknowledgment that secured slaves’ ownership of
property.” see Penningroth, Claims of Kinfolk, 100-101.

139
Throughout the antebellum period, masters took advantage of church tribunals to punish
their slaves. Such charges not only illuminate whites’ anxieties over what they believed
were blacks’ furtive natures, but also a grudging recognition that slaves worked together
in accumulating property. The Tick Creek Bethel Church recorded charges against
Wiggin, the property of Brother Ned Larkin in the fall of 1814, and excluded him with
the apparent blessing of his master.47 Thomas Graves charged his slave, Harry, at a
central Kentucky church in 1801 for stealing his “stockings.” Six months later the same
church heard charges against a female slave, Letty, for “stealing from her mistress.”48 In
1826, the Beech Creek Baptist Church in Kentucky charged slave-member Adam with
making a contradiction in saying that Brother Farmer had “given him a dictionary.” At
the same meeting, the contradiction accusation transformed to a charge of theft and the
church excluded Adam for “having a book that was not his.”49 Rose, belonging to Sister
Willis, was charged “for concealing stolen money” by the Little Cedar Lick Church in
1842.50 The following year, Pastor Thomas Dudley, watched on as the Bryan’s Station
Church excluded his bondswoman, Cealey, for “concealing stolen property.”51 The
charge of “concealing stolen property” hints at the underground economy of slave life in
the trans-Appalachian West. If Cealey and Rose had been the actual perpetrators of the
theft, rather than simply accomplices, the clerk would surely have made the delineation.
Their actions as accomplices, however, led t0 their exclusion from the privileges of
church membership and much of the social interaction that came with it.
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Although a slave could potentially be cut off from his or her site of religious and
social community, church tribunals, without the power to corporeally punish
transgressors, served perhaps a more lenient venue through which to be punished than the
secular courts. Take for example the slaves Sam and Humphrey, who in April 1813 were
charged at the Fayette Circuit Court of stealing four shirts, three waistcoats, one pound of
sugar and “sundry other articles.” A fellow slave, Dick, testified in the case, but at some
point he too was implicated in the thievery. The Fayette County jury dismissed the
charges against Sam, sentenced Humphrey to ten lashes at the whipping post, and Dick to
twenty strikes with the whip.52 Across town and less than a year later, the David’s Fork
Baptist Church charged a slave member, Ned, with theft, and excluded him from the
church fellowship.53
Punishing their slaves in church courts also held potential monetary benefits for
slaveholders. Local courts often levied court fees upon owners if their slave was found
guilty of theft. A jury for Fayette County Circuit Court convicted Jim, the property of
Elijah W. Craig, for the theft of “a sorrel horse” which he rode for “several days by
which the horse was greatly impaired.” The court decided “that Jim shall be taken to the
public whiping [sic] post and there receive thirty-nine lashes on his bare back.”
Furthermore, the court ordered Craig to pay the legal costs.54 In cases when it was an
option, recourse through the church could benefit slaveholders monetarily and forgo the
risk of bodily punishment—and potential lost labor—to their bondsmen.
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Antebellum Baptist churches in Kentucky and Tennessee disproportionately
punished slave members for theft (Figure 2).55 For the population as a whole, slaves
represented one-third of the Inner Bluegrass residents in 1820.56 In the Middle Tennessee
district, from 1810 to 1830, slaves averaged about 22% of the region’s population.57 In
regards to church membership, historian Christine Heyrman has estimated that in 1835,
free and enslaved blacks made up about 25% of the membership of southern Baptist
churches.58 According to my data set which spans select Baptist churches of central
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee, 75% of theft cases recorded involved black
transgressors. Moreover, black members were 60% more likely to be excluded for theft
than whites, and 400% more likely to be excluded when the theft charge was simply one
transgression among others (Figure 3).59
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Theft Charge Outcome % by Race
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Church tribunals heard a disproportionate number of theft accusations aimed at
their black and enslaved brethren for a number reasons. As a form of property
themselves, slaves’ claims to property were always tenuous and contested. The necessity
of publicly displaying their property in order to claim rights over it may have also opened
slaves to charges of theft, either from their fellow bondsmen or their masters. In some
instances, too, slaves’ pilfering derived from sheer necessity. One Kentucky slave noted
that he and his fellow bondsmen believed it was “a kind of first principle” for those who
labored had “had a right to eat.” Another claimed it was his “moral right” to take small
amounts from the “abundance” he had helped to produce.60
Such assertions echoed throughout the slaveholding region. The former slave
Henry Bibb, who had worked in the cotton fields of the Deep South, insisted that “I had a
just right to what I took, because it was the labor of my own hands.”61 Historian Walter
Johnson has noted that food rations for some Mississippi Valley slaves proved so meager
60
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that their stealing provisions became a requirement. After emancipation, former slaves
asserted that white ministers focused almost exclusively on the issue of theft, reminding
slaves they should not steal their “master’s turkey” or their “master’s chickens” or their
“master’s hawgs.”62 This may have been why, although accusations of theft against
enslaved Baptists revolved around a variety of forms of property, provender items
routinely appear in such charges. In 1811 the Red River Baptist Church charged Hannah,
the property of a Mr. Langston, with “taking sugar that was not her own, [and] boiling the
same away to a small quantity & secreting it.”63 The Big Cedar Lick Church charged
Kate “for concealing stolen goods and money” in 1814.64 Mr. S. Smith’s Peter was
charged by the Bryan’s Station Church for “theft in taking his Masters Bacon.”65
Interestingly, the appellation of “Mr.” rather than “Brother” signifies that Peter’s master
was not a member of the church, but that he, or someone directed by him, brought the
complaint to the church, perhaps knowing or hoping that Peter’s exclusion from the
church body would be punishment enough for his transgression. The church clerk,
unfortunately, did not specify who brought the initial complaint against Peter, so we do
not know whether this was a case in which the master sought to punish his slave directly,
or just a prying church-member—perhaps even a fellow slave—who witnessed or heard
of Peter’s theft and who sought out the authority of the church in order to purify its
membership ranks.
Theft accusations against black members proved to be disproportionate, too,
because by the antebellum period, Baptist churches in central Kentucky and middle
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Tennessee increasingly proved unwilling to involve themselves in the property-related
disputes of their white brethren. As Figure 2 shows, churches from the data set did not
record any charges against white members for theft after 1836. Instead, church tribunals
emerged as sites through which to police black members. This resulted from a larger
reformulation of the practice of discipline within some trans-Appalachian Baptist
churches which redirected the bulk of disciplinary charges against black members.
David’s Fork Baptist Church—not to be confused with Creath’s Reformed Church—
located just outside of Lexington exemplifies this process. At that church, both whites
and blacks routinely faced charges through the first two decades of the nineteenth century
(Figure 4). Yet, by the mid-1820s, charges against black members overtook those
directed toward their white counterparts.

Figure 4.
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From 1831 to 1860, the church recorded only 49 charges leveled against white
members, and over one-third of those focused upon members’ non-attendance at
meetings or their interaction with another religious body: in other words, charges related
directly to membership duties.66 In contrast, in the twenty-seven years preceding 1830,
the church recorded 182 charges against its white members. The slow decline of charges
against whites picked up in the late 1820s, amidst the controversy emanating from
Alexander Campbell’s “Reformation” movement, a religious insurgency which stirred
emotions and split churches across the trans-Appalachian West. As I argue in the next
chapter, doctrinal strife altered how members’ understood their churches’ role in
mitigating disputes or dispensing discipline. But this transformation also resulted from
the changing economic and social landscape of Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region, and
Lexington in particular. The increase of charges leveled against black members emanated
from the changing race-relations of the region.
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, Lexington was home to a large
African American community, made up of both slave and free individuals and rooted in
church institutions. Free blacks could be found peddling foodstuffs in the town square
outside the markethouse, while slaves roamed the city on task from their masters. Of
Fayette County’s 1,484 slaves, nearly half (739) worked in ropewalks, inns, mercantile
shops, and brick manufactories. Many lived in the cramped urban quarters in Lexington,
socializing, worshipping, and trading with other blacks in the city. Nearby farmers also
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hired out slaves to labor in the city’s cotton and hemp industries. Such slaves and those
of the city proper gravitated to Lexington’s churches during the first decades of the
nineteenth century, spurring on the growth of African American community.
Many slaves flocked to the preaching of Peter Durrett, a freed-slave known as
“Old Captain”. By 1810, on the heels of religious revival, Durrett served a congregation
of around 500 members. Although many whites welcomed the spiritual uplift of the black
population, their large numbers and general autonomy under Durrett posed a significant
threat to the wider region’s social and religious order.67 Town trustees, who had long
allowed Durrett’s preaching in the city, fretted over the Lexington’s growing black
population and Durrett’s influence over it. The trustees and local white religious leaders
sought first to bring Durrett under the control of the Elkhorn Association of Baptists,
before sanctioning another local free black, London Ferrell—who the whites believed
they could more readily manipulate—to preach in the city. Ferrell established the
African First Baptist Church which fell under the control of the city’s white First Baptist
Church. Membership numbers in the former body remained small until the late 1820s
and Durrett’s death, when the church reached over 300 members.68
White men who partook in the city’s bustling commercial marketplace and
elevated attitudes of economic liberalism looked at blacks’ avenues for economic gain
and community-building with suspicion. The white community had feared a slave
rebellion since the turn of the century when reports of Gabriel Prosser’s uprising crossed
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the Appalachians. Not long after, the Kentucky Assembly passed legislation which
prohibited the importation of slaves from outside the state. Rumors of a slave revolt in
Lexington persisted through the subsequent decades, leading to further white surveillance
of the area’s black community. Lexington’s board of trustees authorized the construction
of watch houses, which served as reminders for whites to stay vigilant. By the War of
1812, as we will see, not only had central Kentuckians embraced a diverse marketeconomy, they had solidified the more fluid racial relations of the previous century.69
This process occurred largely through the state’s legal system, such as the watch house
and coordinated slave patrols, but also through informal networks such as church
disciplinary practices.
Tennessee witnessed similar developments in race-relations as did north-central
Kentucky during the early-republican and antebellum periods. Despite local efforts to
restrict their economic and social autonomy, slaves in and around post-Revolutionary
Nashville still found degrees of independence. In 1802, town leaders in Nashville passed
measures which restricted slaves from hiring themselves out (with or without their
owners’ permission) and leveled fines against merchants who did business with slaves
and upon whites who countenanced slave gatherings after dark. The city also passed a
slave curfew, and five years later appointed a slave patrol and enacted a prohibition
against liquor sales to slaves. These restrictions proved easy to get around, however, as
masters continued to hire-out their slaves. For their part, slaves persisted in selling goods
at local religious revivals or the city market. Such urban experiences allowed slaves a
broader autonomy than their field-laboring counterparts. Yet, as the greater-Nashville
69
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region “civilized,” Ray argues, “slaves’ relative autonomy faced increasing public
contestation.” Free-blacks in Nashville faced also saw a restriction in their autonomy
during the period. Although they had never attained the same rights as their white
neighbors, free blacks had mingled with white society during the 1790s and early 1800s.
Taking advantage of a loophole in the state’s 1796 Constitution, some black freeholders
were able to vote, participate in the militia, and gain a prominent position in regional
affairs. As late as 1825, for instance, “ninety-six militiamen from Rutherford County
complained that the free black population had excessive influence over the county’s
[militia] company elections.”70
Slaves and free blacks had also found slivers of equal recognition in the region’s
churches during the early-republican period. Some churches, such as the Big Cedar Lick
Baptist Church, allowed all members a vote on matters of fellowship. The Mill Creek
Baptist Church likewise granted blacks the liberty to preach.71 But this slight recognition
was dampened by the disproportionate excommunication of free- and enslaved-blacks for
theft, especially after 1830. So, while in some instances slaves could benefit from church
tribunals—using them to secure property claims and punish thieves amongst their own—
as Baptists across the Upper South largely set aside their emancipationist impulses during
the first decade of the nineteenth century, and as Kentucky’s Bluegrass Region and
Middle Tennessee cracked down on black autonomy in general, churches followed suit,
singling out black brethren for crimes seldom enforced against white members.
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When churches did take up their white members’ criminal transgressions, their
decisions often hinged upon decrees leveled by local courts. In matters of a criminal
nature, church bodies had little choice but to acknowledge their shared jurisdiction with
state-based courts. Church members accepted this legal reality. In the summer of 1836,
the First Baptist Church of Nashville resolved that every member “shall be subject alike
to her jurisdiction,” but further that no member, “inconsequence of connection with [the
church]” shall “be deprived of any right, of any kind,” whether “social, domestic,
political, &c, which as a man and a citizen he may lawfully and innocently exercise.”
Although this statement—Article VIII of the church’s constitution—may have been
meant to assure slaveholding members that the church would not interfere with their
property rights, it was also a recognition by the church body that it shared jurisdiction
over each member with the wider world, and specifically the state. Five years later, the
church deferred authority to the state in a matter of discipline. Having taken up charges
against a member for fraud, the church postponed their own decision and suspended the
offending brother “until a judicial decision shall be had in his case.”72
A member’s transgression of state law itself could garner charges from the church
body. In August 1818, the Red River Church admonished Brother John Johnston for
disorderly conduct. Although they initially continued him in fellowship, the church
concluded at their following meeting, “from satisfactory evidence,” that he continued “to
walk disorderly in breaking the peace or violating the laws of the State,” and should be
excluded.73 Throughout the period, however, members of Red River disagreed on how a
member’s violation of state law impacted his or her standing in religious society. In the
72
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early 1840s, disagreements within the church became so divisive that the clerk wrote a
nearby church at Fyke’s Grove, asking whether they should continue fellowship with a
member “that stands convicted by the laws of his country for [a] certain offence.”
Members of Fyke’s Grove insisted “that it was wrong to privilege [the offending
member] to the immunitys [sic] of the church” after he had been “convicted by the laws
of the land.” Agreement between the churches remained elusive, and nearly two years
went by before the Fyke’s Grove church reported that “despite the difficulty,” they
desired “to live together in union and peace” with the Red River Church.74
In other cases, churches revisited previous rulings in member-disputes after the
matter had moved to the secular legal arena, uplifting actions taken by local courts over
rulings of church majorities. In the summer of 1816, the Red River Church voted that
Brother Bell was not guilty of taking “unlawful interest” while conducting a slave sale.
Over a year later, however, in November 1817, the church reconsidered the case “on the
matter of [Bell] taking Usury.” It seemed Bell’s fate at the hands of his fellow church
members was bound up with a recent decision of the Robertson County Circuit Court,
where a jury had found him guilty of usurious practices. Because of his conviction, the
clerk noted the church believed “the cause of religion or the Religious causes suffer[ed]
in [Bell’s] hands.” In January 1818, the church again revisited Bell’s case, exclaiming
that “we cannot clearly say that Bro. Bell was guilty of taking Usury,” yet “for the
veneration we have for the Court & Law of our Country, we publickly [sic] reprobate the
idea of any of our members violating the stated laws of our Country.” Considerable
debate between the members revealed that a majority did not agree with the court’s
74
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decision. Nonetheless, after further debate, and Bell’s testimony, when asked if they
were satisfied with Bell’s actions, members emphatically answered “NO,” and
excommunicated him from the fellowship.75
Indeed, such cases demonstrate the interconnections between state-based and
church-based legalities during the early nineteenth century. Church decrees were
influenced by outside factors, such as actions taken at the local courthouses, even if, as in
Bell’s case, the church did not entirely agree with the court’s decision. This forces us to
re-think the autonomous claims that churches claimed over their internal actions. The
bounds of authority were never fully delineated, but remained murky. In these cases,
courts did not direct the church to take any action against the convicted member, but
outcomes at court could and did inform member’s actions within the church.
This process also worked in reverse, as actions taken at the church meetinghouses
had the potential to effect cases pleading at courts of law. For instance, in September
1803, Hiram Mitchell, a member of the South Elkhorn Church of Fayette County, visited
the Bryan’s Station Church meetinghouse and complained of Bro. John Pickett “for
entering a suit against him in Law contrary to gospel rule.” The previous April, Pickett
had filed suit against Mitchell, claiming that Mitchell’s wife, Nancy, made slanderous
remarks which significantly injured his character and good standing in the community.
Pickett sought five hundred pounds in damages, and the Fayette Circuit Court summoned
the Mitchells to its June session. The case was laid over until September, but before a
decision could be put down, Mitchell spoke up at the Bryan’s Station Church meeting. A
church appointed committee conversed with Mitchell and Pickett and satisfied both
75
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parties. The case pending in the circuit court was apparently withdrawn, as the
September declaration is the last record in the existing case file.76
It is unclear why Pickett initially entered the suit in the Fayette Circuit Court
rather than immediately approaching the church body. Since Mitchell was a member of a
neighboring congregation, Pickett may not have known that Mitchell was even a Baptist.
Or perhaps Pickett did not think that his church could successfully mitigate the dispute.
Whatever the reason, the resolution of their case demonstrates the ability of church courts
to influence the outcome of a case which began in the secular legal system. Scholars
have investigated the importance of “setting” in the resolution of disputes. When a
dispute moves from one arena to another, say the church to the courthouse, or vice-versa,
this has the potential to alter the outcome of the case.77 Furthermore, it can alter the very
nature of the dispute itself. Pickett and Mitchell’s dispute began with Nancy Mitchell’s
alleged slander of Pickett, but it transformed from a simple slander to a dispute between
two Baptists, members of two separate congregations, with apparently different visions of
how or where the matter should be resolved. In this case, at least, the boundaries of
church and secular authority were blurred, as both parties utilized available resolution
outlets which best met their immediate needs.
Church tribunals, rather than autonomous judicatories, were entwined with larger
social and cultural transformations, transformations which by the 1830s had significantly
weakened their authority over white members’ property-related matters. Though
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providing some recourse for blacks, churches emerged as institutions that upheld the
region’s profoundly unequal race-relations. And, as we have seen, in many cases,
churches deferred to actions taken within state institutions. Historian Christine Heyrman
has noted that by the 1830s, Baptist church clerks across the South “inscribed ever fewer
pages of church books with the details of their members’ waywardness.” This, she avers,
proved an acknowledgment that a “meddling” church “was more likely to alienate than
reform the laity.”78 Heyrman’s contention is primarily focused upon matters of familial
relations, and not property relations, but her timing holds true for the latter as well.
Churches increased reticence to mitigate their members’ property-related
disputes, however, resulted from the changing economic and social backdrop of the
region, and not solely from an effort to retain member-allegiances. By the antebellum
period, a dynamic market-economy had taken hold in the Kentucky- Bluegrass and
Middle-Tennessee regions. As a political economy founded upon notions of liberal
individuals eclipsed the moral economy centered upon communitarian ethics, churches’
role in mitigating the property-related disputes of their brethren receded. Not only did
members’ civil disputes hold the potential to drive wedges in the church fellowship—the
opposite goal of church discipline’s focus upon the protecting the peace—but the sin of
covetousness, denounced by Baptists and other religious groups, became harder to
identify amidst the speculative, acquisitive cultural milieu. Debt was reconfigured from a
moral failing to a near requisite of doing business in the expanding capitalist system, and
sinful economic behavior became harder to identify. Refinement and gentry values
radiated from the urban centers of Lexington and Nashville, heralding both acquisition
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and family privacy. In turn, churches slowly lost power—and in some cases deferred it—
over their members’ economic matters.

As in many areas of the republic, north-central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee
witnessed rapid economic and social change in the half-century after the Revolutionary
War. During the 1770s and 1780s, Euro-Americans had settled the greater-Lexington
area in hopes of taking advantage of the “best poor man’s country.” Their expectations
for finding agrarian independence through landownership were significantly curtailed by
the arrival of the gentry in the 1790s. Although many of these latter newcomers added to
their substantial wealth by taking advantage of the chaos arising from disputed land titles,
they also established churches, courthouses, and helped integrate transportation and
market networks. This in turn transformed Lexington into an economic hub for the
surrounding region.79 By the second decade of the nineteenth century, the Inner
Bluegrass region had transitioned from an agricultural-oriented society to one in which
entrepreneurs, manufacturers, lawyers, and merchants dominated the political and social
landscape. Textile manufacturers had made inroads on the household production of
many goods, while other budding industries and technologies pushed aside the
independent artisan.
Lexington by 1810, historian Craig Thompson Friend notes, had developed into
“the most urban of western towns.”80 A population influx of lawyers, merchants,
artisans, and free blacks helped make up the city’s 4,279 residents. A vibrant
manufacturing industry, mainly revolving around hemp production, strengthened the
79
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city’s budding economy. Over the course of the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, a new-money gentry emerged from the ranks of manufacturers and other
entrepreneurs. “As the nineteenth century proceeded,” Friend continues, “refinement,
capitalistic investment, and lines of distinction spread from Lexington outward.”81 Along
the way, individuals’ relationship to the wider community transformed. As the previous
chapter demonstrated, family households became increasingly atomistic. In the more
refined areas of Lexington, a burgeoning middle-class subscribed to and propagated
divisions between public and private. This weakened sources of communal regulation
over familial matters, and freed the “self-made” men of Kentucky to pursue economic
advance with less moral responsibility. Indeed, by the mid-1830s, the “extra-moral
workings of capitalism seemed more rewarding” for central Kentuckians “than traditional
patterns of familial and communal obligation.”82
The Middle Tennessee area witnessed comparable economic transformations
during the first decades of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the century, the region
stood at the edge of white civilization, virtually inaccessible to many of the major trade
outlets and beset by recent skirmishes with Natives. As Nashville served as the primary
port along the Cumberland River, early on in the nineteenth century, city boosters—made
up of planters, lawyers, and merchants—pushed for farmers in the surrounding area to
plant more cotton. Once picked, the cotton was filtered through Nashville’s flourishing
manufacturing sector or through its port, eventually making its way to the international
market. By the 1810s, Nashville and the surrounding countryside had shed a selfcontained, “economy of necessity” and embraced the new commercial world. As
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historian Kristofer Ray argues, the commercial boosters who led this charge “ultimately
dragged all of the region’s residents into a faceless economic system.”83 Historian John
Larson notes that amidst the social transformation wrought by the market revolution of
the early-nineteenth century, “Individual identity dissolved into anonymity, commitment
into contract, vocation into work, a living into a wage.”84 Baptists and other church goers
were not exempt from these experiences. Whereas since the Revolutionary period
churches had sought to mitigate their property-related disputes, the emergence of contract
relations between individuals weakened churches ability to effectively mitigate their
members’ economic disputes.
The new market economy of the nineteenth century, with its inducements toward
speculation and deceit, opposed the harmonious communitarian ethos that Baptists,
prescriptively anyways, sought to establish in their church bodies. The Elkhorn
Association of Baptists declared in 1826 that too many Christians resorted to
“unwarrantable and criminal means” in their pursuit “to mass wealth.”85 Five years later,
preacher James Black exclaimed that worldliness was infiltrating church meetinghouse
walls throughout the state. He lamented that only a fraction of members routinely
attended church business meetings, and those who did were often distracted by outside
concerns. “How discouraging to a minister,” Black concluded, “after he has travelled
several miles, in order to meet his appointment at the court of the Lord; to find probably
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not more than twelve or fifteen members collected, and they probably conversing on
politics, agriculture, or commerce.”86
For Baptists, amassing great wealth, or covetousness, served as a gateway to
economic risk, which, though increasingly necessary to succeed in the new economic
marketplace, “alienates the affection of Christians” and “strengthens the bands of
infidelity.” Greed and unfair business practices were bad enough for nineteenth-century
Baptists, but their potential to lead to adversarial legal contests further disrupted religious
society.87 Alexander Campbell, writing in 1828, two years before his split with the
Baptists, agreed. Breach of covenant, assuming debt beyond one’s means, and
speculating were as serious offences as “theft, lying, and slander.” For, when “we hear of
a [C]hristian compelled to pay his debts by law, or to atone for the breach of covenants
by fines; when we see one asking securities to obtain money on which to speculate, or see
him eagerly engaged in the pursuit of wealth or any earthly distinctions,” Campbell
averred, we must consider such conduct as a great “libel on [C]hristianity.”88
Although Baptists sought to avoid this “libel” by containing such matters within
their meetinghouse walls, from the early nineteenth century on, many churches
sanctioned members’ recourse to local courts for their contract and property disputes. As
in criminal cases, churches’ permission for members to sue in court highlights the
integrated relationship of church authority and that of the state. Moreover, this deference
to state-based courts implicitly constructed the bounds of religious and civil authority,
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with churches’ gradually relinquishing control over members’ economic matters. For
instance, a Tennessee Baptist Church summoned Brother Levi Powell in July 1821 to
answer for a debt he owed Brother Wheles. If Powell refused to hear his fellow brethren,
then the church encouraged Wheles to “pursue the ordinary maner [sic] to recover” the
money owed to him.89 Other churches, too, proved unwilling to get involved in messy
civil disputes of the brethren. Members of the Little Cedar Lick Church in Tennessee
agreed with their brethren from Alabama. In 1828, they granted Brother William White
“liberty to commence suit against Sister Stevenson and others.”90 Similarly, in June 1809,
the Red River Baptist Church liberated “Bro. Darnell from the injunctions of
brotherhood” with a former member, paving the way for him to seek recourse at the local
courthouse.91
In contrast, other members displayed their uneasiness over their churches’ role as
arbiter for their economic disputes. In January 1815 Brother Drake reported to the Big
Cedar Lick Baptist Church in Tennessee that Bro. Brinson “had failed to comply with a
contract between the two men.” Brinson and Drake agreed to submit the matter to an
arbitration committee, whose decision would be final. The committee, however, found
no damages, decreeing that “each of them [should] endeavor to bear his own burthen.”92
Nearly two years later, in December 1816, the church charged Drake with three
transgressions. Not only did he commit an “assault and battry [sic] on the boddy [sic] of
Josiah Brinson,” he also took “out a peace warrant” against him. The church’s final
charge arose form Drake’s questioning of its authority, specifically by his declaration that
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“the Church never should settle any thing for him again.” Drake’s wishes came true, as
the church excluded him from the fellowship, and thus placed him out of its authoritative
jurisdiction.93 Yet his actions after the initial contract dispute with Brinson in early 1815
demonstrate that he did not agree with the arbitrators’ decision that no damages were
present, or that he should “bear his own burthen.” Instead, he sought the protection of
secular authorities, securing a peace warrant before taking the matter into his own hands
by apparently assaulting Brinson.
The expanding market-economy of post-Revolutionary America held
repercussions for churches’ disciplinary efforts. Across the republic, Americans’
engagement in regional and international commercial exchange increasingly supplanted
local, face-to-face transactions. The assignability—a creditor’s ability to transfer one’s
debt to a third party—of notes and bonds undercut the social relations which had
previously formed the exchange, the immediate relations necessary for effective churchbased arbitration. Moreover, debt was redefined from a moral failing to an economic
risk, the price of doing business in a capitalist economy.94 Alongside, law, especially at
the state level, emerged as a more formal and professional enterprise, devoted to
protecting individuals’ property rights and facilitating this dynamic economic
marketplace through predictable and objective decrees. Church bodies, prone to faction,
lacking legal formalism, and undercut by the very contractual membership ushered in by
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, often found themselves unable to
authoritatively resolve their members’ civil disputes.
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Church tribunals only served as effective legal sites when members
dispassionately judged each other’s disputes. Witnesses, committeemen, and voting
members, when “called upon to testify, judge, and advise,” had to be objective or risk
their prejudices tainting the proceedings. Even a slight “defect, in their temper,
testimony, judgment or advice, may turn the scales against success.”95 As Jacob Creath
Jr. would certainly agree, individuals possessed a right to due process in both churchbased and state-based courts. By the 1830s and early 1840s, many disputants, however,
decried the unfair, factionalist-produced decrees emanating from their local
meetinghouses. Church leaders throughout the country, too, witnessing a decline in
disciplinary activity, set out to strengthen churches’ law-making functions by formalizing
their procedures, stressing the importance of predictable and dispassionate mitigation.
The very stability and continued progress of their respective organizations were at stake.
Their efforts fell in line with leading legal thinkers of the antebellum period who, as
Morton Horwitz writes, “sought to depoliticize the law” by insisting “upon its objective,
neutral, and facilitative character.”96
As early as the 1820s, trans-Appalachian Baptists began calling for a more
uniformed system of discipline, though not until the 1840s did church leaders take serious
steps to formalize its procedures. The First Baptist Church of Frankfort composed a letter
in 1823 to the Franklin Association asserting “that every society should have a
compendium of discipline under which offenders of every grade might be easily arraign’d
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[sic], reclaim’d [sic] or sencured [sic].”97 Two decades later members would get their
wish. In the 1840s, a number of ministers devoted tracts to church government and
church discipline. Eleazer Savage gave two reasons for publishing his Manual of Church
Discipline in 1844. “Disciplinary measures, as they exist,” he contended, “are more
frequently the offspring of passion, than principle.” Moreover, church members
possessed no guide “to scripturally instruct church members, as to the different kinds of
offences” and “the proper methods of treating them.”98
The Reverend Warham Walker concluded his own treatise, Church Discipline—
also published in 1844—claiming that an adherence to the principles elucidated within
his text, “by any church, would be found highly conducive to its true prosperity.” He
continued: “The discipline of a church, if it be conducted according to the law of Christ,
will be characterized by harmony, simplicity, and regularity. The law leaves nothing
doubtful, in respect either to the mode of disciplinary actions, or the spirit in which it
should be performed.” Walker further warned those churches that governed discipline
“by no rule, save their own discretion,” that their path could be “fraught with peril.”99
Those churches risked “introducing corruption, disorder, and dissension” into their ranks,
maladies which eventually would render them “incapable of united, vigorous, and well
directed action” towards their secular or regular enemies.100
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William Crowell’s The Church Member’s Manual, appearing in 1847, proved so
popular that three years later, he published a condensed version as a handbook. In 1873,
a new revised version was issued.101 Like Savage and Walker, Crowell stressed the
importance of discipline. “The course of the church should always be uniform and
consistent in the its treatment of offences,” he wrote, lamenting that some churches
“notice some offences and pass by others.” He then elaborated a number of procedural
requisites for proper administration of church-based justice, including sections devoted to
ruling according evidence, the various punishments available for churches, and the
treatment of excluded persons.102 In sum, Crowell devoted over sixty pages to the various
procedures, attributes, causes for, and types of church discipline.
These religious-treatise writers’ quest for a formalized church disciplinary system
fell in line with contemporary legal thinkers who heralded the necessity for law’s
objective, formal nature. The treatise writers focused on formalizing the practice of
discipline, elevating universal practice over particulars. By the 1830s, the American legal
profession had developed a treatise tradition which sought to present law as scientific,
emanating “not from will but from reason.” Law, prominent legal intellectuals insisted,
was “an objective, neutral, and apolitical system.”103 As the jurist James Kent stressed in
his Commentaries on American Law, it would be “extremely inconvenient to the public if
precedents were not duly regarded, and pretty implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety
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and stability of such rules, that professional men can give safe advice to those who
consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to buy, and to trust, and
to deal with each other.” If judicial decisions were ignored, he continued, “we should
disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property.”104 Indeed, by the late antebellum
period, state legal reformers in the South increasingly infringed upon local authority over
property matters, claiming the state’s protection of property was in the public interest.105
Local legal venues persisted throughout the period, with legal reformers deriding
localized law’s inherent flexibility and unpredictable nature. Parties in property disputes
at church meetinghouses made similar arguments, and their indictments of churches’
juridical proceedings and decrees hint at a larger reconceptualization of law, its location,
and sources of governing authority during the first-half of the nineteenth century.
In his quarrel with Henry Foster, Jacob Creath Jr. insisted that the David’s Fork
Reformed Church had failed in is scriptural duty to mitigate member-disputes. The
church’s decision, in his view, was compromised well before its official decree. Creath
charged that from the beginning of its proceedings the church had erred in handling the
case. At one point during the trial, Foster reportedly ““flew into a violent rage.” For that
action alone, Creath exclaimed, Foster should have been marked and turned out of the
society of good men.”106 The church instead pronounced Foster innocent “on his own
bare word,” without evidence, and “contrary to all the laws of all civilized
countries…contrary to all Protestant Christendom.” Only after declaring Foster
innocent, for example, did the church encourage Creath to send any evidence he
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possessed. The timing of this request unnerved the preacher. “Can such a church be
called a habitation of justice?” he asked. What if a secular court “should give a verdict
first, on the accuser’s word and then seven months afterwards call for evidence? What
would the community say of such a court?” And, furthermore, “whose character or
property would be safe in such hands?” The church, rather than upholding the Scriptures
and fairly resolving her members’ disputes, had failed to properly pursue justice. “I have
begged this church to settle this matter,” Creath exclaimed, but “she would not.”107

“An Older Jacob Creath, Jr.”108
The church’s decree reflected larger problems within the church body at David’s
Fork, complications that hindered its ability to dispense discipline and resolve disputes.
Covetousness and speculation proved one of the central charges that Creath had leveled
against Foster, but he extended the charge to include the entire church, exclaiming that
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the church had become “a nest of traders and Southern speculators.”109 With its character
in question, Creath believed the church could no longer objectively serve as a site for
dispute resolution. By contrasting its operations to the workings of secular courts—
asking what if “the courts of the country” operated in such a way so as to give a verdict
before receiving all the evidence—and declaring that he could no longer trust his
character and property with the church—Creath hinted that the David’s Fork Reformed
Church had lost credibility as an effective law-producing site. Insisting it had departed
from all “Protestant Christendom,” he implicitly raised the “civilized” operations of the
Commonwealth’s courts above those of the church body. As his former brethren at
David’s Fork seemed reluctant to sufficiently investigate the matter, the feeling may have
been widespread throughout the church community and beyond.110
Witnesses, observers, and participants across the trans-Appalachian West echoed
Creath in accusations against their local churches. William Collins expressed as much
not long after Creath’s dispute with Henry Foster. In the spring of 1841, Collins, a
member of the Elizabeth Church of Particular Baptists in Bourbon County, Kentucky,
had in hand thirteen tons of hemp. William Anderson, a life-long acquaintance of
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Collins’s and fellow member of the Elizabeth Church, expressed interest in buying the
crop, but needed to do so on credit. Following a church meeting in April, Anderson and a
handful of other church members assembled at Collins’s home to broker the deal. There,
according to Collins, the two drew up contract terms, eventually agreeing to those
stipulations two days later. Upon receiving payment of up to $300 on May 1, Collins
contracted to deliver that quantity of hemp to Anderson, with the rest to follow at his
discretion over the summer and fall of 1841. Anderson further agreed to make payment
in whole with ten percent interest by June 1842. In late April, amidst a wet spring,
Collins called upon Anderson to ensure he still wanted the first part of the hemp
delivered. Not having completed his hemp-house, Anderson declined receiving delivery
at that time. Collins ultimately delivered over two tons in June, but received no money
from Anderson. Despite Collins’s agreement to deliver the remaining eleven tons of
hemp at his discretion, Anderson—still having not paid his initial installment due on May
1—wrote Collins, insisting he send no more until Anderson directed him to do so.
“After waiting several days and receiving no money,” Collins later wrote, “I concluded
that he had violated the contract, and that therefore I was absolved or released from any
further obligation according to law.” Collins did not trust his personal judgment,
however, and called in help from “some eight to ten persons, all of whom coincided with
[his] own opinion.”111
Collins’s appeal for substantiation of his position proved simply the first step of a
long mitigation process that navigated from informal arbitration with church members
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serving as referees, to a church vote, and eventually to the Bourbon County Court. After
hearing testimony from a female church member who had been present when Collins and
Anderson had agreed to the contract, the two arbitrators ruled that Anderson had indeed
violated the contract, and owed Collins for the two tons already delivered. Both parties
agreed with the ruling, but Anderson did not immediately hand over the note. At the
August church meeting, two members agreed to enter as Anderson’s security for his debt
to Collins. “I then felt that I was perfectly safe,” Collins insisted, “having three Particular
Baptists bound by honor,” and Anderson agreed to draw up a note for Collins. A few
days later, however, he demanded that Collins “make confession to him or [they] could
not live together in [the] Elizabeth Church[.]” Collins refused, and Anderson “lodged a
complaint” against him at the July church meeting, claiming injury done “in purse and
feelings.”112
The dispute continued for months, with Collins, Anderson, and numerous other
church members leveling accusations at one another. Part of the problem, according to
Collins, was Anderson’s refusal to turn over a promissory note for the hemp. At one
point, Collins told Anderson that he “had proved the contract by testimony sufficient to
indict any man in Bourbon county for murder,” and further that his actions justified an
exclusion from the church.113 Anderson responded by accusing Collins of usurious
practices, fraud, disorderly conduct, and Collins’s son, with false swearing. After
numerous failed attempts, the Elizabeth Church eventually called a special meeting to
settle the difference. By this time, Collins had grown tired of Anderson’s stalling, and
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believed the church was hardly in a position to settle the matter effectively, as “all the
members had taken sides,” hindering the potential that they could reach and objective
decisions in the case.114 Instead of tackling the facts of the dispute, however, the church
voted they were distressed with both Anderson and Collins. Collins stood and expressed
his confusion on the vote, and left the meetinghouse. The church eventually resolved that
Collins had erred in so quickly absolving the contract and that Anderson was at fault for
not adhering to the decision of the previous arbitration committees. At one point, as
Collins tried to explain himself to the church, the moderator cut him off, claiming his
words reflected badly upon the church body. “It then seemed to me,” Collins later wrote,
“that I could say nothing but what was deemed out of order or unnecessary.” He
relented, and upon request from the moderator, Anderson again refused to turn over the
note. A motion and second for both men’s exclusions from the church passed.115
Unsurprisingly, Collins believed the church had made a mockery of the whole
affair, and, like Creath, hinted that the local court proved more effective than the
congregation for such a contract dispute. The moderator had even reportedly “remarked
that it had been the worst managed case he ever knew.” Following his exclusion, Collins
asked one member why the church did not allow him and Anderson to settle the matter at
law. The brother replied because a law suit would engender “cross swearing among the
members of the church, and a jury might decide differently from a committee, which
would place the church in an awkward position.” Another member admitted that the two
men’s exclusions were handled as one vote—a rather rare occurrence—because
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“otherwise, there would have been a split in the church.” The church’s actions may have
protected the coherence of the membership body, but its failure to protect its members’
individual rights upset Collins, convincing him of the necessity of state law. “I conclude
from it that if professors of the religion of Christ can act as here stated,” he exclaimed, “I
have lost little in being excluded from their fellowship and communion.”116 After the
exclusions, Collins eventually initiated suit against Anderson, “and there was crossswearing, sure enough.” Collins prevailed, though the court only awarded him a little
over $100, some $300 less than the amount he claimed Anderson owed.117
Collins insisted on multiple occasions, however, “that is was not the money [he]
was contending for,” when he sought arbitration from the church.118 Soon after the
dispute began, one neighbor told Collins that word had circulated about his backing out
of the contract.119 Surely the awareness of rumors spreading throughout the neighborhood
and the surrounding area of his alleged failure to live up to his contract with Anderson
drove Collins’s actions during the church proceedings. Once that legal venue buttressed
the rumors by excluding Collins—labeling him as both a less-than-straightforwardbusinessman and unrepentant moral transgressor—he first found solace at the local court
before making “public in pamphlet form the causes that led” to the degradation of his
civil and religious identities.120 He claimed to be perfectly satisfied “that all who heard
the trial,” and, he noted, “they were a good many,” were “satisfied” that he deported
himself throughout the endeavor “above board,” taking “no ungentlemanly advantages”
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of Anderson.121 His account—though describing primarily the church’s handling of the
case—ends with him triumphant in a court of law, and that arena’s ruling eclipsing
actions taken by the church, his rightful property and reputation restored.
Not far from the Elizabeth Church, members of the Washington Baptist Church
were embroiled in their own disagreements over church discipline and the “exercise of
arbitrary and lawless power” during the mid-1840s.122 More so than the charges of
Collins and Creath, however, the consternation aroused within the Washington Church
centered upon actions taken by their sister churches and governing association. In 1845,
the printed minutes of the Bracken Association noted rumors of Elder Gilbert Mason’s
(minister for the Washington and Lewisburg Churches) past transgressions. The
accusations stemmed from alleged actions taken by Mason when he served as preacher at
the nearby Mayslick Baptist Church during the early 1840s. Along with five other
charges, Mason was accused of “serious impropriety as to the disposition” of monies
collected for Georgetown College.123 The Washington Church took up four of the six
charges against their pastor immediately after the conclusion of the association meeting
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in September 1845, and “[Mason] was unanimously acquitted.” The church decided they
had no jurisdiction over the two other charges.124
Three months after the association’s meeting, however, the Mayslick Church held
a council—attended my members of churches in both the Bracken and Elkhorn
Associations—which touched upon the charges against Elder Mason. Having already
been dismissed from the Mayslick Church on good terms in 1843, and accepted as the
pastor of the Washington Church soon after, members of the latter charged the Mayslick
proceedings were illegal, “altogether unauthorized, and unprecedented in Baptist
jurisprudence.”125 Any effort “to arraign, try, or even prefer charges against any
individual member, out of his own immediate church,” Washington Church members
asserted, “is an act of usurpation; and is wholly unauthorized by Baptist Law, or scripture
teachings.” Not only did the “Mayslick Council” overstep its authority hearing charges
against a member of another church—who was not present and had already made
satisfaction for the offenses in 1842—but the council ignored overwhelming witness
testimony in favor of Mason.126
The Washington Church disregarded the decision of the Mayslick Council, and
the controversy continued throughout 1846. In January, the Washington and Lewisburg
Churches published a reply to the Mayslick Council, which further stoked the
controversy and led to another gathering of an advisory council in July. After hearing
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testimony and examining evidence, the Lewisburg Council—as the July meeting came to
be known—ruled that Elder Mason deserved “expulsion from [his] church.”127 The
Washington Church retorted that the Council’s proceedings against Mason were tainted
by prejudice and illegality, and refused to follow its recommendations. Similar to the
cases of Creath and Collins, Washington Church members believed their pastor’s
reputation was being trampled by extra-legal procedures propelled by passion and
faction.
In defending their position to the Bracken Association, the church called upon
Judge Adam Beatty, a circuit court judge in Mason County who had participated in the
Lewisburg proceedings. Beatty submitted a long letter in Mason’s defense, claiming that
after Mason defended his actions to the Council, the delegates changed the charge—in
relation to the Georgetown donation— from embezzlement to breach of trust. Thus, he
continued, the council made “it a crime in Elder Mason to have defended himself
against” the embezzlement accusation, “by the production of evidence showing that he
was not guilty of the charge!!” Its procedural tactics shocked the judge. “Was such an
anomaly ever before witnessed in a judicial tribunal?” he asked. “Could any thing [sic]
else but a judgment of condemnation be expected from a tribunal, which was of opinion
that an endeavor, on the part of the accused, to defend himself, served only to aggravate
his offences.” Moreover, the council had found Mason guilty of slander based upon
evidence of confession. This evidence, the judge continued—pointing to a ruling made
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals—holds “‘very little weight’” in state-based courts. As
twenty-seven individuals corroborated the preacher, in contrast to the confessions of a
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few, “this species of testimony ought not to have the weight of a feather in deciding the
facts of [Mason’s] case.”128 On another charge related to a debt owed to a Mr. Kirk,
Beatty claimed there was ample evidence to disprove the accusation, yet the council
voted the charge sustained.129 Despite Beatty’s defense of both Mason and the
Washington Church, delegates to the Bracken Association cut ties with the Washington
Church in 1846 for its refusal “‘to abide by and perform the decision of the [Lewisburg]
Council in Elder Mason’s case.’”130
The Bracken Association’s actions particularly incensed members of the
Washington Church. Not only had the Association severed ties with the Washington
Church, but it had adopted a resolution calling for Mason’s retirement.131 In turn,
Washington Church members invoked a number of Baptist authorities—including John
Taylor and Warham Walker—who highlighted the danger of power-usurping
associations. For Mason’s congregants, in dissolving ties with their church and casting
aspersions against their pastor, delegates to the Bracken Association had acted from
passionate malice, wielding “lawless power” against the church’s scriptural rights:
We are greatly deceived if what we have set forth does not convince all candid
and dispassionate men, whose minds have not been warped by preconceived
opinions, that the action of the Association at its present meeting…has been a
violation of the first principles of justice, and inconsistent with Baptist law and
usage, in cutting off the Washington Church from its association with its sister
churches, and thus attempting to degrade and dishonor the said church for doing
what it had a clear legal right to do.132
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Although Creath, Collins, and members of the Washington Church disagreed on doctrinal
principles—Creath a Reformer, Collins a Particular Baptist, and the Washington Church
of the Regular Baptist Order—each could agree that they had been wronged by the
workings of prejudiced tribunals. And as Judge Beatty pointed out, Mason’s reputation
had been castigated by a Council that paid no heed to the rigors of law. For them, and
surely other church-goers throughout the region, their churches lacked the attributes of
state law’s professional, formal, and objective procedures and outcomes. The fact that
each of the above disputes centered upon white men’s property and reputations
compounded the matter, and impelled the respective parties to detail their disputes’
particulars in published form.
Yet a central theme in each account was the contrast between church-based and
state-based legal venues. For Creath, no “civilized” tribunal of a secular nature would
proceed as did the David’s Fork Church. The Washington Church and her supporters,
too, denounced the “arbitrary” rulings of the association’s councils. Not only did they
lack authority, but had acted contrary to both state and Baptist law. Collins also relished
finding recourse at the local court, noting that he had become “perfectly satisfied lawing
such men as Anderson.” He concluded his pamphlet noting the subsequent disciplinary
paralysis which infiltrated the Elizabeth Church following his exclusion. Pointing to one
case under consideration, he exclaimed, “having been, I think, for five months before the
church,” without movement, “I really fear the church is almost afraid to make an attempt
to regulate her own business.”133
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Such outcomes were exactly what writers like Savage, Walker, and Crowell
hoped to avoid when they published their treatises devoted to church discipline in the
1840s. In each case the deciding tribunal strayed from procedural corrections and fell
into the pit of passionate resolution. This is not to say that passion or faction was absent
from churches prior to the late-antebellum period. But, amidst the expanding, integrated
marketplace of the early nineteenth century, as debt transformed from a moral to
economic failing, and as refinement spread outward from urban centers such as
Lexington and Nashville, individuals, church-members and not, sought more formal,
unprejudiced, and predictable mitigation for their property disputes. This led to a
weakening of church authority over white members’ property-related matters and a
disproportionate focus on black members’ transgressions. In other instances, as we will
see over the next two chapters, doctrinal disagreements which pervaded early-nineteenth
century Baptist churches often implicated property. The factionalism and schism
produced by the period’s transforming religious culture also helped transform how
individuals envisioned their churches as sites for legal realization. As law-makers and
church-goers engaged in the cultural process of separating church from state, such
controversy further constructed the boundaries of religious and civil authority in the
nineteenth-century United States.
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CHAPTER 4. “THE PUTRID [SIC] CARMAGE OF CONTENTION”: RELIGIOUS
INSURGENCY AND DISCIPLINARY DECLENSION

"It is [Alexander Campbell’s] interest to scatter the Baptists awhile, that he may rake up
all he can."1

In April 1831 the Fox Run Baptist Church of Shelby County, Kentucky gathered
for their monthly meeting. Following prayer and reception of new members, the
moderator opened the floor for the airing of grievances. Brother John Ford claimed that
fellow-member James Drane had failed to comply with a contract to which the two men
had previously agreed. The church clerk initially recorded little detail, but did note that a
committee was formed “to examine into the merits of the case, and their Decision [was]
to be final.” The committee subsequently ordered that Drane pay Ford “a reasonable rent
for the use of the 35 acres of land” or otherwise let Ford retain the land until he thought it
proper to give full possession of the tract to Drane. At the following meeting in May, the
church admonished Brother Jeptha Brite “for opening his doors to disorderly preaching.”
The two cases appear to have little in common, and are actually rare in that the church
body did not level any exclusions from the church fellowship, nor is there record of either
man making acknowledgement to any wrong doing in order to remain a full member of
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the Fox Run Church.2 A closer look reveals that the two men were in-laws; Brite’s wife,
Elizabeth, was a Drane by birth. And the “disorderly preaching” that took place at the
Brite home was the handiwork of one or both of the Creaths, a family whose affinities
with the dissenting views of Alexander Campbell were well known throughout the
region.3

The defendants’ collective action over the next weeks—with the apparent aid

and support of their wives—speaks to the changing nature of church authority over
matters of dispute resolution during the 1830s, as well as to how insurgent religious
movements altered how individuals envisioned and engaged with law in postRevolutionary Kentucky.
Fox Run’s charges against James Drane and Jeptha Brite encapsulate Baptists’
efforts to regulate their members’ household relations and their business matters.
Following the charges, Drane and Brite, along with their wives, submitted a remonstrance
to the church. Both couples asserted that a factionalist spirit had pervaded the church
body. The Dranes resented the civil award levied in favor of John Ford and against them,
while the Brites claimed that the church held no authority over who they invited into their
own home. Their grievances hint at individuals’ reconceptualization of church authority
discussed in the preceding two chapters: that changing understandings of the household
(in this case family privacy) led to a decline in disciplinary efforts aimed at household
2
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regulation, and that for many, economic transformation necessitated a passionless,
predictable legal system for resolving property- or business-related disputes. The cases
against Drane and Brite, however, were complicated by the trans-Appalachian West’s
changing religious culture. Baptists throughout Kentucky and Tennessee, after nearly
fifty years of institutional growth and membership expansion in the region, witnessed a
prolonged period of internal dissension and church schism during the 1820s and 1830s.
The religious insurgency associated with Alexander Campbell and Barton Stone’s
“Reformation” movement, while siphoning members from Baptist churches (and as we’ll
see in Chapter 5, producing heated litigation over church property), also subtly altered the
ritual of church discipline.
During the 1820s and 1830s the region’s religious landscape scorched with
dissension as Baptists argued over a variety of doctrinal matters, but especially as the
teachings of Campbell and Stone gained prominence and adherents. Campbell’s calls for
the supremacy of the individual over the collective will of the congregation, along with
his denunciation of creeds, confessions of faith, and any religious body not deriving from
the scriptures, found fertile ground among the region’s Baptists. By the time the Fox Run
Church admonished Brite for allowing a Campbellite to preach in his home in 1831, area
Baptists had experienced years of schism within their churches, governing associations,
and “neighbourhoods.” Notions of church and community did not completely erode, of
course, but for some individuals, internal dissension and church schism transformed how
they understood their church’s role in enforcing discipline and maintaining the social
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peace of the community.4 Motivating factors for a seeming reluctance, on the part of
some churches, to enforce hitherto common disciplinary practices are difficult to
ascertain, but this chapter contends that as member relations became strained by the
influence of the Stone-Campbell movement, church discipline receded and church bodies
grew less willing to enforce their law-making powers. The practice of church discipline
did not completely cease amidst the Campbellite schisms of the period. It continued,
especially in rural areas, throughout the nineteenth century.5 Bogged down with internal
dissension and schism, however, many afflicted churches recorded fewer or no charges
during the controversy. This examination, then, illuminates how changes in the religious
culture affected individuals’ vision of the wider legal culture.

Despite slow growth from the end of the Revolutionary War through the 1790s,
Baptists and Methodists kept up with the region’s overall population growth during the
first decades of the nineteenth century, constructing both an institutional infrastructure
and welcoming a large number of members. Their Presbyterian counterparts did not fare
as well. From the statehood period on, doctrinal disputes and divisions wrecked
Kentucky’s Presbyterian churches. By 1820, the denomination in the state, including
those aligned with the Cumberland group (a more revivalist faction which had broken off
from mainline Presbyterians during the first decade of the nineteenth century) numbered
only about 3,700. Ten years later that number more than doubled to 7,610 members
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worshipping as 120 church bodies.6 Presbyterianism in Tennessee progressed even
slower.7 Methodists proved more successful than Presbyterians. By 1830 Kentucky
Methodists numbered just over 28,000 members affiliated with 51 circuits and stations,
and 93 ministers.8 Methodist regional conferences based in Tennessee (but including
members from parts of Georgia, Mississippi, and northern Alabama) grew from just
under 3,000 in 1803 to nearly 70,000 in 1840.9 Like the Methodists, Baptists in
Kentucky expanded throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century. Boasting 574
churches affiliated with 34 associations and just under 40,000 members in 1830, the
Baptists, though divided due to various doctrinal disagreements, were the largest
denomination in the state.10 Their Tennessee brethren by the mid-1830s claimed over
27,000 members worshipping in five hundred congregations.11
Despite the steady growth, trans-Appalachian Baptists—and their Protestant
cohorts in general—constantly worried about the progress of religion in the region.
Indeed fears of irreligion and deism’s progress haunted religiously-minded Americans
during the post-Revolutionary period.12 In 1798 Lexington resident Robert Stuart
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lamented that “[p]erhaps there never was a day when men of virtue were so few. The
Infidelity; the Profanity; the dissipation & almost universal depravation of morals which
at present pervade every part of our country, is truly alarming.” Christianity, Stuart
continued, “is now banished from our polite circles” and had “become the sneer of
ridicule.”13 Stuart and other’s fears were surely pacified over the next few years as a
Great Revival swept through the western frontier. Historian John B. Boles asserts that
following the revival, “religion for a time came to monopolize the popular mind in
Kentucky.”14
The give-and-take between religious fervor and spiritual drought was a constant
theme during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century Baptist
historian John Spencer claimed that in just a matter of a few years after the revival, deism
and infidelity, which had been “almost silenced” during the period of religious fervor,
“began to vaunt itself again.” The Elkhorn Association reported only 9 new baptisms,
and across Kentucky, 1808 proved “the gloomiest year” of the young century. By 1810,
however, Spencer insisted, “some light showers began to relive the thirsty land, and more
fruitful seasons followed.”15 This ebb and flow of spiritual success and dearth was
encapsulated in a letter received by Kentucky resident Capt. Thomas Buckner in 1819.
“Religion and Atheism take their turns in this town,” the correspondent wrote, “but at this
present writeing [sic] religion weighs predominant. Three mile sermons and half a mile
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prayers are all the rage at this time.”16 Yet nearby in Shelby County just four years later,
Martin Baskett lamented that even professors of religion “in our country have gotten
proud and love the world better than the Cross.”17 Soon after in 1825, Baskett changed
his tune, noting that he had recently received “some pleasing accounts from different
parts” of Kentucky about revivals.18
Despite this relentless anxiety over religion’s progress or regress, sectarian strife
and doctrinal dissension proved a perhaps greater concern. The Great Revival not only
helped to push evangelicalism towards the mainstream, it ensured a large amount of
religious diversity, which in turn, placed stress on the existing church institutions in the
trans-Appalachian West.19 For the Baptists, their greatest threat emerged with Alexander
Campbell’s increased critiques of their doctrine and form of church governance during
the 1820s. But Campbell, Stone, and their teachings were not the only divisive influence
circulating among the region’s Baptists in the 1820s and 1830s. The Rev. R.B.C.
Howell, upon becoming editor at The Baptist (later the Tennessee Baptist) in 1838,
assured his readers that the newspaper’s theological positions would not change. "I have,
from the beginning, still am, and ever expect to remain," Howell asserted, "a Baptist of
the 'Old School.'" This certainly did not mean, however, that he was caught up with any
of the "mummeries" recently propagated, and then “so rife in Tennessee." Howell
repudiated "Parkerism, Campbellism, Mormonism, anti-effortism, antinomianism, and
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every other similar fantasy.”20 His assurances touched on some of the largest divisions
within the Baptist denomination as well as the rise of competing doctrines and sects that
wrecked the religious landscape during the antebellum period.
Other than Mormonism and antinomianism, the “mummeries” which Howell
referred to stemmed from opposition to the Mission movement. The mission
movement’s roots were in the east, where evangelical Congregationalists and
Presbyterians feared for the West’s presumed moral laxity. With hopes of establishing a
Christian Commonwealth that included the Trans-Appalachian region, eastern
evangelicals organized a number of benevolent and missionary societies during the 1810s
and 1820s—including the American Sunday School Union (1814), American Bible
Society (1816), American Tract Society (1826), and the American Home Missionary
Society (1826). Many Baptists not only supported these establishments, but went on to
organize their own foreign missionary organizations, including the Triennial Convention
(1814), the American Baptist Home Missionary Society (1832), and the Baptist General
Tract Society (1824).21
The missionary cause reached the West with Luther Rice’s itineration throughout
Kentucky and parts of Tennessee in 1815-1816. Through Rice’s efforts, along with the
dissemination of mission circulars, a number of western churches and associations were
brought into the missionary fold. Unlike their more theologically liberal opponents, antimissionists (often labeled “anti-effort” or “Primitive”) did not wish to construct
expansive denominational apparatuses that stretched beyond the local level. Instead,
20
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anti-missionists clung to a traditional, Calvinistic understanding of God’s sovereignty.22
Fragmented by doctrinal disagreements themselves, however, anti-missionists never
coalesced as a denomination. Their opposition to the missionary cause and the clamorous
reaction they engendered among pro-mission Baptists linked these disparate religious
groups. And although some anti-missionary churches took part in regional governing
associations, their critique of unscriptural religious institutions such as bible and tract
societies bled into other Baptists’ critiques of associations and their potentially dangerous
ability to usurp congregations’ powers. Campbell’s denunciation of all ecclesiastical
structures other than the local congregation echoed those of anti-missionists, but for most
Baptists, his anti-mission impulses may have been the least worrisome aspect of his
doctrine. Even still, anti-missionists’ message proved popular throughout the transAppalachian region.
Daniel Parker emerged as one of the most vociferous critics of the missionary
system during the 1810s. Living in Tennessee, not far from the Kentucky line, when the
mission cause first gained popularity in the West, Parker soon moved to southeastern
Illinois and began more actively propagating his anti-mission views. In 1820 he
published A Public Address to the Baptists Society in which he castigated missionary
societies—and specifically the “Baptist Board of Foreign Missions”—as not only
unscriptural but dangerous to Baptists’ democratic form of church governance. 23 Later in
the decade, Parker advanced the “Two-seed” doctrine, his theological basis for antimissionism. God, Parker claimed, created Adam and Eve in his likeness (the good seed),
22
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and after the fall of man, he planted in Eve, and all the daughters of Eve, the “seed of the
serpent.” Thus, those born of the former seed were the children of God; the latter, the
children of the devil. In bringing the Gospel to foreign lands, to the descendants of the
devil’s seed, Missionary societies embarked on a worthless endeavor.24
In some ways, Parker’s anti-missionary views echoed those of the popular Baptist
preacher, John Taylor, whose message gained traction among many trans-Appalachian
Baptists in the opening-decades of the nineteenth century. Taylor would later deride
Parker in 1830, claiming that both he and Campbell were “distracting the Baptists in the
Western country” (he also claimed it was possible that neither man was religious at all).25
In 1819, however, Taylor published his Thoughts on Missions in which he infamously
claimed that missions smelled of “the New England Rat.” He compared the missionary
system with the Catholic Church’s selling of indulgences during the pre-Reformation
period, denounced theological schools devoted to educating ministers, and decried the
“artful measures of those great men [missionary agents]” in pilfering money from
common church members. “How is it,” Taylor exclaimed, “these white-handed gentry,
always stretched out for money, and like the horse-leech, ever crying give, give!!” Similar
to Parker, Taylor warned that the missionary effort was really an aristocratic plot, one
contrary to the Baptists’ highest authority: the local congregation.26
Baptists’ fears of governing associations consolidating power over autonomous
churches compounded divisions over the mission question. One of Taylor’s chief
24
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objectives in publishing Thoughts on Missions, had been “to drive [missionaries] our of
Baptist associations,” organizations whose existence Taylor supported but whose powers
he always believed should be limited.27 Particularly of concern to Taylor and other critics
was the ability of associations to usurp the disciplinary powers of autonomous
congregations. As Taylor noted in 1823, “a number of poor Baptists,” especially, were in
the habit of using Associations “as a kind of appellate court.”28 Pastor Peter Gayle of
Tennessee likewise lamented in 1835 that there appeared to be certain groups who were
“anxious to introduce the system of making Associations Ecclesiastical Courts to regulate
and bind the consciences” of the individual. Yet he held out hope that the “good old
spirit of independence” was advancing in the state, which would never imbue
associations with “supreme jurisdiction in ecclesiastical government.”29
Debates over the mission question and the utility of governing associations
pervaded trans-Appalachian Baptist churches, at times provoking schism. The Buffalo
Lick Baptist Church in Shelby County, Kentucky resolved in 1832 that it had no “legal
authority” to participate “in the new theorys [sic] of the day, such as the Bible Society,
Missionary, Tract, Temperance, [and] Sunday School.” Together “with the Baptist
Convention Scheme” Buffalo Lick members continued are “but man made at best, &
consequently, [have] more of the love of money, and self, than the Glory of God.”30 In
Fayette County, Kentucky the South Elkhorn Baptist Church divided in the early 1820s,
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and the church’s majority faction withdrew from the Elkhorn Association.31 After a brief
account of the division, the clerk recorded the proper form of church governance. Most
importantly, the majority ruled that the church “is a worshipping congregation & is the
highest Court Christ has fix’d on earth.” Church bodies were free to leave associations at
their will, as they “may be in one association today & tomorrow in another.” An
Association’s only purpose was as an advisory council, the clerk recorded, “not as some
would have it, a legislative one.”32
The contention and schisms such disagreements engendered held the potential to
alter how churches practiced discipline, and thus, how church members envisioned their
communities’ broader legal culture. During the mid-1830s, debates over the pro-mission
Tennessee Baptist Convention erupted in the Little Cedar Lick Baptist Church. After
initially deferring the missionary question to their association in August 1834, the church
clerk recorded only one disciplinary charge (for an unspecified offence) during the next
nineteen months. Nearly three years later a similar dearth in discipline occurred as the
church experienced a division due to the majority’s vote to join the missionary cause. In
June 1837, Elder Thompkins petitioned the church for “dismission for himself and as
many others of the Brethren and Sisters as wished to be dismissed.” To its credit, the
majority acquiesced, dismissing on good terms at least twenty-nine individuals
(Thompkins included) over the next two months. They even allowed that any member
with similar misgivings could leave the church through September without facing
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excommunication proceedings. After that month, “the order made allowing the Brethren
and Sisters to join the dismistion [sic]” would “be nul [sic] and void and of no affect.”33
This allowed the Little Cedar Lick Church to break apart without any potentially
tumultuous disciplinary proceedings. Yet it did not stop doctrinal disagreement or
division from affecting how members interacted with their church as a legal site. For a
year preceding the formal withdraw of Elder Thompkins and his followers, the church did
not record any disciplinary activity. That silence continued until July 1838, a full twentyfour months with no record of the church fellowship meeting as church tribunal.
Moreover, from the time the church initially took up the mission question in August 1834
until years after the 1837 division, church discipline ebbed. From 1830 through 1833 the
clerk recorded one charge per every 5.03% of the church membership. In contrast, over
the next four year period (1834-1837)—from the church’s first recorded mention of the
Tennessee Baptist Convention through the division—that same number fell to just 1.79%.
That rate remained a low 2.65% over the next four year period (1838-1841), before
finally surpassing its pre-division level between 1842 and 1845 by rising to 5.83%.34
Little Cedar Lick’s experience during the 1830s is simply one example of how church
schism and doctrinal dissension altered individuals’ conceptions of their churches as lawproducing sites. But the same process played out in other churches entangled in various
doctrinal disagreements or in disputes with competing sects.
The Bryan’s Station Baptist Church near Lexington was one Kentucky’s first such
organizations. Constituted in 1786, Bryan’s Station Baptists met regularly for the next
33
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twenty-five years. By 1801 the church had grown to 421 members. That year the church
dismissed 267 members to organize the David’s Fork Baptist Church. Prior to 1802, the
church recorded 76 charges against its white members and 34 charges against its black
brethren during its fifteen-year history. From the start of 1802 through the first two
months of 1811, the church clerk made note of an additional 88 charges against whites
and 66 against blacks, a total of 164 charges against whites and 100 against black
members in the church’s first twenty-five years of existence. By 1811, however, the
church found itself on the brink of schism. The difficulties stemmed from an interchurch dispute between members of the Bryan’s Station Church and a nearby
congregation at Town’s Fork, and implicated numerous other churches in the area as well
as the Elkhorn Association.
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In 1810, the majority of Bryan’s Station met with other disgruntled churchfactions and formed the Licking Association of Particular Baptists. The minority,
dissatisfied with the majority’s doctrinal stances and desiring to remain with the Elkhorn
Association, declared in January 1811 “that they were no longer under the jurisdiction of
the church” at Bryan’s Station. Two months later, the majority excluded the 35 memberminority (including 9 black members, at least 8 of whom were slaves) for disorderly
conduct in relation to fomenting division within the church or withdrawing from
membership without letters of dismission.35 Over the course of the next year (April
1811-February 1812), the church excluded another 10 members for joining the schismatic
group. In contrast to its first twenty-five years of existence, the decades following the
1811 schism witnessed a drastic decline in the church’s disciplinary activities. From
1812 through 1860 the church only recorded 102 charges against its white and black
members (51 each).36 Though the majority remained largely intact after the 1811 purge
of recusants, those who stayed behind pursued discipline with less rigor.

For many Baptists, however, Campbell and Stone’s divisive influence throughout
the region—and in Kentucky especially—proved the greatest threat to their institutional
stability.37 The “Reformation” (or “Restoration”) that many Baptists derided so intently
during the antebellum period resulted from the convergence of two religious movements.
35
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In 1832, after nearly a decade of critique, Alexander Campbell and his fellow
“reformers” joined with Barton W. Stone, and the adherents of his Christian Church.
Unable to agree upon a name for the united movement, members of the new sect were
known as Christians, Disciples of Christ, or Reformers. Their churches were identified
alternatively as Christian Churches or Churches of Christ. During the 1820s, Baptists
primarily referred to them as Campbellites or, sarcastically, as “reformers,” their
ministers “proclaimers,” and their influential doctrine, derogatorily, as “Campbellism.”
Historians have since referred to the coalition as the “Stone-Campbell” movement.38
Barton Stone, born on Christmas Eve 1772 in Charles County, Maryland, was
baptized in the Church of England, but converted to Presbyterianism in the early 1790s.
In 1796 he became an ordained minister licensed by North Carolina’s Orange Presbytery.
Stone itinerated briefly through West Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, before finally
settling in 1797 with Presbyterians at Cane Ridge and Concord in northern Kentucky.
Despite his ordination and travels, he harbored uncertainty over some aspects Calvinism,
including doctrines of the Trinity, predestination, and reprobation. He was called in 1798
to become pastor of the united congregations at Cane Ridge and Concord, but upon
extensive examination of the Westminster Confession of Faith, he initially declined
ordination by the Transylvania Presbytery because of his doubt over some of the
Confession’s doctrinal points. The Presbytery, thinking his uneasiness extended solely to
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the Trinity, and not to predestination, election, and reprobation, deemed him sufficient
and subsequently ordained him.
After attending revivals in southern Kentucky during the summer of 1800, Stone
led a five-day camp meeting back at the Concord Meetinghouse. Thousands reportedly
attended those services, but it was overshadowed by the Cane Ridge Revival in August of
the following year, which drew an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 individuals to hear
preaching from Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist ministers. The revivals confirmed
Stone’s discomfort with the doctrines of predestination and reprobation. Soon thereafter,
he began insisting that all sinners could be saved simply by coming to and believing in
Christ. Some of his fellow Presbyterians accepted Stone’s new theological stances, but
others in northern Kentucky derided his unorthodoxy. In September 1803, Stone, along
with four other ministers facing charges from the Kentucky Synod, withdrew from that
body. Shunning sectarian designations, they insisted that the only appellation a true
believer needed was that of “Christian.” Over the next seven years, internal divisions
among the Christians (and continued doctrinal arguments with prominent Presbyterians
such as David Rice) resulted in Stone’s lone leadership of the sect by 1811. Over the
next decade Stone established churches in Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky. By 1830 the
Christian Church numbered more than 16,000 members dispersed through the TransAppalachian West from Alabama to Indiana, as well as along the east coast in Virginia
and North Carolina. That year, Stone, for a second time, proposed a union between his
Christians and Alexander Campbell’s reformers.39
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Alexander Campbell40

Barton Stone41

Alexander Campbell was born in the Broughshane Parish of Ireland on September
12, 1788. The son of a Seceder Presbyterian minister, Campbell grew up in a devout
family and joined his father’s church as a teenager. At the age of twenty Campbell set
out to join his father, Thomas, who had earlier immigrated to the United States. A shipwreck derailed Campbell’s first attempted voyage—while confirming his life calling as a
minister—and redirected him to Glasgow for a year of study. There, Campbell imbibed
the Scottish Common Sense philosophy which would inform his Scriptural interpretations
throughout his life. Moreover, church leaders in Glasgow influenced his thinking on
everything from congregational autonomy, weekly communion, the exclusion of creeds,
and the restoration of primitive Christianity. He grew disgusted with the sectarian
bickering that pervaded his own church as well as the Scottish reform movement in
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general. In 1809, Campbell and the rest of his family migrated to the United States, reunited with Thomas Campbell, and settled in Washington, Pennsylvania. Alexander and
Thomas quickly set their sights on promoting Christian unity, forming the Christian
Association of Washington which later became the Brush Run Church. Campbell married
in 1811 and took up a farm in what is now Bethany, West Virginia.42
In 1812, both Campbell men repudiated infant baptism and aligned with the
Baptists’ doctrine on full immersion for converted believers, the beginning of a nearly
two-decade tumultuous relationship between the younger Campbell and that group.
Through the 1810s, Campbell tended his farm, taught school, and itinerated for the
Baptists. He never officially joined the denomination, but remained connected with that
group until the late 1820s. Two of Campbell’s early churches belonged to Baptist
associations, and in 1823, he started publishing the Christian Baptist. He germinated
some controversy in 1816 when in a presentation known as the “Sermon on the Law” he
insisted that rather than being bound by Mosaic Law, Christians were “under grace,” thus
elevating the New Testament above the Old. Some at the time and since have pointed to
this moment, and subsequent debates that followed, as the beginning of his reformation
movement. But controversy took hold in the 1820s, as Campbell used the pages of the
Christian Baptist to herald a “reformation of the apostolic order based upon the New
Testament.”43 Critics seized on Campbell’s doctrine, forming an opposition periodical
known as the Baptist Recorder. Amidst this controversy, Campbell and Stone aligned
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into one movement in 1832, and Stone’s Christian Messenger announced “the union of
Christians in fact in our country.”44
To an outsider, the main theological differences between the Stone-Campbell
movement and mainline Baptists—the former’s heralding the authority of the New
Testament over the Old,45 its adherence to baptism for the remission of sins, and
especially its renunciation of creeds, confessions of faith, and other human instruments of
church government which were central to many Baptist churches—may appear slight.
Yet individuals involved in the schisms took the divergences seriously, and distinguished
the distinctiveness of each group (as historian Edmund S. Morgan once noted, “the most
hotly contested religious differences among Christians have often been differences of
degree; the shift from orthodoxy to heresy may be no more than a shift of emphasis.”). 46
Jasper Morris remembered in the 1840s a schism that took place in the Mason County
Baptist Church the previous decade. He insisted that the two churches had since “been
two distinct and separate sects having…different rules of church government.”47 Another
observer, James Ingels, echoed Morris’s assertions, noting that Baptists and Reformers
“entertain[ed] different principles of religious faith both in theory and practice.” Ingels
departed the Bethlehem Baptist Church soon “after the Campbellites commenced
preaching there,” because, he claimed, “their doctrines didn’t suite me.”48 Even when
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church-goers were not educated on the nuanced doctrinal subtleties between Reformers
and Baptists, they insisted upon the two groups’ separateness. One Baptist claimed “I
don’t know [the Reformers’] rules, but I do know they do not hold the same faith and
doctrine that we do.”49
From the late 1820s on, Baptists obsessed over the influence of Campbell and his
followers. The editors of the Baptist Banner devoted column after column of their
regular periodical to anecdotes of Campbellite hypocrisy, charges of blasphemy, and
details of the doctrine’s continued advancement amongst Baptist ranks. In some
instances, Baptist writers sought to convince readers that Campbellite leaders deceived
their followers. An 1836 article noted that one reformed church in Kentucky met every
week (opposed to Baptists who generally communed monthly) for service and solicitation
of donations for the poor. Yet, “there arose much confusion and debating in this
congregation of the reformation,” the editorialist insisted, “when it appeared that the
greater portion and nearly all of this fund for the poor (we think that is what they call it)
had been paid to the ‘proclaimers!!!’”50 At times, the reports veered toward a McCarthylike obsession with rooting out the dissenters, and editors admitted as much. The Franklin
Association of Baptists charged its member churches to “make no compromise with
error; mark them who cause divisions; [and] divest yourselves of the last vestige of
Campbellism” in your midst. Likewise, the Banner proclaimed “Some of our readers
may suppose that we devote too much of our paper in noticing the Campbellites, but we
think the state of things in Kentucky imperiously demands it.” Kentucky was “doomed
to be a battle ground,” as the reformers “are organizing and have already commenced a
49
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systematic attack upon” the Baptists of the state. They traveled in all directions, the
editor continued, bringing their false doctrine to the populace, “it therefore becomes us to
be on the alert and to repel the various slanders and misrepresentations that are afloat.”51
John L. Waller, the editor of the Baptist Banner from 1835 to 1841, probably
genuinely feared the Campbellite influence in his state.52 Yet he was also reared with the
stories of his ancestors’ religious persecution during the late eighteenth century. The
editor’s great uncle, also named John, was well-known among early Baptists. The elder
John Waller had been rumored to be an “exceedingly wicked man” in the 1760s, but
found Christ during the latter part of that decade and became a renowned preacher of the
Baptist faith. He was one of three arrested in 1768 when authorities seized Lewis Craig
at the Spotsylvania meetinghouse. Six years later, in March of 1774, Virginian
authorities again arrested Waller for preaching without a license. He continued to pray
and preach from his jail cell, before being brought to trial. Waller refused to post bond as
two other of his persecuted cell-mates had, and remained in jail for two more weeks until
he was finally released. Early-American Baptists prided themselves—and many still
do—on their persecuted past, and it is not inconceivable that Waller, the editor, employed
hyperbole when warning his brethren of the Campbellite phalanx advancing through his
state. Even so, the Stone-Campbell movement represented a genuine threat to many
trans-Appalachian Baptists. It reminded them, though they did not face the same state-
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sanctioned persecution as their colonial-era predecessors, that they had their own battles
to fight, their own reasons to stay vigilante.53
Like Waller, Baptists throughout Kentucky equated their encounter with
Campbell’s rising influence with war. Leaders of the Baptist Church in Washington,
Kentucky charged in 1844 that the “tenants, doctrines, & views preached” by the
Reformation Church “are at war with the principals & doctrines of the Baptist Church.”54
Indeed, Baptist historian John Spencer insisted that in Kentucky, the Campbellite-Baptist
struggle “was a civil war,” as “strife pervaded every department of society.”55 Though
Spencer wrote over a half-century after the schism, antebellum-Baptists shared his
sentiments, worrying that Campbell’s views were hazardous to both religious and civil
society. James Fishback, a prominent Baptist minister in the Lexington area, admitted in
1834 that there were “many good men & women among those who call themselves
Reformers,” but he insisted “that the principles by which they are distinguished from
other Protestant Christians” were “of a dangerous tendency” both to the individual
morality and more “generally upon the good order & piety of society.”56
To others the Campbellite plague appeared to affect all of Kentucky. After
receiving news of Campbell’s popularity from his brother, an observer in Elizabethtown
replied that “from what you say about the principles and Doctrine of A. Campbell I
infered [sic] that you tho’t all Kentucky was in a distressing state.” He admitted that “in
some parts the Baptists have been witchedly [sic] mangled,” but that the day was coming
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when the Lord would lift up his “true followers.”57 Likewise, M.A. Crute wrote her aunt
in 1844, lamenting that the “Campbellites appear to be carrying the day” in her Kentucky
neighborhood. “There has been considerable excitement about them and much
controversy,” she continued. “They receive new members almost every week. I have
less faith than ever in religious controversies,” as “nothing is better calculated to make
infidels than angry religious disputes.”58
To Tennessee Baptists, the situation appeared just as dire. The Reformation
movement gained ground in Tennessee after 1827, the year in which a major split of
Tennessee Baptists occurred over an increased Arminian influence in the state. Churchhistorian J.H. Grime noted a number of ministers and churches that broke from their
Calvinist counterparts in the 1820s as Campbell’s “new-fangled notions” waged “war
against the Articles of Faith” of Tennessee Baptists. Although he exclaimed that the
region had “been a battle ground between Baptists and Campbellites,” he continued
boastfully in the early-twentieth century, “to-day, as then, the Baptists hold sway.”59 The
state of affairs seemed more contested in the late 1820s and early 1830s. R.B.C. Howell,
editor of the Tennessee Baptist and pastor of Nashville’s First Baptist Church, noted that,
since Nashville served as “Headquarters of the Reformation” in the region, the
movement’s “ablest exponents” resided in its immediate vicinity, “and the influence they
exerted, both in the city, and throughout the country, was of immense magnitude.”60
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Though “destruction reigned supreme” in the region’s Baptist churches, the struggle
developed the group’s preachers and laity into “theological combatants,” Howell
exclaimed, “ever ready to meet an enemy, and strike him down.”61 Tennessee Baptist
minister John Bond likewise averred that during the 1820s “all the churches (more or
less) of the Concord Association” as well as churches throughout the region, “were in
perfect ferment by the leaven of Campbellism.”62
Although annual association meetings, as we will see below, witnessed their fair
share of turmoil revolving around Campbell’s influence, dissension and church schism
pervaded local congregations and church neighborhoods, bringing the doctrinal disputes
to bear on church goers across the region. The Clear Creek Baptist Church of Woodford
County, Kentucky suffered prolonged controversy during the 1820s. John Taylor
exclaimed that “the church had been so overwhelmed with sorrow and confusion with
those contentions [debates over creeds, charges of heresy, etc.]” in the late 1820s, that “a
number among [the church’s] best members had taken [dismission] letters and gone
elsewhere.” The neighboring congregation of nearly 300 members at Shawnee Run, a
“once happy church,” also split over doctrine with “one part falling in with the fooleries
of Campbell.” After faction and “bitter conflict” began spreading through the South
Benson Baptist Church, Taylor exclaimed, “those buzzard-men [leaders of the
“Reformation”] smelled the putred [sic] carnage of contention, and flew with speed,
perhaps 20 miles,” to effectuate a division.63 Describing the Mt. Vernon Baptist Church
following its 1834 schism, Roadham Rout claimed it “has been toarn [sic] asunder by
61
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internal decentions [sic]."64 Reverend James Black remembered that in the 1830s, “the
majority of the Bethlehem [Baptist] Church went off into the doctrine of the Reformation
or Cambelites [sic] as they were called.”65
Rev. Howell likewise insisted that “Campbell’s doctrines were gaining ground
throughout Middle Tennessee. Ministers and congregations were failing into them on
every hand,” including Nashville’s First Baptist Church.66 Under the preaching of Phillip
Fall—whose pastorate, according to Howell, “produced continued dissatisfaction,
excitement, and discussion”—the church fully aligned with the Reformation by 1828.67
In 1826-27, factions from the Buffalo Ridge and Sinking Creek Baptist Churches in East
Tennessee aligned with Stone’s teachings. By 1835, just three years after its formation,
forty-seven churches throughout Tennessee were affiliated with the Stone-Campbell
movement.68 More than controversies involving only church members, such schisms
implicated residents throughout the wider church neighborhood. As Spencer Anderson,
unaffiliated with any church, reported after the local Baptist congregation split over
Campbell’s influence: “the peace of the neighbourhood is broken and as I consider on
account of the division in the Church.”69

During the 1820s and 1830s, rather than experiencing harmonious relations
between and within congregations, Kentucky Baptists experienced a period of prolonged
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dissension and schism. The Elkhorn, Long Run, and Franklin Baptist Associations, made
up of churches largely from north-central Kentucky, serve as useful case studies through
which to uncover how an increase in internal disputes over doctrine affected the workings
of Baptist church tribunals. Kentucky Baptists organized the Elkhorn Association in
1785, the first such body west of the Appalachians. Initially constituted with only five
affiliated churches, within ten years the Elkhorn Association housed thirty churches with
just under 2,000 members.70 By the turn of the century, membership in Elkhorn’s
affiliated churches more than doubled to 4,853.71 Between 1826 and 1840—from the
first rumblings of Campbellism through the next decade—the Elkhorn Association
averaged 3,742 members, and continued to be a leading governing organization for
Kentucky Baptists.72 Elkhorn’s counterpart, the Long Run Association, resulted from
the “Great Revival” of religious sentiment that swept through frontier regions at the turn
of the nineteenth century. Responding to the rise in membership, twenty-six churches
from seven different counties (including one in the Indiana territory) came together in
1803 and formed the Long Run Association. By 1810, Long Run had added thirteen more
churches, bringing its total membership to 2,851 and making it the largest association in
the state at that time. For the next thirty years, the association averaged nearly 3,200
members and remained one of the principal governing bodies amongst Kentucky
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Baptists.73 Constituted by eight churches formerly connected to the Elkhorn, Long Run,
and North District Associations, the Franklin Association held its first meeting in
September 1815. Fifteen years later, it boasted 19 affiliated churches claiming a
membership of 1,728. Though never as large as Long Run or Elkhorn during this period,
the Franklin Association averaged nearly 1700 members during the 1820s, and was made
up of churches from in and around the state capitol of Frankfort, and thus served as an
important organization for the Baptists’ institutional network.74
Campbell’s rising popularity in the West infiltrated and challenged the growth of
churches composing the Long Run Association during the early 1820s. Two years after
he preached to the congregation in 1823, the Church of Louisville queried the Long Run
Association about the justification of various organizations. “Is there any authority in the
New Testament for a Religious body to make human Onsets, and confessions of faith[?],”
she asked. And what of associations themselves, does the New Testament authorize such
bodies, “if so what is it?” Following Louisville’s lead, the Shelbyville Church asked
“Are our associations as annually attended of general utility?”75 Delegates referred the
queries to the member-churches for a vote, and requested each to send a reply in their
1826 letter. The queries stirred up some consternation in member churches, as the
exclusion-per-member rate for all of Long Run’s reporting churches jumped from just
1.04% in 1825 to 4.56% the following year, its highest level in over two decades.76
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The Elkhorn Association also witnessed disorder among member-churches due to
Campbell’s teachings. In 1827, two sets of delegates arrived from Lexington’s First
Baptist Church, each claiming to be the true representatives of that body. The minority
faction, which sought to change the church’s appellation from “Baptist” to “Church of
Christ,” had excluded seven “of the most prominent members opposed to them.” The
majority in turn excluded forty-two members associated with the dissenting faction.
Elkhorn’s delegates stated their hesitance over interfering “in the internal government of
the Churches composing her body,” but were convinced that the majority formed the true
First Baptist Church of Lexington. They also warned the minority group “of the awful
danger and alarming tendency of causing divisions in society by [the] introduction of a
system of things by which the name and character of the Baptist denomination would be
essentially changed.”77
As early as 1825 the Franklin Association noted that the subject of “heresy and
unsound doctrine” was “a very frequent subject of conversation” and questioned the
efficacy of “Christian union.”78 The association similarly denounced Campbell and other
reformers in 1827. Their attack—insisting that Campbell and Stone were “puissant
pugilists”—was brought on by Campbell and Stone’s refutation of Franklin’s 1826
percentage in closer context, from 1814 to 1825, it never reached 2% and averaged only 1.47%. The query
to the churches, then, ignited dissension and led to a drastic increase in excommunications.
77
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Circular letter which had stressed the importance of creeds and questioned the ability of
anti-creedists to maintain the “unity, purity, and harmony” of their churches. For,
“without respect to a Creed,” the letter read, a church “is reduced to the cruel necessity,
of harboring under her wings, the vilest heresies that now disgrace the Christian name.”79
Though proclaiming to be under attack by heretics and their false doctrine,
Kentucky Baptists witnessed a revival that lasted from 1827-1830. From 1827 to 1828
alone, Elkhorn’s churches reported an increase of 1,500 members.80 Across the state
during the three-year revival, Baptist churches received over 15,000 new members.81 The
religious fervor that prevailed, however, owed a great deal to the growing popularity of
Campbell’s teachings, and for the rest of the 1820s, discord pervaded the region’s Baptist
churches. Nineteenth-century Baptist historian John Spencer, noting that the revival
“probably suspended” many of the schisms bubbling during 1825 and 1826, admitted that
it “greatly favored [Campbell’s] reformation,” and insisted that the revival had left
Baptist churches in Kentucky “proportionately weakened in moral power.”82
Associations throughout the state, continued to deal with doctrinal dissension
engendered by Campbell’s movement during the last years of the decade. Elkhorn’s
1829 circular letter noted the “great agitation” spreading through the region’s religious
society, but reminded brethren “that in all cases of difficulty and grievance, there are
proper tribunals to which we may resort for satisfaction, to which each individual
member is accountable for his sentiments.”83 At the following meeting in 1830, Elkhorn
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dropped communication with the Church at Versailles for “receiving into her
membership” Jacob Creath, Jr. who had “in faith and practice, departed from [Elkhorn’s]
constitution” and who had been active in “constituting minorities.” After appointing a
committee to investigate the standing of another member-church, and its rumored
departure from Elkhorn’s constitution, the delegates voted to cease “further
correspondence with churches and Associations that hold to certain doctrines of Mr.
Alexander Campbell.”84 In 1829, delegates to the Franklin Association, along with their
sister Associations, ended correspondence with the Mahoning Association for adhering to
doctrines of “A. Campbell.” A letter from the association in 1830 reminded its affiliated
churches that “[b]efore Alexander Campbell visited Kentucky, you were in harmony and
peace.” But amidst his scourge, instead of “preaching, you now may hear your church
covenants ridiculed” as the “fell spirit of discord stalk in open day through families,
neighborhoods, and churches.” The printed minutes for that year also included thirtynine excerpts taken from Campbell’s publications which the Franklin Baptists claimed
were fallacies.85 At the same time, the Long Run Association sought to shore up their
stance on creeds, making clear in 1830 that it was “constituted on a Baptist Philadelphia
Confession of faith” and that the Campbellite doctrine stood “in direct opposition to the
existence and general dictates of our constitution.” The report concluded by urging the
transgressors to “discontinue their writings” and cease their “rebellion against the
principles of our associational existence.”86
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The doctrinal dissension wreaked havoc in Kentucky’s Baptist churches,
siphoning off members and affecting ritual practices. At times, whole church bodies
departed from the Baptist faith and adopted Campbell’s doctrinal views. For instance,
Benjamin Allen, pastor of the Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church, “carried about seveneighths of [that] church into the heresy of Campbellism” in 1831.87 Others, like
Lexington’s First Baptist noted above, split into opposing factions. The Long Run
Association reported a loss of just over 1,100 between 1829 and 1831. Likewise,
Elkhorn churches noted a decline of 892.88 In just one year, 1829 to 1830, Kentucky
Baptist churches suffered a loss of over 5,500 members.89 “All the intelligent of the
denomination saw [by 1830] that the cause of Christ was languishing,” Spencer wrote,
“that the churches were diminishing in numbers, and still more in piety, intelligence and
the enforcement of discipline.”90 Throughout his multi-volume work on Kentucky
Baptists, Spencer reverted to harsh language, especially when discussing anti-missionists
and anyone associated with Alexander Campbell. Yet a closer look at the disciplinary
practices within individual churches bears out his insistence. The dissension, coupled
with the revivalist-induced influx followed by a schism-induced withdrawal of
individuals strained member relations and altered how Baptists envisioned their churches
as legal sites.
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The Flat Rock Baptist Church of northwest-Shelby County divided over
Campbell’s teachings in August 1831.91 At that month’s business meeting, twenty-one
church members, a minority, met and composed the letter to the Long Run Association
requesting recognition as the true church of Flat Rock. “[A] majority of the church,” they
claimed, had, “for some time passed [sic]” departed from “not only the Faith but also the
Rules and Regulations of the Baptists.” In the decade previous the split, the church clerk
recorded charges ranging from “going with vain company,” to intoxication, fighting,
adultery, mistreatment of children, “joining the Methodist Society,” and “going to law”
with a fellow member.92 From 1815 through 1825 (the year the Long Run Association
referred the queries over Campbellite doctrine to the churches), the church averaged onecharge-recorded per every 5.5% of the church membership.93 For the last five years of
that period (1820-5), that same average reached 7.34%. In contrast, over the subsequent
decade (1826-36) that rate collapsed to a mere 0.85%, including no recorded charges for
nearly seven years, from October 1829 to July 1836 (See Figure 6).94 From the first signs
of doctrinal disturbance within the Long Run Association in 1825, the Flat Rock church
witnessed a decade of declining disciplinary activity, including a complete lack of
discipline in the years immediately prior to and following the 1831 schism. The church
body, no longer a site for impartial resolution from one’s religious peers, instead became
a site of distrust and doctrinal contestation.
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Flat Rock/Pleasant Grove Church,
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Deeper in the Bluegrass, the David’s Fork Church of Fayette County also
experienced internal dissension and schism due to Campbell’s movement, upheaval that
by the end of 1820s helped transform how white members approached their church for
dispute resolution or moral regulation. From 1824 through 1829 the David’s Fork Church
recorded one charge per every 3.49% of its membership. In 1830, the year a Campbellite
minority seceded from the church, that average unsurprisingly skyrocketed to 8.71%, the
highest such figure between 1824 and 1840, and nearly three points higher than the next
closest year, 1824, which averaged one charge per every 5.88% of the membership. Over
the course of the rest of the 1830s, in contrast, the church documented only one charge
per every 1.52% of the church membership.95 This significant drop in disciplinary
activity is made even greater when we split the charges down by race, and consider—as
we did in the previous chapter—that after 1825, the David’s Fork Church focused its
disciplinary practices almost exclusively at its black members. From 1831 (the year
following the schism) to 1860, the church recorded 186 charges, only 49 of them leveled
95
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against white members, and over one-third of those focused upon members’ nonattendance at meetings or interaction with another religious body.96 Clearly, by 1830
white members of David’s Fork had re-imagined the ritual of discipline. The church’s
disciplinary mechanism had transformed into a forum through which to police the ranks
of black members, both free and enslaved, while white members showed increased
reticence during the 1830s to discipline one another or utilize the church body for dispute
resolution.97
Member churches of the Franklin Association suffered similar disciplinary
reticence amidst doctrinal discord. The Mount Pleasant Baptist Church of Franklin
County, Kentucky, for a time considered “one of the most prosperous churches in the
Franklin Association,” divided when a visiting preacher, who had been granted usage of
the Mt. Pleasant meetinghouse, began siphoning members from the Baptist Church.98 In
July 1825, only seven months after the Baptist church opened their house to Rev. Thomas
Smith, “and as many other as may choose to join him for the purpose of worshiping
Almighty God in the way that to them seems right,” the church rescinded the order.
Though it is unclear what specific doctrine Smith preached, in 1827 the Franklin
Association coupled him with Campbell and Stone as opponents of the creed system of
church governance, and at the time of this resolution, Mt. Pleasant members were
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engaged in debates over their church constitution.99 During the ten months after Mt.
Pleasant Baptists barred Smith’s congregation from using the meetinghouse, they
excluded seven individuals for joining Smith’s church. From about the time of Smith’s
request to use the house in late 1824 through at least 1828, the church did not record any
disciplinary activity—other than those excommunications related to joining Smith’s
church.100 Prior to the Smith’s appearance and the subsequent exclusions, members had
consistently turned to the practice of discipline to regulate their community—the chargeper-member rate from 1820-1824 was 5.9%—citing members, for among other offences,
failure to attend business meetings, disorderly conduct, and joining the Masons.101 From
1825 to 1828, when the church record book abruptly ends, that rate fell to 3.66%. If we
remove the charges revolving around members interacting with an outside religious
group, the disciplinary rate for those years is zero.
Likewise, Mt. Pleasant’s sister church of Buffalo Lick, though never explicitly
dividing over the Stone-Campbell movement, saw drastic cuts in their disciplinary rates
during the 1820s as dissension pervaded the Franklin Association. From 1815 to 1825,
the church leveled one charge per every 5.64% of the membership body. During the next
decade (1826-1836), that rate fell to just 1.86%. Narrowing the period to 1826—from the
time the Franklin Association disseminated its letter against the anti-creedists—through
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the Association’s exclusion of the Hopewell Church for adhering to Reformation doctrine
in 1833, Buffalo Lick’s disciplinary rate was only 1.49%.102
Numerous churches, then, witnessed disciplinary declines that correlated with
dissension germinated by the Stone-Campbell movement.103 The practice of discipline
did not completely cease of course. The Flat Rock church largely resumed its disciplinary
activities again in the early 1840s. The David’s Fork Church, too, continued to charge
members, especially black members, through the antebellum period. Yet churches
throughout the region faced a dearth of disputation and moral regulation during the 1830s
due to the changing religious landscape. As historian Nathan Hatch has noted, increased
competition from both the secular and religious spheres—from civic associations and
other religious groups—for allegiance during this time period meant that “many
denominations maintained their authority only by seldom exercising it.”104 Perhaps
Campbell’s elevation of the individual’s interpretation of the scriptures for salvation
undercut attempts at maintaining a communal order. The continued controversy, too,
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would have instilled distrust amongst the brethren, causing some individuals to look
elsewhere for dispute settlement.
Moreover, churches of the Long Run, Franklin, and Elkhorn Associations, as well
as with Baptist churches across Kentucky, witnessed a period of expansion and retraction
during the late 1820s and early 1830s. Congregants certainly took notice of both
neighbors and strangers moving in and out of their church, and this may very well have
altered their sense of community and the role of the church in fostering or maintaining
social relations. An individual would be far less likely to bring a dispute to his local
church if his familiarity with or trust in those deciding the case—one of the chief
advantages of church-based arbitration—had receded due to heightened internal tensions.
There is also evidence that the Campbellite insurgency affected other aspects of church
ritual. John Taylor noted that amidst the dissension at the Clear Creek Baptist Church in
1829, "the church had no communion at the Lord's table during the whole year; indeed
they were not in circumstances so to do, and scarcely any have been baptized."105 In any
case, the declining disciplinary rates during the doctrinal controversy demonstrate how
changes in the region’s religious culture transformed individuals’ conceptions of the
broader legal culture with which they interacted.

For Shelby County Baptists in 1831, the Campbellites were simply one scourge
among others that had recently swept through the area. During the previous year, the
county had experienced a smallpox epidemic, a scarcity of drinking water, and an
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increase of “mad dogs” roaming its towns and villages.106 In the eyes of some area
Baptists, the rabid dogs proved a perfect metaphor for the Campbellites, or as Taylor
described them, those “hairbrained [sic] reformers,” who “in all their extravagant folly,
and wicked disorder,” were “tearing churches to pieces.”107 Hair-brained or not, as we
have seen, Campbell’s movement divided churches, families, and neighborhoods along
religious lines. Within the Long Run Association, at least four churches broke apart,
including those of Flat Rock, Harrod’s Creek, and Floyd’s Fork. In the Elkhorn
Association, a number of churches—First Baptist of Lexington, David’s Fork, and Clear
Creek—divided along doctrinal lines. The Elkhorn Association also ceased
correspondence with other congregations, such as the churches of South Elkhorn,
Versailles, and Providence for departing “from the faith and constitution of the
Association.”108 Elkhorn’s central-Kentucky counterpart, the Bracken Association, went
through a similar experience. In 1830 Bracken’s churches suffered a “thorough and
Radical” division as “that association cut off or excluded” all those associated with
Campbell’s movement.109 To the south, the Campbellite influence reduced the Concord
Association of Middle Tennessee and North Alabama Baptists from 49 churches and
3,399 members in 1822 to only 11 churches and 805 members five years later.110
Similar to their sister churches throughout the trans-Appalachian West, the 1820s
proved a period of decreased disciplinary activity for the Fox Run Church. From 1820 to
1824, the church recorded one charge per every 2.59% of the membership. In 1825, the
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church witnessed a rash of disciplinary cases, leveling one charge per every 12.94% of
the church membership, up from only 2.22% the previous year. This drastic increase can
partly be attributed to the church’s organization of a Sunday morning session in order for
its enslaved members to take part in church discipline (over half of that year’s charges
were against slaves for disorderly conduct). Yet the record book demonstrates that
Campbell’s teachings had also crept into members’ doctrinal leanings. In August 1825,
the church excluded Brother Thomas for making “a public declaration” against “some
doctrines held and believed by this Church (and the Baptists, generally),” that fell in line
with the then strengthening Campbellite movement. From 1826 to 1830, the charge per
member average dropped to only 1.18%, the bulk of these charges directed at black
members. In the five years previous to its accusations against the Dranes and Brites, the
Fox Run Church only leveled charges against one white man, in 1829, for intoxication
and “whipping his two sisters.”111
Within this context of doctrinal discord and disciplinary declension, the Fox Run
church took up the respective cases of Brethren Drane and Brite. In each, the church
failed to dispense a traditional punishment, requiring party to make “satisfaction” for
their actions. The church simply “disapprobated Brother Brite’s proceedings” for
allowing such “disorderly preaching”—that of one of the Creaths—in his home. And
Drane, it seemed, was only ordered to pay rent on land in his use, but which belonged to
Brother John Ford. Presumably, Fox Run members came to these decisions in order to
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avert disorder, uphold church authority, and maintain peaceful social relations amongst
the fellowship.112
In June 1831, however, the Brites and Dranes submitted a letter of grievances to
the church and demanded it be recorded in the minute book. Their remonstrance made
clear that tensions had been bubbling within Fox Run for at least a year. “We are
dissatisfied with [B]rother Wm. Ford,” the letter began, “for his unwarranted insinuations
and reflections which he cast upon us in the church letter of 1830 to the Association.”
William Ford had, at the very least, made accusations in this letter that the Dranes and
Brites were involved with the Campbellites, and perhaps under the influence of one of the
Creaths. His subsequent apology, the Dranes and Brites claimed, did “not prove
satisfactory.” Furthermore, Ford had not only failed to truly account for the doings of the
Fox Run church. He had, along with others, “held a Council—we do not mean a Church
Council—just before [the 1830 Association meeting] for the purpose of sending Brother
Woods and Basket, to try [the Drane’s and the Brite’s] Faith by the Creed.” Apparently,
the doctrinal leanings of the two families had been under suspicion for some time.
Having been presented to the Long Run Association in 1830, and spoken of in an
unsanctioned Council by their fellow church members, the two families believed that
they had fallen victim to a “spirit of intolerance and persecution” which had arisen within
the Fox Run Church.113
The letter to the association and the investigation into their doctrinal leanings
were merely fragments of the Drane’s and Brite’s overall set of complaints against the
“leading members” of Fox Run. The church had further refused “to Record the
112
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accusation” against James Drane “as it was acted upon.” The committee formed to
investigate the dispute between Drane and John Ford determined the matter to be a
“misunderstanding” and not a willful breach of contract by either party. Yet the church
ruled that Drane should “pay fifty dollars for misunderstanding Bro. Ford.” The money
seemed to be a secondary concern as the Dranes insisted that the church erred in handling
the case. For their part, the Brites felt they too had been wronged by the charges laid in
against Jeptha. Yes, he had allowed the Creaths to preach in his home, but he did not
appreciate the course pursued by “those that took an active part against” him. He and his
wife Elizabeth had simply invited neighbors and the Creaths into their home “so that they
could be accommodated with seats.” The church had no authority in the matter, they
claimed, because there had been no church resolution prohibiting a member “from
inviting who he pleases [into] his own private house.” “Now Brethren,” the accused
concluded, “if this is the way you dispose of business in your courts of Conscience; we
do not wish to have any more cases in the Court.” 114
If anything the remonstrance demonstrates how the changing religious landscape
could infiltrate the workings of a church’s disciplinary system. According to both
defendants, the fellowship of the Fox Run church had been broken, and it manifested in
unfair disciplinary procedures. The initial charges against each, the Dranes and Brites
insisted, resulted primarily from a persecutory spirit which pervaded the minds of some
of Fox Run’s “leading members.” No longer, with the increase in doctrinal disagreement
and strained relations (in this case dating back at least a year, and perhaps all the way
back to 1825 with Brother Thomas’s exclusion), could their church body be expected to
114
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serve as a neutral arbitrator, a familiar venue through which to seek resolution. Once the
church’s “courts of Conscience” and its ritual practice of discipline (one that both created
and maintained the fellowship) could no longer be trusted to justly uphold the peace of
the congregational body, then the church community was fractured. The Brites and
Dranes did not attack the church because they necessarily ceased to believe in its
doctrine, but rather because of how the church practiced law.
In 1834, three years after the Dranes and Brites demanded exit from the church,
they joined other Baptist dissenters, many from Fox Run, and constituted the Clear Creek
Church, a body affiliated with the Disciples of Christ.115 Not all Baptists who left the
denomination under the influence of the Campbellites directly attacked the church’s
disciplinary procedures. But few who withdrew from Baptist churches, left a letter of
remonstrance like the Dranes and Brites. Their accusations of unfair treatment and their
contention that the Fox Run Church had been overwhelmed by a “spirit of intolerance
and persecution” found a receptive audience. Similar schisms are apparent in church
record books of 1830s Kentucky. Churches often excluded members for “discipling,”
joining the “Campbellites,” or departing from the “faith and order” of the Baptist
denomination.
Baptist apprehension for Campbell and his followers persisted through the
antebellum period. The Rev. Eleazer Savage claimed in 1844 that both Campbellites and
Mormons were “heretics,” deserving of swift punishment from church tribunals. As late
as 1855, rumors swirled through Louisville that the city’s Baptists might reunite with area

115

Willis, History of Shelby County, 79. Not to be confused with the Clear Creek Baptist Church of
Woodford County.

219
Campbellites, much to the chagrin of some local Baptist preachers.116 Campbell and his
early followers were immensely successful during the antebellum period. By the eve of
Civil War, the Disciples of Christ were no longer an insurgent sect; rather, with a
membership of over 200,000, they were the fifth largest Protestant denomination in the
nation. Campbell’s calls for the supremacy of the individual over the collective will of
the congregation, along with his denunciation of any religious body not found in the
scriptures, certainly struck a nerve amongst many early Baptists.117 Not only did it lead
to a significant exodus from churches affiliated with the Baptist Society, but, as we’ve
seen, also affected the internal workings of the church for those who remained within the
Baptist fellowship.
John Taylor insisted that the best way to stop the Campbellites advance upon
Baptist society was to “give them no place in our meeting houses; and should they
complain, let them use the common rules of society for redress.”118 Some on both sides
sought out society’s “common rules” when negotiating access to meetinghouses, as the
schisms of the 1820s and 1830s propelled church factions and trustees into secular
courtrooms in order to secure their rights to church property. In Kentucky, Pastor James
Fishback claimed that many reformers, especially those who violated others “religious
rights in seizing upon their meeting houses,” threatened the “peace, concord and
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happiness” of the state. This, he concluded, required churches “to resort to the laws of
the land for her protection and defence [sic].”119
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CHAPTER 5. “A GREAT CURSE TO THE NABOURHOOD [SIC]”: CHURCH
SCHISM, TEMPORAL COURTS AND THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RELIGIOUS SPACE

“I do not undertake to say which party is in the wrong but there is conciderable [sic]
hostility in the nabourhood [sic] between the parties.”1

In May 1834 the members of the Mt. Vernon Church of Christ in Woodford
County, Kentucky drafted a resolution detailing their property claim to the local meeting
house. The resolution asserted that the church considered “herself as occupying [the]
house agreeab[le] to the design of the original builders” and donors of the land.
According to the deed, church members had no authority to use the property “in any other
way or manner than as a constituted part of the Baptist Society of Kentucky.” If they
allowed a preacher of “another sect or denomination” to use the building then they might
“forfeit” their own rights to the house. Members unanimously approved the resolution.
Immediately thereafter, member John Curd produced a remonstrance signed by twentyone church members criticizing past actions taken by their pastor, Doctor James
Fishback.2 Curd insisted that he and his followers “must withdraw” from the church
body, and since they possessed “equal rights” to the meeting house, they intended to
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continue using the building for worship.3 Fishback retorted that Curd had ignored church
rules and sought to organize a new church “consisting of the disciples” of Alexander
Campbell and Barton Stone. Although twelve of the dissenters accepted dismissal on
good terms from the church, Curd and a number of others refused, and the church
excluded them for, among other things, breach of covenant and fomenting division within
the church. Days later, Curd, his fellow dissenters, and a new pastor, “forcibly entered”
the meetinghouse and declared that they had formed a new church.4 Over the summer of
1834, the two factions fought for control of the meetinghouse and eventually engaged in
a lengthy legal contest. Rather than rejecting the authority of secular legal institutions,
Mt. Vernon church members, along with their brethren throughout the region, resorted to
local and state courts to mediate messy doctrinal disputes that implicated rights to church
property.
Legal scholars and historians have examined church property disputes and their
effect on church-state relations in the United States. For the most part these studies focus
on United States Supreme Court decisions. In particular they have looked to the Court’s
application of the deference principle in Watson v. Jones (1872),5 and its clarification of
the neural-principles approach a century later in Jones v. Wolf (1979).6 These
examinations are overwhelmingly fixated upon schisms in hierarchically-organized
denominations, such as the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopalian churches, from the
immediate post-Civil War period through the early twenty-first century. They do not fully
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consider disputes within congregationally-based religious groups such as the Baptists or
church-property conflicts in the antebellum era.7 Until very recently, scholars who study
pre-war property disputes have primarily focused on schisms emanating from the
sectional-split of the major Protestant denominations between 1837 and 1845.8 Prior to
and amidst these divisions over racial ideology, however, Baptists across the transAppalachian region found themselves entrenched in a competitive religious marketplace
characterized by doctrinal dissension, church schism, and litigation.
The experience of the Mt. Vernon church is a clear example of how the pluralistic
post-Revolutionary religious landscape propelled religious groups to interact with the
state. Chapter Four demonstrated how the controversy and schism surrounding
Campbell’s “Reformation” altered members’ visions of their churches’ as law-producing
arenas. Many such schisms engendered property disputation between opposing doctrinal
7
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factions. Mt. Vernon members’ inability to contain the doctrinal dissension led to a
nearly four year struggle for control over the local meetinghouse. The contest navigated
through extra-judicial arbitration, the local chancery court, and culminated with an 1838
decree by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state’s highest judicatory. Curd v.
Wallace, as the case came to be known, like numerous similar cases in antebellum
Kentucky, exhibits how church and state were linked during the post-establishment era.
Neither Kentucky nor Tennessee possessed a legacy of church establishment. Yet state
governments still influenced religious groups through legislative enactments and court
rulings. Amidst a presumably “free” religious marketplace, one increasingly
characterized by dissension and church schism, actions taken by both religious and state
actors opened the door for the latter to shape ecclesiastical affairs.
This was not a top-down imposition of state authority. Lawmakers, state judges
especially, strived to avoid meddling with ecclesiastical discipline, polity, or doctrine,
claiming that to do so would be to violate “the spirit and policy of the constitution.”9
Instead, reacting to the changing religious culture, individuals and church bodies sought
out state authority to secure their temporal holdings. Local and state courts emerged as
venues through which individuals debated religious doctrine, claimed religious identities,
and secured property. By looking at doctrinally-driven church-property disputes among
antebellum Baptists—disputes often overshadowed by similar contests arising from the
sectional controversy—we can uncover how the “democratization” of America’s
religious culture not only begot “a jurisprudence of disestablishment” fashioned through
the legal system, but also how it allowed local and state courts to review matters of
9
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church discipline and doctrine, and thus, how religious controversy significantly shaped
church-state relations at the local and state levels.10
Doctrinal schisms and church property contests reveal the role of the state in
defining sacred space and determining religious identity. Religious experience, scholar
Belden Lane writes, “is invariably [a] ‘placed’ experience,” occurring in familiar or
ordinary places and legitimated as sacred through ritual practice.11 Lane is particularly
concerned with how humans come to interpret certain landscapes as sacred, not
necessarily with the importance of property—meetinghouses, land, etc.—to religious
groups. Antebellum church property disputes in secular courts, however, highlight not
only the continued importance of set-aside religious space (that is, many congregations’
identification with specific structures), but the state’s part in legitimizing, circumscribing,
or defining that space. Indeed, as scholars have noted, sacred space is often more than a
site imbued with meaning. It is a nexus of politics, power, and property. The “sacred
character of a place can be asserted and maintained through claims and counter-claims on
its ownership.” For many, a space assumes sacred attributes through appropriation and
possession.12 To secure ownership, to legitimize a group’s appropriation of real property,
or, in many cases, to protect their meetinghouses from insurgent religious groups,
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churches had to turn to state authority. State law operated in different, at times subtle
ways to determine the boundaries of religious space by identifying what religious
doctrine or denomination could legitimately occupy that space or what group vying for a
particular place constituted the “true” church. The state was able to exert authority over
religious groups precisely because individuals sought to spatially claim certain tracts of
land, meetinghouses, and other church buildings for professors of specific creeds.
Local meetinghouses, too, served as physical manifestations of the contested
religious marketplace. Antebellum-era disputes over these spaces highlight how access
to public meetinghouses demarcated the spatial contours of religious tolerance. Indeed,
the very act of excluding a sect or denomination from public meetinghouses assisted
others in defining that space as sacred.13 In order to spatially-claim a meetinghouse,
however, groups had to utilize state authority. Through church incorporation, land-deed
reversionary clauses, and specifications in subscription bonds, church members, land
grantors, and entire communities inscribed religious orthodoxy with rights to church
property. In so doing, they assured the state a place in religious life despite the professed
separation of church and state, in spite of the supposed inability of civil authority to
“penetrate the veil of the Church.”14
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The preceding chapters have demonstrated that law emanated from a variety of
locations and social interactions during the post-Revolutionary period. This chapter,
focused primarily upon church meetinghouses, should not be misconstrued as arguing
that religious experience was beholden to church edifices. The landscape of religious
community extended beyond meetinghouse walls to a range of settings. Many, like the
Brites and Dranes whom we encountered in the previous chapter, gathered in private
homes to pray, discuss doctrine, and worship with local preachers. The well-known
camp meeting revivals of the period also shifted the experience of religious community
from permanent structures to riversides and clearings in the woods. The 1801 revival at
Cane Run, about twenty miles from Lexington—simply the most notable instance of
camp-meeting revivalism—drew some ten thousand individuals for four days of
preaching.15 In a letter to his brother about his attendance at an association meeting in
Davis County, Kentucky, Frank Stone expressed awe over “the greatest concourse of
people I believe I ever saw. The woods and the church was almost alive with men,
women, children, horses, [and] buggies.”16 Some congregations assembled in
schoolhouses, courthouses, and other civic buildings ordinarily utilized for a variety of
purposes.17

Soon after its organization in early 1816, for instance, the First Baptist
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worship time at the city’s public house of worship.18 Nashville’s First Baptist Church
spent much of the early 1830s holding services in a rented yet “commodious room in the
Masonic Hall.”19 The religious landscape of the early nineteenth century, like the legal
landscape, was fluid.
Still, meetinghouses remained central sites for religious gatherings. Historians
have noted that during the early-nineteenth century, Baptists and other evangelicals
defined the church not as the physical space of worship, but as the covenanted group of
believers. Evangelicals may have had “no qualms about using secular structures,” as
scholars Anne Loveland and Otis Wheeler note, but access to local meetinghouses proved
important to both church officers and the laity.20 In 1846, Nancy Pierce, noting her age
to be “some where [sic] in Eighty,” insisted she wanted a Baptist church to worship at her
neighborhood meetinghouse in Bethlehem, Kentucky (as it had done prior to a church
schism brought on by Campbell’s Reformation). She claimed she could walk to the
meetinghouse, “but not there & back in the same day.” Yet, “when ever [sic] the weather
was suitable” she wished to attend services, and there was no other nearby
meetinghouse.21 Local Baptists so intently desired access to the space that members of a
church in close-by Paris left that body and joined the Bethlehem Baptists with hopes of
18
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securing rights to the building.22 In their dispute with Fishback and the Baptists, too,
Curd and his followers based their “equal rights” to the Mt. Vernon meetinghouse on its
proximity to their residences.23
The post-Revolutionary religious marketplace not only witnessed competition
over adherents but engendered new understandings of religious space. For seventeenthcentury Puritans, the meetinghouse inferred “a neutral public space,” often marking the
center of town and utilized for a variety of spiritual and secular activities.24 Over the
course of the eighteenth century, however, the religious purposes of New England
meetinghouses increasingly eclipsed their civil functions. By 1850, more refined church
buildings devoted solely to religious community replaced the traditional public
meetinghouse.25 In the Anglican-Chesapeake of the colonial era, too, churches were built
in central community locations and used for both secular and religious undertakings.26
From the early days of settlement, trans-Appalachian inhabitants also purposed
meetinghouses as both civil and religious spaces. In 1799, for example, political leaders
in Kentucky held a public rally at the Bryan’s Station Baptist meetinghouse to propagate
a platform for the state’s upcoming constitutional convention.27

The line between the

secular and sacred is further blurred when we take into account churches’ legal
operations throughout this period, as members sought out authoritative dispute resolution
at their local meetinghouses.
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Moreover, a variety of denominations held services at shared public
meetinghouses. At the Lancaster, Kentucky meetinghouse, the Methodist, Baptist,
Presbyterian, and Reformation churches all “had their different days” for worship.28 In
1822, the clerk for the Frankfort Baptist Church recorded that a committee had been
appointed to converse with the local Methodist and Presbyterian churches in order “to
afford [the Baptist] Church an opportunity of worshiping” in the public meetinghouse an
additional two Sabbaths a month.29 Before the two churches found themselves
entrenched in litigation in the 1840s, Newton Clift remembered that the meetinghouse in
Washington, Kentucky had been “for some part passed [sic] used in common by [the
Baptists] and the society of Reformers.”30 This spatial ecumenicalism extended to urban
areas with denomination-specific (private) church buildings. The 1829 meeting of the
Elkhorn Association of Baptists, for example, relied upon Lexington-area Methodists and
Presbyterians who opened their meetinghouse doors for the association’s delegates and
other attendees to hear preaching.31
In many smaller towns during the post-Revolutionary period, however, religious
groups often shared common worship space. A recurring sentiment expressed by churchgoers and other observers in church-property disputes was that the buildings or grounds
in question were “republican” in nature. Pastor Fishback claimed that many such
structures in Kentucky—though not the house at Mt. Vernon—had been “built as
28
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Republican Meeting houses free for every body [sic] or for preachers of all the religious
sects to preach in.”32 In the dispute over the Bethlehem meetinghouse, the respondent
insisted that “[a]ll denominations of Christian Baptists as well as others were permitted to
use the house until the exclusive use of it was claimed by members” of the complainants’
church. Likewise, referring to the “old meetinghouse” in Lancaster, Jacob Robinson
insisted in 1855 “that a sufficient amount [of money] could [not] have been obtained to
have built any other than a republican church,” for “at that time [referring to the late
1810s] there was a strong feeling in favour [sic] of Republican Meetinghouses.” Others
claimed “the church was used as common property.”33 William Huffman, Sr. testified
that he “never heard of any special claim set up by any denomination” to the Lancaster
meetinghouse until the day of his deposition.34 The notion of a “republican church” or
“republican meetinghouse” denotes the underlying entanglement of politics and religion.
The shared community space nurtured one’s civil and religious identity, his political
virtue and private morality.
Whether seeking to build a republican meetinghouse such as the one in Lancaster,
or a private structure for a particular congregation, churches relied upon public donation.
Once churches had secured a tract of land for the “purpose of erecting a meetinghouse
32
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upon”—usually donated by one or two local residents—they turned to raising funds for
construction. Member-appointed building committees circulated subscription bonds
through the surrounding neighborhood, surely hailing the positive effects that a new
worship space would have on the community. And many were successful. A Baptist in
Tennessee noted that several of his brethren, along with a number of Presbyterians,
Methodists, and individuals “of no particular church, subscribed liberally” for the
construction of a Nashville Church.35 Another church member who was central in raising
the money to build the Lancaster meetinghouse felt “clear to say without fear of
contradiction that two thirds of the money was subscribed by persons who belonged to no
church.”36 After Tavner Branham and David Harris each donated a half-acre of land for
the Mt. Vernon house, other local residents chipped in what they could. Subscribers
agreed to pay “the sum annexed to [their] respective names,” one-third “in money, the
other two thirds in corn, wheat, whiskey, pork, bacon, beef, cattle or materials…all at
market price.”37 Such meetinghouses, whether claimed by a specific congregation or not,
could help cultivate “[u]niversal peace, good morals, kind feelings, &
happiness…throughout the neighbourhood.”38
When disputes subsequently arose over access to meetinghouses, church factions
pointed to their members’ monetary donations in order to claim rights to the disputed
35
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property. At Mt. Vernon, Curd and his co-defendants adopted this strategy after
Fishback’s church secured an injunction against them at the Woodford County Circuit
Court. Those who contributed to the meetinghouse, they insisted, did not intend for one
pastor (Fishback) and his followers to have exclusive possession of the house. With
particular attention to female donors, they noted a handful of original subscribers to the
meeting house who now communed with their church. Mrs. Branham, the widow of
Tabner Branham “gave one half acre of the ground” and fifty dollars. Mrs. Caldwell,
also a widow, donated “$70 or $80,” and “Mrs. Price[,] a widow whose husband gave
$100” had all joined the new church and were now, because of the injunction against
them, “prevented from worshipping their maker in the house they aided to build.”39 The
Woodford Circuit Court agreed, ruling that original subscribers could not be barred from
the meetinghouse.40 Similarly, a member of Nashville’s Reformation Church, which had
retained property deeded to the Baptist Church after a schism, claimed the Baptists
possessed no right to the house, for only one member of the Baptist Church had donated a
mere “ten dollars.” It was unreasonable to assume that a large majority of members,
“embracing in their number those who had given the lot, and had been most liberal and
active in getting the house built,” the writer insisted, should hand over the house “to a
few persons” who had donated so little.41 In other cases, residents insisted that their
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meetinghouse could not be sold or repurposed “without a concurrence of all the
subscribers,” no matter their religious affiliation, or lack thereof.42
Though often shared by various religious groups and nominally available to all
denominations, this spatial ecumenicalism had its limits. Land deeds, subscription papers,
and common understanding indicated the bounds of religious tolerance in the postRevolutionary United States. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the federal
government and most states had outlawed religious establishments. The legal practice of
toleration, which had developed in most of the colonies during the eighteenth century,
historian Chris Beneke recently argued, was replaced by a common commitment to
religious liberty. Religious-based prejudice and persecution persisted throughout
American culture, of course, but, Beneke continues, this was largely unaided by a legal
system devoted to liberal religious beliefs. I agree with Beneke that not only was postRevolutionary America a much more religiously tolerant place than previous, and that the
cultural process of implementing religious liberty “established important precedents for
the future” of pluralism, religious and otherwise, in the United States.43 Yet this also
obscure’s how early Americans utilized the legal system to exclude those considered
dangerous or unorthodox from common meetinghouses. Many individuals claimed
openness alongside exclusion with little apparent qualms. For instance, observers could
claim, as JC Bryant did, that local meetinghouses were built as “republican church[es],
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free for every body [sic],” but these spaces were usually restricted to mainstream
Protestant denominations.44 As Bee Salter remembered, the Lancaster meetinghouse
“was built for all denominations except the Roman Catholics and Shakering [sic]
Quakers.” Yet she continued, insisting, “It was built by the public and was always a
republican house.”45 Others echoed her sentiments.46 Even Judge Duvall of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals allowed that the land in controversy had been donated to the public “for
the use of all religious denominations professing the Christian faith—Roman Catholics
and Shakers excepted.”47
This exclusion through legal instruments was common in denominational-specific
devises as well. John Davis donated an acre of land to the Particular Baptists Society in
Davidson County, Tennessee, but noted that “other orderly gospel ministers shall have
privilege to preach” in the meetinghouse when not in use by the Baptists.48 Though not
specific, “orderly gospel ministers” connoted Protestant Christian, and more likely,
Methodist, Presbyterian, or Baptist. Later, Campbell, Stone, and their Disciples of Christ
would be considered as more aligned with the Christian mainline, but in the 1820s and
1830s, detractors often labeled them as “disorderly” and “disturbers of the peace.”49 The
subscription paper for the Mt. Vernon house noted the property and meetinghouse was
44
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“for the benefit of the Baptist Society, & when not occupied by them,” it was open for
any “Gospel Preacher invited by a subscriber.”50 After the 1834 schism, members of
Fishback’s church claimed that the reference to the “gospell [sic] preachers” was “placed
in said article for the purpose of excluding Barton Stone and his followers,” that the latter
and his followers were not preachers of the gospel.51 Daniel Williams likewise testified
that “the words gospel preacher” were inserted into the paper because “all the Baptists in
the nabourhood [sic] refused to subscribe” to the building of the house “unless the above
exclusion was made.”52 Without legislation, then, without meddling judges or overt
institutional collusion, individuals and communities encoded religious orthodoxy in legal
instruments and claimed local common property for a general set of religious principles.

Beyond subscription bonds and land deeds, however, individuals and churches
utilized legal mechanisms and state authority to secure their property. Church
incorporation, though controversial during the late-eighteenth century, provided religious
groups a variety of legal powers, not the least of which was the ability pass property in
succession. Each state handled church incorporation differently. In New England, as
parishes were considered public, municipal corporations, individuals residing within their
geographic boundaries constituted the membership. Residents were subject to parish
taxes and liable for its debts. In an arrangement which persisted until disestablishment
during the post-Revolutionary period, the parish minister acted as trustee, holding fee-
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simple title to any donated or granted lands. Other colonies and states continued to rely
on the charter system developed in the mother country—which meant petitioning the
legislature for corporate status—well into the nineteenth century, only ceasing that
practice when states adopted general incorporation laws.53
Baptists had an uneasy relationship with church incorporation during and after the
Revolutionary Era. In 1784, the Virginia General Assembly passed an act incorporating
the Episcopalian Church in the Commonwealth. Baptists claimed the Incorporation Act
smacked of state preference for one religious body.54 To compound matters, the
Assembly had awarded the Episcopalian Church all the church buildings, land, and other
property located throughout the Commonwealth. Led by their governing associations,
Virginian Baptists flooded the legislature with petitions attacking church incorporation.
One petition submitted by preachers Reuben Ford and John Leland—representing the
thoughts of the state’s four Separate Baptist associations—described church
incorporation as “pregnant with evil, and dangerous to religious liberty.” Memorials that
had been circulated at court days and church meetings called for a repeal of the
Incorporation Act and the sale of the “public property” held by the Episcopalians.55
Virginians’ taxes had paid for the glebe lands, and thus, Baptists argued, it should be
returned to the people. Episcopalians, in turn, asserted that ownership of the land was part
and parcel with their acceptance of disestablishment and the end of state financial
support. If the legislature dissolved the church’s claim to the land, then it threatened the
very sanctity of private property. Though the legislature repealed the Incorporation Act
53
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in 1785, it initially left the glebe lands intact, not providing for their dissolution until
1802.56
The advantages of church incorporation continued to be debated by both religious
and state actors well into the nineteenth century. Old-School Presbyterians and AntiMission Baptists, in particular, believed that incorporation for religious groups held
potential dangers for both church and state.57 Their experience fighting against
Virginia’s religious establishment did not sour all evangelical groups on the necessity or
idea of religious corporations, however. Into the antebellum era, many church groups
engaged in heated public debates in Virginia over the issue, often arguing in favor of
church incorporation as the best way to protect their interests. The state legislature
proved more reluctant and consistently turned down churches’ requests for incorporation.
Such an act would be, the legislators exclaimed, “inconsistent with the principles of the
constitution, and of religious freedom, and manifestly tends to the establishment of a
national church.”58 Relying primarily on interpretations of the 1786 Statute of Religious
Freedom, and its implications for the relationship between church and state, historian
Thomas Buckley notes that the General Assembly left Virginia’s churches “in a legal
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limbo [and] without secure title to property or a recognized status in civil society.”59
Acts of incorporation were certainly important for religious societies’ claims to property
and the ability to pass such property in succession. Yet incorporation from the state
legislature also legitimated the internal workings of the church itself: the ability to
enforce group rules, bylaws, and member obligations.60
In Kentucky, state legislators, perhaps learning from the struggle to the east, but
also reacting to conditions of the local religious backdrop, sought to better define the
power and place of churches in civil society. Property disputes such as the one at Mt.
Vernon can be traced back to the final days of 1813, when an unspecified religious
congregation from Concord sent a petition to the Kentucky Assembly. Apparently, some
years after a tract of land was donated to the members of the Concord congregation,
“several of the trustees to whom the deed was made” were removed from their position.
The petitioners, unsure “as to their power to do any thing [sic] relative to said land” and
“the mode of appointing successors” to the removed trustees, prayed that the Assembly
would pass a law “appointing certain trustees” and “vesting them with certain powers.”61
After investigating the matter, the courts-of-justice committee reported “that other
religious societies” had found themselves in similar circumstances and advised that even
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though the government should never seek “to control or interfere with the rights of
conscience,” it was “equally bound” to protect “each man” in his religious practices and
enable “every [religious] society to hold a small portion of land” for erecting a
meetinghouse. The House, therefore, should adopt a resolution in order to protect
religious societies “from the inroads of the lawless.” Moreover, the committee
recommended that a law should be passed pointing “out a mode in which trustees of the
property can be appointed, changed, or renewed.”62 The state Senate initially rejected the
bill, before reconsidering it with amendments proposed by a joint committee. The
Assembly eventually passed the measure, and the governor signed “An Act for the
Benefit of Religious Societies of this Commonwealth” on February 1, 1814.63
The first section of the act constructed a framework for Christian groups to elect
or appoint trustees according the society’s internal rules, provided they record those
elected with the county courts. The trustees were invested “with the legal title” of the
land, and possessed the “power to do any legal act” that may be necessary for “the safe
keeping and preservation” of the church’s property. Yet, the bill continued, if a “schism
or division” occurred in the church, the act should not be interpreted as an authorization
for the trustees to “prevent either of the parties so divided, from using the house or
houses of worship, for the purpose of devotion, a part of the time, proportioned to the
numbers” of each party. Furthermore, the act was not to be understood as authorizing
“the minority of any church having seceded from, or been expelled or excommunicated
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from the church” to interfere with the majority church’s appointment of preachers or
designated time of worship.64
Two decades later, amidst congregational schisms due to the Stone-Campbell
movement and dissension over the role of missionary societies, the Kentucky Assembly
provided an even easier method for religious groups, specifically Christian organizations,
to acquire and maintain a legal identity. In 1835, the Assembly passed “An act to provide
a remedy for religious societies and communities,” granting churches the power to
appoint “one or more suitable persons upon their record book” to act as a committee or
trustees on behalf of the congregation to bring suit to prosecute or recover “any claim,
right or title” the church had in real or personal property.65 Kentucky’s Revised Statutes
which took effect in 1852, moreover, strengthened the 1814 Act by forbidding all church
trustees, (not simply those appointed as successors to the original trustees) from barring
schismatic factions from meetinghouses. The latters’ rights could not be impaired unless
they were excommunicated “bona fide, on the grounds of immorality.”66

64

Acts Passed at the First Session of the Twenty Second General Assembly, for the Commonwealth of
Kentucky: Begun and Held in the Town of Frankfort, on Monday the Sixth Day of December, One
Thousand Eight Hundred and Thirteen, and of the Commonwealth the Twenty-Second (Frankfort, KY:
Gerard & Berry--Printers for the Commonwealth, March 2d, 1814), 211-212. The Act also stipulated that
“the quantity of real estate hereafter acquired by any religious society and vested in trustees and their
successors…shall not exceed four acres of land.” Two decades later, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled
in Gass,184, that the 1814 Act does not limit religious groups from acquiring more than four acres, rather
“it only restrains the application of the benefit of its own provisions, to an acquisition not exceeding four
acres.” Section 3 of the 1852 Revised Statutes provided that religious societies could acquire up to fifty
acres of land "for the purpose of erecting thereon houses of public worship, public instruction, a parsonage,
a grave yard, and a horse pound." See, KY. Rev. Stat. of 1852, Chap. 14, Sec. 3.
65
Preston S. Loughborough, A Digest of the Statute Laws of Kentucky, of A Public and Permanent Nature,
Passed Since 1834, With References to Judicial Decisions. Together with an Appendix Containing Certain
Laws of the United States, A List of Claims Payable at the Treasury of the State, With Instructions and
Forms for the Authentication Thereof, and for the Accounts and Reports of the Jury Fund; and Forms of
Certain Proceedings in County Courts and Before Justices of the Peace (Frankfort, Ky: Printed by Albert
G. Hodges, 1842), 499.
66
KY. Rev. Stat. of 1852, Chap. 14, Sec. 3, Proviso 5.

242
Even before the Baptist-Campbellite schisms of the late 1820s and early 1830s,
opposing church factions understood the importance of acquiring corporate form to claim
property. The Bryan’s Station Baptist Church near Lexington fractured in early 1811, as
one body embraced Particularistic Baptist principles. Just a year later the schismatic
group appointed a committee “for adjusting and securing” their rights to the
meetinghouse. Bryan’s Station’s sister church, South Elkhorn Baptist, witnessed a
similar division in 1822. After being excluded from the church by the main body, the
minority faction, led by none other than James Fishback, constituted a new church (also
called South Elkhorn Baptist) and appointed trustees “to maintain the title of S.E.
meeting house ground.” Upon learning of their opposition’s legal maneuverings, the
majority church acted in kind, appointing two men as trustees to secure their rights to the
church property. Ironically, Fishback’s actions in this dispute were turned against him a
decade later when his detractors at Mount Vernon selected their own trustees to the
contested meetinghouse and registered their names with the county clerk.67
The ability of religious groups to appoint trustees and incorporate provided them a
necessary legal identity to pursue debts, enforce member obligations, and receive or
convey property. For instance, Thomas Berryman pledged in August 1839 to donate $125
to the Kentucky Baptist Education Society.68 Berryman subsequently refused to pay his
debt, claiming that the funds collected “were being used contrary” to the Society’s
originally-stated intentions. An Owen County jury disagreed with Berryman and ordered
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he pay “the debt in the petition mentioned & one cent in damages.”69 Incorporated
religious groups could also rely upon state authority to enforce their by-laws. Recognized
Christian societies, then, could expect that, as Justice George Robertson of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals declared in 1842, that “civil courts” would protect churches “in the
proper and undisturbed enjoyment of their religious exercises, the rightful enforcement of
their ecclesiastical discipline, and the peaceful occupancy and use of their property.”70
Control of lands and meetinghouses was particularly important for religious groups,
affording congregations the ability to receive and transfer real property. In the 1840s, the
Methodist church in Harrodsburg, Kentucky sold their interest in the local meetinghouse
to a Baptist church. Soon after, however a committee representing the Baptist church
filed a bill against the Methodists arguing the latter lacked title to the property. The
Baptists requested the contract be rescinded. Writing for the Court, however, Judge
Simpson, ruled that, since the property in question had been vested in trustees, “to hold
for certain purposes, their deed to the trustees of the Baptist Church certainly conveys the
legal title.” In receiving the property, moreover, the Baptists were “secure against any
proceedings in the common law Courts to disturb their possession, or to deprive them of
the use thus acquired.”71
During the post-Revolutionary period, Tennessee lawmakers did not enact as
extensive legislation concerning church property and schisms as did Kentucky. In 1817,
however, they did pass a bill that secured church property for groups receiving up to ten
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acres of land deeded to either trustees or directly to the congregation.72 The measure
failed to provide property rights for schismatic factions. Nor did it take into account what
should happen if a church changed doctrine and assumed a religious identity different
than the one specified in the deed. In a way, this provided for natural doctrinal evolution
in congregationally-based churches. Some contended, however, that church property
should remain with the group affiliated with the denomination specified in the legal
instrument.
The case of Nashville’s First Baptist Church illuminates how religious
controversy propelled church bodies to seek out state authority with the hopes of ensuring
subsequent doctrinal stasis. In 1821 the church received a grant of land on Spring Street.
The donor deeded the property to the “United Baptist Church of Nashville,” but over the
course of the 1820s, the church adopted views associated with Campbell’s Reformation.73
By the end of the decade, a minority had broken away from the church and re-constituted
a body based upon Baptist principles. For six years the new church battled their former
brethren, now the Reformation Church, for the Spring Street meetinghouse. First
Baptists’ longtime pastor, R.B.C. Howell later claimed that the “house of worship
belonged justly, without a doubt, to the “United Baptist Church,’ according to the terms
of the deed, and not to the church of ‘the Reformation’.” Unfortunately for the new
church, Howell wrote, the original Baptist church had never incorporated and “was a
body unknown to law. It was neither a person, nor a corporation, and therefore incapable
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of holding property.” Even if a judge ruled to dispossess the house from the Reformation
Church, the property would revert to the original owner, who remained with the church
majority. “The legal resort to obtain [the Spring Street building] which had been talked
of,” Howell concluded, “was therefore abandoned.”74 In 1836, after having worshipped in
the city’s courthouse, a local schoolhouse, and the Masonic Hall, Nashville’s First Baptist
Church acquired a tract of land for a new house of worship.75 Members had learned a
harsh lesson. This time they ordered the trustees to insert the church’s majority-approved
confession of faith and constitution into the title papers. “If at any time a majority of the
Church should depart” from the expressed doctrine, the order declared, “the property of
the church shall belong to the minority, however small, who adhere to [the present]
principles.” If all the members departed from the “present doctrines”, the trustees were
directed to hold the property for any group who “may now profess or hereafter embrace
the present principles of the Church.”76
Land grantors took similar actions to ensure their bequests remained associated
with their religious preferences. Some made no stipulation of particular principles. Jonas
Bradley donated one acre to the Cedar Creek Baptist Church in Wilson County,
Tennessee for them to hold “so long as the Baptist Church shall continue a regular
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constituted body at said place or meeting house.”77 Others, like John Bond, who donated
land to the Union Baptist Church, noted the property was for “the benefit of said Church
now constituted at said meeting house & there [sic] successors in principle & practice
forever.”78 Yet some donors took no chances. Charles Hays donated a half-acre in 1820
to the Antioch Baptist Church “holding and maintaining the communion of Baptized
believers, the impotency of fallen man, the imputed righteousness of Jesus Christ, [and]
the election of grace and eternal judgment.”79 Likewise, in 1817, Emmanuel Skinner
conveyed two acres to the Spring Creek Baptist Church. He also included eleven
principles adhered to by that fellowship (and which he presumably believed were the
tenets of the true Baptist), noting more than once that the land was for the “use and
benefit of said Baptist Church and their successors of the same faith and order in
religious worship.” If the church deviated from their doctrinal path, then the land would
be returned to Skinner and his heirs.80
Doctrinal disagreement and congregational schisms over a variety of issues
played out in county clerks’ record books and local meetinghouses. In 1808, amidst
efforts of anti-slavery Baptists to abolish the peculiar institution in Kentucky, Elijah and
Winnifred Hanks conveyed a tract of land to trustees of the Newhope Church in
Woodford County. They insisted, however, that the church could hold the property only
so long as it adhered to the belief “that perpetual[,] hereditary[,] involuntary[,] &
unmerited Slavery is contrary to the gospel of Jesus Christ.” If the church strayed from
that position, or the property was put to any other use, then it would revert back to the
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Hanks.81 The mission controversy, one of the largest and most significant divisions to
emerge within Baptist churches prior to the sectional crisis, began rupturing
congregations in the region as early as the 1810s.82 By the mid-1830s, many Tennessee
Baptists witnessed internal turmoil or schism over the question of the Baptist State
Convention, a pro-mission body established in 1834. As “New School” or “Missionary”
Baptists in Tennessee engaged in a broad movement to spread the gospel through Bible
Societies, Foreign Missions, and Educational Associations, they faced a conservative
counteroffensive made up of “Old School,” “Hard Shell,” or “Anti-Missionary” Baptists
who denounced the man-made, the movement’s unscriptural institutions.83
Divisions over the missionary question led to religious doctrine being encoded in
subscription papers and land deeds. Members of the Little Cedar Lick Church agreed in
1838, not long after a schism over the Mission question, “to build a meeting house by
subscription…for the use of the United Baptists and free for the Methodist an
Presbyterian” churches. By deeding it to the “United Baptists”, the church explicitly
barred their former brethren who denounced the Tennessee Baptist Convention the
previous year.84 In 1837 Thomas Bradshaw granted over four acres of land to the
Spencer’s Creek Baptist Church for their “exclusive use and benefit” provided “always
that [the church] shall be wholly distinct from the Baptist State Convention of
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Tennessee.”85 The following year, Philip Smart and William Mary donated just over an
acre to the Ridge Church of United Baptists, a body “disconnected from the Baptist State
Convention and all other institutions contrary to the order of the old united Baptists.”86
For donors such as Bradshaw, Smart, and Mary, Middle Tennessee’s changing religious
backdrop of the 1830s necessitated a legal bulwark against their property being swept
away with opposing doctrine. These actions may seem like benign, ordinary efforts to
secure property. And sometimes they were. Yet by tying property to specific doctrinal
principles, such stipulations hindered the ability of the church majority to direct their own
theological course. If a church, whose property was deeded to a body unaffiliated with
the Missionary movement, for example, decided to embrace the Missionary cause, it
could engender years of consternation and negotiation between factions for rights to, or
control over, the deeded property.
Land Deed stipulations, then, could at times empower seceded or excluded
minorities to the detriment of the Baptists’ highest earthly authority: the will of the
church majority. Such was the case of the Concord Baptist Church of Brentwood,
Tennessee, not far south of Nashville. The church divided over the mission question in
the fall of 1835. The pro-mission majority, in support of the church’s long-time
preacher, founder, and one of the “strongest promoters” of the missionary cause in the
state, James Whitsitt, ordered the details of the split recorded in the opening pages of
their new church book. In 1834, church members had voted overwhelmingly to continue
Whitsitt as their pastor. Three dissenters “succeeded in agitating the church painfully on
this subject,” however, charging that Whitsitt, in pursuing the Missionary cause, had
85
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departed from the “original principles” of the church. Members investigated the charges,
but acquitted Whitsitt “by a unanimous vote with the exception of his accusers.” The
church gave the three dissenters a month to re-think their position and fall in line with the
authority of the church majority, demanding also that William Nance, one of the
Whitsitt’s accusers and the church clerk, turn over the record book. Nance refused and
members charged him with, among other things, “a breach of trust in illegally retaining
[the church’s] property.” Nance and his two cohorts withdrew from the fellowship, and
the majority excommunicated them for good measure. The controversy continued
through that year, with the majority excluding three other members who had “withdrew
from the church for reasons of the same kind.” Nance and his fellow dissenters claimed
they were excluded simply because of their opposition to the workings of the Baptist
State Convention. Though only totaling five in number, the group insisted upon
recognition as the true Baptist church of Concord. The pro-mission majority, of course,
also claimed to be the true Baptist church, even if—as the dissenters asserted—they had
drifted from the fundamental principles on which the body was founded.87
Negotiations between the two parties turned on the wording of the church’s land
deed, and provided the minority faction with the exclusive right to the meetinghouse.
Numbering near forty members, the majority had successfully retained Whitsitt as their
pastor, but their embrace of the Baptist State Convention’s more liberal theological
principles hindered their access to the meetinghouse. Over the next several years, the
clerk recorded meetings that took place in members’ homes and at a local school. It
appears that in the early 1840s, the majority still had at least partial access to their
87
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original meetinghouse, for in December 1843 “the subject of repairing the old
meetinghouse or building a new one was agitated.” After investigating the matter, the
church learned that their former brethren had claimed the meetinghouse and were
“determin[ed] on hostile movements” if the majority pursued any further claims to the
property. Rights to the “old meeting house and particularly the ground upon which it is
built,” the clerk recorded, was “connected with the old confession of faith or the
fundamental doctrinal principals upon which the Concord Church was first constituted,”
and no longer ascribed to by their body. A discussion ensued whether the church should
adopt their former constitution and confession of faith, which “was rejected by a very
large majority.” Realizing that by refusing to adopt their former principles, they
relinquished their claims to the meetinghouse, the church voted to raise a subscription
paper and begin looking “out for a new situation [to] build another.” 88
The Concord Church’s lack of a written constitution or articulation of faith
inhibited their ability to acquire a sound title to land for a new meetinghouse. In June
1844, the committee appointed to oversee the subscription paper and the erection of a
new house of worship reported they had indeed secured a tract of land from one Lafayette
Ezell, yet continued that “it will be very difficult for us to obtain a valid deed” to the lot
unless “we have some articles or confession of faith in order to tell who we are.” Nearly
ten years had passed since the first rumblings of dissension had appeared over the
mission question, and almost nine since the minority seceded from the main body—
claiming recognition as the true church of Concord and rights to the original
meetinghouse—and the majority pro-mission body had yet to declare their theological
88
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principles in constitutional form.89 On New Year’s Day 1845, Ezell conveyed over four
acres to the “Missionary or United Baptist Church at Concord.”90 The necessity of
securing legal title propelled the Concord Church to profess their faith in writing, to
articulate their religious identity in order to gain legal recognition. Their newly acquired
property would thereafter be entwined with their liberal, pro-mission standards of faith,
and would presumably protect the church from reliving the material uncertainties of the
prior decade.
This is not to say that property matters wholly constructed individuals’ religious
beliefs. Concord Church members signified as much when they voted down the
resolution to adopt their old principles—the church constitution and confession of faith
associated with their former meetinghouse. But conflict over property certainly
exacerbated church schisms and may have informed many individuals’ denominational
affiliation. In the case of Nashville’s First Baptist, for instance, only five members,
along with their families, and a “few friends,” took part in the reorganization of the
Baptist Church in 1830. “Not a few [individuals] were held back by social and family
influences which were brought to bear upon them with great power,” Rev. Howell
insisted, while others, “were down and utterly disgusted with the endless agitations” and
ceased attending either of the churches. Yet the small number was also due to the fact
that their original meetinghouse on Spring Street—the one deeded to the Baptists but
retained by the Reformation Church—was “very handsome.” All the members were
“very proud” of it, and would have been “obliged to abandon” their “spacious house of
worship” and assemble instead “in an unsightly hovel.” Moreover, Howell continued,
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“many of the most liberal and wealthy” members of the church “were satisfied to remain”
with the Reformation Church. In contrast, the re-organized Baptist body was made up of
only a “handful of members, comparatively poor [and] without a house of worship, or the
means to build one.” Thus, those who remained with the Reformation “saw no prospect
for success.”91
Across the trans-Appalachian West during the post-Revolutionary period, local
meetinghouses emerged as sites of contestation over religious doctrine. Churches and
land grantors entwined rights to property with specific theological principles—at times
hindering the ability of the church authority to adopt new doctrine—and, through statebased law, spatially constructed the bounds of religious tolerance in the new republic.
Doctrinal specification in land deeds and subscription papers were only the most subtle
ways in which religious groups’ utilized state authority to secure their temporal holdings.
By the early 1830s, the region’s Baptists had witnessed nearly a decade of discord
emanating from Alexander Campbell’s growing popularity. The schisms emanating from
this sectarian insurgency led some churches to seek recourse for their property disputes at
local and state courts. Their actions illuminate how the changing religious culture—
engendered itself by constitutional enactments separating church and state—necessitated
churches’ interaction with state authority.

By the time the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided Curd v. Wallace (1838), its
first dispute over church property arising from doctrinal schism, courts across the United
States had experienced decades of litigation between disputing religious factions. In
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1790s Vermont, clashes between Congregationalists and Baptists over property erupted.
Baptists demanded partial ownership in existing meetinghouses or recompense for fees
paid to build and maintain them. Congregationalists also found themselves in heated,
sometimes violent, conflict with Methodists and Universalists who they tried to bar from
town meetinghouses.92 A decade later, litigation ensued when Vermont’s legislature regranted all lands which had previously been allotted for religious purposes for the support
or education. This litigation continued for decades and germinated two U.S. Supreme
Court Cases.93 More than eighty cases in Massachusetts alone involved Unitarian factions
battling their Trinitarian Congregationalist counterparts.94 And in Virginia, the
Assembly’s 1802 Glebe Act did not end controversy over churches’ property.95 Nor did
it, as historian Thomas Buckley notes, “separate church and state or prevent
government’s involvement with religious issues or the churches.”96 Indeed, he continues,
the “Virginian glebe fight demonstrated the possibilities for the entanglement of church
and state, religion and politics that would follow throughout the nation’s history.”97
Although Curd proved the first case over a disputed meetinghouse to reach the
state’s Court of Appeals, Kentucky courts had not been entirely free of conflict over
religious groups’ property. After two members withdrew from Pleasant Hill Shaker
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community in the 1830s, they initiated suit against the Shakers for the property they had
brought into the society. In Gass v. Wilhite (1834), the Kentucky Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the Shakers.98 Writing for the Court, Judge
Nicholas pointed to the Shakers’ articles of association which clearly stated that new
members “bring and devote to the joint interest of the church, all such property as they
justly hold &c.” If a court ordered the seceding members’ property returned, Nicholas
claimed, “it must be in direct contravention of their express agreement” made upon
entering the Shaker community.99 The material benefits of membership extended only to
those who remained within the fellowship.
Local courts also witnessed disputes involving land and meetinghouses following
schism. In 1832, the Fayette Circuit Court heard a case concerning property belonging to
Lexington’s African Baptist Church. In the early 1820s, church trustees, all free blacks,
acquired two separate tracts of land. The first lot had no meetinghouse, while the second
had a “suitable house of worship.” The church began worshipping at that house, and thus
never pursued construction of a house on the first lot. By the end of that decade, “several
members” of the church “were expelled therefrom upon charges of immorality” and
“united as a separate congregation.” The expelled members, acting as a new church,
erected a house of worship on the empty lot, and proceeded to use that building for
services. The original African Baptist Church denied the new church’s claim and sued
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for “a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said property.” The case
dragged on until the Fayette Court dismissed it with costs in June 1837.100
Both these cases foreshadowed litigation appearing in local and state courts over
the next four decades. From the 1850s through the early 1870s, Kentucky courts
arbitrated property claims in schisms over racial ideology. In the 1830s and early 1840s,
however, courts litigated property disputes arising from doctrinal schisms, splits resulting
primarily from Campbell and Stone’s insurgency. In Kentucky, with schismatic sects
relying on the strictures of the 1814 Act, many churches found themselves entrenched in
litigation—alongside and against their friends, family, and former brethren—over local
meetinghouses. In these cases, doctrine and religious identity often took center stage,
availing the state a role in reviewing and determining each.
Thanks to the efforts of John Taylor, the 1828 schism within the Clear Creek
Baptist Church of Woodford County was probably the most infamous example of
Campbell’s influence in Kentucky. The “intruders [had] pushed in,” Taylor reported in
his 1830 pamphlet, A History of Clear Creek Church; and Campbellism Exposed, and
through their preaching “divided and distracted the church.” After the division, the
Baptists of Clear Creek, “like many other distressed places in Kentucky,” had to share
their house and “forbear to commune together at the Lord’s table” with those “vulgarly
called Campbellites.” Campbell’s adherents, Taylor remarked, “seem to be very church
hungry; if they cannot get a whole one, they will put up with a scrap.”101 Taylor’s
comments can be read in two ways. Hungry for new followers and converts to their
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doctrine, Taylor believed that the Campbellites endeavored to sway whole church bodies,
or at least a minority faction, to their doctrinal position. His lamentations also point to
the material realities of doctrinal dissension and church schism, as church meetinghouses
throughout Kentucky emerged as sites of negotiation and controversy for competing
religious groups.
Not all disputes over church property emanating from Campbell’s Reformation
revolved around legal title or even access to the grounds and meetinghouses. At times,
the opposing parties had to work out more mundane matters such as building
maintenance. The Floyd’s Fork Church in Fishersville, Kentucky split over Campbellism
in the early 1830s. Both parties retained some access to the meetinghouse, though
relations continued to be strained between the two groups. In December 1834, the
Baptist body appointed a committee “to see the party claiming a part of this house” to
inquire over “putting in a floor of plank” and installing a pulpit. The Reformation
Church at Floyd’s Fork did not agree to help with the repairs, primarily because Baptist
church had not assisted them in building the church benches. Instead of voting internally
to pursue construction, the Baptist church’s actions were curtailed, and they agreed to
dispense with the matter for the time being. Similarly, in the early 1840s, the Harrod’s
Creek Baptist Church appointed a committee to correspond with the Reformation Church
which shared their meetinghouse “to take in consideration the necessity of repairing the
meting [sic] house.” Four years later, the Reformation Church asked the Baptist Church
whether “they will give or take one hundred dollars for their interest in the meeting
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house.”102 Such negotiations were certainly more common occurrences for churches then
litigation in the secular courts, but these more routine parleys demonstrate the pervasive
nature of church-property concerns, during and after schisms.
Participants on both sides of the religious controversy understood the importance
meetinghouse-access for the continued growth and success of their respective body. John
Curd claimed that “the occupancy of meeting houses by opposing parties” was “a great
drawback to the progress of the reformation, in Kentucky at least.” Yet the actions taken
by Curd and his party in their effort to retain proportional usage of the Mount Vernon
meetinghouse clearly demonstrated that they believed their expulsions were unjust, and
even though they were the minority faction, that they retained rights to the
neighborhood’s house of worship. Similarly, writing from Lexington in 1834, James
Challen informed Alexander Campbell and the subscribers of the latter’s Millennial
Harbinger newspaper—Campbell’s successor to the Christian Baptist—that the
“reformation” was suffering, and he believed it was due primarily to “our having an
interest in so many Baptist meeting houses, which precludes the probability of meeting at
the same place” and at the same time each week. “I have been almost tempted to pray,”
Challen continued, “that the disciples may be entirely excluded from every Baptist house
in the land.” Only then would they be “obliged” to construct their own dwellings. Not
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all the followers of Campbell and his “reformation” agreed on the necessity of expulsion
from Baptist bodies or construction of new meeting houses.103
The “law of the land” to which Challen referred was, of course, Kentucky’s 1814
Act. In many disputes over meetinghouses which entered Kentucky courts the 1814
statute became an issue. Indeed, although legislators had passed the bill with hopes of
avoiding the disputation that had arisen in New England and elsewhere, the statute may
have propelled disputing factions to pursue recourse through the state legal system. 104
Prior to the Civil War, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled on at least six cases in which
the 1814 Act became an issue.105 In Tennessee, where the legislature failed to pass a
nearly identical law in 1827, and where churches were similarly divided over doctrine
and form of church government, I have yet to discover any state Supreme Court cases.106
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In the conflict over the Mt. Vernon meetinghouse, the 1814 Act centered prominently,
even before the case reached the Woodford County Circuit Court or the state appeals
court. Pastor Fishback testified that Curd and his fellow dissenters were well aware of the
1814 Act, and specifically that the dissenters believed the law provided them a right to
the meetinghouse. For his part, Fishback read the statute from the pulpit in an effort to
convince the dissenters that Curd had misunderstood the legislators’ intent in passing the
measure.107
No matter how disputants interpreted the law, however, the 1814 Act paved the
way for judges to review or revise actions taken by church majorities. In his opinion in
Curd v. Wallace (1838), Justice George Robertson of Kentucky’s Court of Appeals
lamented that the case file exhibited “a large mass of polemical theology” which “was
probably abstract and unessential” and certainly not “the province nor the inclination of
this Court to consider.” Civil courts had no business determining whether “the Church of
Christ” under Fishback was “essentially” a Baptist Church or part of the Baptist Society
as understood by Harris and Branham, the grantors of the land. Nor was it necessary or
proper to determine whether the “reformers” led by Curd were part of the Baptist society
or not. Instead, Robertson insisted, the court could only consider the controversy so far as

opinions of such a body can not [sic] but change,” he wrote. “To fix their fleeting wherries [sic]; to anchor
them immovably in the stream of time is beyond human power; for the mind, at least, is free; ranging by its
inherent strength through the boundless fields of knowledge, molding its belief according to its
apprehension of the trust, and incapable of fixedness until the day when all truth shall be made known.
And if it were possible, it were wrong; to limit activity of mind is to set boundaries to human knowledge.”
See, ibid., 365-366. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 23 Ill. 403, Lexis 246,
(1860), pointing to a number of Kentucky cases—including, Shannon, Curd, Gibson, and Hadden—ruled
that in case of schism, the property should remain with the church that adheres to the tenets of discipline
and organization to which was the property was originally dedicated.
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it “involves the right of property or use” between the two groups.108 Though clearly
striving to avoid meddling in church affairs, the court’s decree, relying upon the 1814
Act, did just that. Robertson granted Curd’s schismatic church proportional usage based
upon its seceding members, despite the fact that many of those seceding members had
been excommunicated by a regular vote of their former church. This, of course, touches
on one of the Act’s potential problems, specifically its first proviso mentioning
“immorality.” For who defines “immorality?” The judges? The church body itself? The
legislators, in both the 1814 measure and the 1852 Revised Statutes, failed to define the
term. Fishback claimed the dissenters had acted immorally when they fomented division
within the church. “By immorality is ment [sic],” he wrote, “‘any act, conduct, or
practice, which contravenes the divine commands or the social duties of the members of
the Church'.”109 For Fishback, and surely other members of his church, the court’s
allowing of members deemed immoral by the church to continue using their
meetinghouse, smacked of state interference.
Indeed, during the 1830s, some observers denounced the 1814 Act as a threat to
religious liberty. In 1835, “A Spectator” called upon state legislators to repeal the law.
During the previous five years, he lamented, it was “believed that at least fifty adverse
claims to the use of meetings houses” in Kentucky had been taken up “by a new sect that
call themselves Reformers, composed of the followers of A. Campbell and B.W. Stone.”
These individuals may not have been pushed out of the Baptist ranks for traditional
immoralities, but they had “created schisms and divisions in churches” and failing in both
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their religious and civil duties. Their actions constituted immorality, Spectator insisted,
because immorality was anything that went against the commands of God or “‘violate[d]
social duties.’” It was fine if individuals changed their religious viewpoints and left their
former church in peace. But the Reformers, and especially those who sought to retain the
use of Baptist meetinghouses, brought only “disorder and strife.” By facilitating the
Reformers, the 1814 Act had brought “the destruction of the comfort, peace, and
happiness of churches,” as well as “neighborhoods and families,” and needed to be
immediately repealed. If not, then the legislature would continue to reward “disorderly
and licentious men” for violating “the rights and good order of religious society” and
corrupting “the good morals of the state.”110
The Act, too, held the potential to encourage dangerous religious ideas to gain
influence and adherents. On the same page of the Baptist Banner as Spectator’s editorial,
an anonymous article warned readers that the Act enabled more than simply Campbellites
or other Reformers. “For should some two or three members of a church become
Mormonites [sic], or followers of Matthias; or even Deists or Atheists…what is there [ in
the 1814 Act] discussed by [Spectator], to debar them from using the meeting house to
propagate their dangerous and demoralizing sentiments?” Already, the writer continued,
he knew of meeting houses in Kentucky where “as many as three parties” claimed the
same space to worship.111 In Nashville, Tennessee, where no law provided proportional
usage for schismatic groups, observers echoed this sentiment in public arguments over
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access to houses of worship. One writer asked his opponents (who had retained the use
of the church building after a schism) what they would do if a majority of their body
suddenly became “Mormons, or Jumpers.” Would they give up their meetinghouse and
“walk off content with the result[?]”112 This may have been a back-handed insult at the
supporters and congregants of the Campbellite Church. Yet statements such as these
display the growing cultural anxiety over the prevalence of non-belief and the rise of
marginal religious movements. As communities’ central social and spiritual sites,
meetinghouses were too important to allow them to fall in the hands of professors of
unorthodox, disorderly, or dangerous religious principles.
In its decree, Robertson and the Court addressed the possibility of marginal
religious groups gaining access to property. Noting the “anomalous, and somewhat
perplexing” provisos of the 1814 Act, Robertson sought to calm Fishback and others who
feared the law availed their local meetinghouses to religious outsiders. Robertson
insisted the legislature did not intend to secure meetinghouses to those who “renounce the
christian [sic] religion and become infidels or Mahometans.”113 Rather, the Act was
intended as a check on trustees’ authority in doctrinal disputes. It sought to leave
disputing parties “to ecclesiastical discipline and authority, to the protection of their own
christian armor, and to the guidance of their own christian charity and prudence.”114 Yet
to Fishback and his church, the Act appeared to do exactly the opposite. It rewarded
those excluded by a regular vote of the church, deferring church authority to that of the
state. Throughout his decision, Robertson appeared uncomfortable applying the Act.

112

James Whitsitt, "Article 3--No Title," Nashville Republican, 25 July 1835, p. 3.
Curd, 196.
114
Ibid., 197.
113

263
Subsequently, although a number of schismatic factions initiated suits based upon the
1814 Act, after its ruling in Curd, the Court interpreted the statute rigidly, applying it
only in cases in which the trustees had been appointed according to its strictures, and
dispensing with the Act when the property in question remained in the hands of the
original trustees.115
But even cases in which Kentucky courts ruled the 1814 Act inapplicable, some
jurists meddled with actions taken by church authorities. Frankfort’s First Baptist Church
divided over Campbell’s doctrine in 1841. The majority excluded a number of members
who then formed a new church a right to worship the meetinghouse. Seeking exclusive
control over the property, the Baptist majority faction “invoked the intervention of
the civil power by filing a bill” at the Franklin Circuit Court. That court ordered the
Baptist Church to hold a new election for its board of trustees and directed that members
recently excluded could vote in the matter. Upon hearing the case in 1842, the Court of
Appeals, rejected the Reformation Church’s invocation of the 1814 Act. Secular courts,
“having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” said the justices, “cannot revise or question
ordinary acts of church discipline or excision.” The exclusions, the court continued,
meant that they are no longer members of that society, and thus no longer “entitled to any
rights or privileges incidental or resulting from membership therein.”116 The Court’s
deference to actions taken by the church body, a tactic it again utilized five years later in
Gibson v. Armstrong (1847) and in Berryman v. Reese (1850), would eventually be
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in its first church-property case, Watson
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v. Jones (1872), which involved the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville.117
These cases and others highlight the continuing process of constructing the boundaries of
civil and religious authority after disestablishment, a process which continued throughout
the period at local, state, and federal levels.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals increasingly relied upon the deference principle
in its decrees, yet church property cases still provided avenues for state authority to
determine a group’s religious identity. At the center of many church-property cases was a
congregation’s denominational affiliation, especially when the land had been deeded to a
specific group. The subscription paper for the Mt. Vernon meetinghouse indicated that
the house was to be “For the benefit of the Baptist Society,” and both sides jockeyed for
recognition as a Baptist body while insisting that their opponents were heretical in their
doctrine. Curd and his co-defendants denied that they or their pastor, F. Palmer, held any
heretical beliefs, expressing their willingness “to submit to the most rigid scrutiny on
these points.” When asked if Fishback’s church was “any part of the Baptist Society,”
member Robert Risk asserted that “I did not join it on such & joined believing it to be the
Church of Christ.” Risk’s sentiments were echoed by former member, Robert Adams,
who averred that “so fare [sic] as I know they are not recognized by the Regular Baptist
Society as a Regular Baptist church.” Adams had heard from current members, too, that
Fishback’s church had changed their name, established open communion, and asked to be
dismissed from the Elkhorn Association. Witness William Poindexter testified that he
had personally heard Fishback declare that “the name Baptist was a sectarian tag & the
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association a biding place for the devil[.]”118 One witness even insisted that he heard
Fishback claim that “if the house was not awarded to them he would advise [his] church”
to rejoin the Elkhorn Association or General Union of Baptists, “by which means [his
church] would be able to get the house.”119 Fishback, of course, claimed his church was
of the regular Baptist order, yet it went by the appellation of “Church of Christ” and had
voluntarily departed from the Baptists’ regional governing association. Indeed, prior to
the court case, an arbitration committee ruled that neither Fishback’s nor Curd’s church
were Baptist organizations.120 Despite the land-deed strictures and the testimony,
however, the court of appeals awarded control—though not exclusive usage—of the
house to Fishback’s church.
In other cases, too, the Court strayed from the original land deed’s doctrinal or
denominational specifications. In 1847 it awarded a meetinghouse to the United Baptist
Church of Washington despite the original deed’s stipulation that the property was for the
use of the town’s Particular Baptist Church. Observers testified that the United Baptist
Church was not a Particular Baptist Church, that it adhered to a different doctrine of
salvation, and that the Particular Baptist governing Association in Kentucky did not
recognize or correspond with that body as a Particular Baptist Church.121 The court
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insisted that a change in name did not entail a change in religious identity. Throughout
the early nineteenth century, however, “United” Baptists and “Particular” Baptists did
distinguish themselves from one another, and at times the differences caused schisms in
both individual churches and their regional governing associations.122
The following year, in Scott v. Curle, the Court again deviated from the strictures
of the land deed—which had clearly directed the property to the Regular Baptists—and
awarded the meetinghouse to the schismatic Reformation Church, even after
acknowledging that the latter had “dissolved all connection with the Baptist order.”123
Over twenty-years later, the United States Supreme Court insisted that civil courts could
not deviate from property donors’ express terms, claiming, “it is not in the power of the
majority of [a] congregation, however preponderant, by reason of a change of views on
religious subjects to carry the property…to the support of a new and conflicting
doctrine.”124 This ruling, surely, would have gratified numerous Kentucky and
Tennessee Baptists who watched as their property was swept away by Campbellite
factions during the antebellum period.
The Kentucky Court of Appeal’s rulings in these cases were certainly not the last
word on matters of church property in that state or, of course, throughout the nation.
Indeed, from the 1850s through the early 1870s, disputes over church-property percolated
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through Kentucky’s courts. In cases such as Harper v. Straws (1853)125 and Gartin v.
Penick (1868)126, the Court continued crafting its jurisprudence of disestablishment. This
process came to a head in Kentucky with the dispute over the Walnut Street Presbyterian
Church in Louisville, a congregation divided between allegiances to the denomination’s
Northern and Southern branches. That case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court in
1871, and served as precedent for subsequent church-property conflicts for nearly a
century.
But rather than a beginning, the cases over racial ideology serve as bridge
between antebellum disputes arising from doctrinal controversy and those of the
twentieth century.127 The pre-war cases in Kentucky illuminate not only the connection of
church and state—despite no legacy of establishment in the state—through the first-half
of the nineteenth century and beyond, but how the democratizing religious culture
propelled churches’ to seek out state authority to protect their property. In his answer to
the original bill at the Woodford County Court, John Curd lamented his “mortification
and pain” in arguing “spiritual matters in a tempiral [sic] court.” Yet it did not stop him
or his co-defendants from attacking Fishback’s doctrinal inconsistency and herald their
own orthodoxy in testimony, or, when the lower court’s ruling went against them, seek
further recourse at the Court of Appeals. Like their counterparts throughout the region
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(and across the young nation), they appealed to state authority to settle disputes that their
church tribunals could not successfully mitigate.
It is a mistake, however, to center the examination solely upon cases which
reached local and state courts. Neighborhood meetinghouses served as important sites
for individuals’ spiritual and social interaction, and from the earliest days of settlement,
churches looked to the state in order to claim and maintain their property. State authority
worked in subtle ways to shape religious matters. Whether through incorporation or
stipulations in land deeds and subscription bonds, legal authority protected churches’
temporal property and implicitly constructed the boundaries of sacred space, upholding
communities’ understandings of religious orthodoxy while barring others from
“republican” meetinghouses. Rather than moving in “clearly defined” and “separate
spheres,” as Judge Robertson claimed in Gartin, church and state—religious and civil
authority—often crisscrossed during the early-republican and antebellum-periods.
Baptists, especially, but other religious groups as well, often pride themselves on their
autonomous natures. Yet, as disputes over church property clearly demonstrate, churches
are “artifacts of the state,” reliant on its protection, and subject to its authority. By
seeking out state assistance, Baptists, who had fought so passionately for the separation
of church and state during the Revolutionary era, inadvertently opened the door for civil
authority to shape ecclesiastical affairs.
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EPILOGUE

“I desire to see…that every disorderly person and church may be made to feel the
authority of Christ's laws, and every good member of society inspired with growing
confidence in their protection.”1

In January 2012, Fairfax County Circuit Court Judge Randy Bellows ordered
nearly $40 million worth of church property returned to Virginia’s Episcopal Church.
Five years earlier, a number of conservative congregations—upset with, among other
things, the Church’s celebration of same-sex relationships and ordination of gay clergy—
broke away from the Episcopal Church and joined the Anglican Church of Nigeria.2 The
schismatics, according to Michelle Boorstein of the Washington Post, took with them
some of the “largest, most prominent churches in the region,” leaving those who stayed
behind worshiping in “borrowed basements and empty houses.”3 Applying the “neutral
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principles of law,” Bellows insisted that upon examining Virginia statute law, land deeds,
and the Constitution and Canons of [the Episcopal Church] and the Diocese,” that it was
“overwhelmingly evident” that the Episcopal Church had “contractual and proprietary
interests” in the property of seven disputed churches. He ordered the congregations
recently affiliated with the Anglican Church of Nigeria to “promptly relinquish control
over the properties to the Diocese.”4
On the heels of the court’s decree, those who remained with the Episcopal Church
expressed an eagerness to return to their former churches. Deborah Miller claimed the
Falls Church where she had worshiped from 1982 until the schisms was “within the
fabric of who we are. It’s a holy place.”5 Similar frustrations had been evoked in the
1840s by Nancy Pierce when she testified about her desire for the nearby Bethlehem
meetinghouse to be re-opened for her Baptist congregation. John Curd and his fellow
recusants conjured the same emotions in their battle with James Fishback and his
followers at Mt. Vernon, arguing that the dissenters had not only helped construct the
meetinghouse, but were settled in a “convenient distance” from the property, and thus
entitled to its use.6 In each case, the dispossessed congregation sought out state authority
in hopes of regaining access to their local church buildings. The state’s role in settling
each dispute illuminates the continued linkage between church and state throughout
American history.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/after-prolonged-legal-battle-virginia-episcopalians-prepare-toreclaim-property/2012/02/08/gIQAhfJI7Q_story.html.
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Disestablishment at the state and federal levels during the post-Revolutionary
period repositioned churches as private institutions, presumably removed from asserting
state-like governing powers.

Yet as we have seen, Baptist churches in Kentucky,

Tennessee, and across the South and West, claimed broad jurisdiction over their
members’ personal and public affairs. They encouraged members to refrain from “going
to law” with another, and served as important law-making sites for all members
regardless of their sex, race, or social status. Churches litigated disputes over contract,
land-sales, and slave warranty cases. They policed household relations—at times serving
as sites of authoritative recourse for abused dependents—and protected the purity of their
own covenanted communities by expelling unrepentant transgressors as well as those
who bucked church authority by propagating doctrinal dissension. Baptists insisted, as
Reverend Eleazer Savage did in 1844, that church tribunals served as “the only proper
judicatory, before which matters of difficulty can be brought; and the only proper court,
wielding the power of ultimate decision.”7
Church tribunals’ operations—and their potential effectiveness—however, were
entangled with the legal, economic, and cultural transformations that gripped much of the
nation in the first-half of the nineteenth century. By 1830, middle Tennessee and northcentral Kentucky were no longer outpost societies far from governing authority and
isolated from national and international markets. Rather, both areas had developed into
vibrant commercial centers with their residents fully engaged in the expanding market
economy. The region’s overall growth gave rise to a class of wealthy planters, lawyers,
merchants, and manufacturers who disseminated middle-class values of domesticity and
7
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family-privacy. The more fluid gender- and racial-relations of the immediate postRevolutionary period dissipated, and the churches’ opportunities for authoritative
recourse for women and blacks were tempered.
Alongside these economic and social transformations—and in some cases
facilitating them—a social relations by contract vision for society assumed precedence in
American legal and intellectual thought. While middle-class families insisted upon
domestic privacy, state-law makers gradually reformulated the law of the household. In
Tennessee and Kentucky, progressive divorce measures not only provided women greater
leeway in separating from an abusive or neglectful husband, but also clashed with
Baptists’ scriptural vision for marriage as a lifelong contract. The increasingly liberal
economic order embraced by so many Americans during the period, too, led to calls for a
legal system based upon predictability, free from subjectivity or passion. For many
antebellum Baptists, the decrees emanating from their church meetinghouses were
riddled with factionalism and prejudice. So, while individuals such as Jacob Creath
insisted he would never trust the church with his “character and property” again, religious
treatise writers engaged in a broad effort to formalize Baptist jurisprudence.8 It was too
little too late, as the antebellum period proved the beginning of discipline’s slow
marginalization in Baptist church life.9
As Creath and others heralded the operations of state-based law above legalities
rooted in local churches, American religious groups were still dealing with the profound
8

Jacob Creath, Jr., A History of Facts in Relation to the Conduct of Henry Foster, From the year 1831 to
the year 1840, in Foster, Clark, & Talbot v. Creath, Hiske &c., 15, Fayette County Circuit Case Files,
Courts of Justice (hereafter FCCJ), Box 91, Drawers 811, case 60, Kentucky Department of Library and
Archives, Frankfort, Kentucky (hereafter KDLA).
9
Gregory A. Wills, in Democratic Religion: Freedom, Authority, and Church Discipline in the Baptist
South, 1785-1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 117.
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changes unleashed by disestablishment and the process of reconfiguring their roles in
society and their relationship with the state. The very free-religious marketplace that
Baptists and other evangelicals fought for in late-eighteenth-century Virginia, while
instituting religious liberty and removing tax support for the Anglican Church, also gave
rise to a competitive denominational-landscape which required many churches to resort
to state authority to secure their property rights. Churches’ experience with dissension
and schism added to, and in some cases produced, the factionalist spirit Creath and others
derided during the early nineteenth-century. In the trans-Appalachian region, divisions in
the Baptist-ranks over missions, the utility of associations, and, especially, the StoneCampbell movement, hindered churches’ effective practice of discipline and led many
individuals to re-think their churches as legal sites, and thus re-conceptualize a central
aspect of church ritual. Moreover, by entwining property rights with doctrinal principles
in land deeds and subscription bonds, grantors of land or money, and at times whole
communities, turned to state authority to secure public spaces of worship for professors
of particular creeds. Their actions implicated state-based law in excluding unorthodox
religious groups and held the potential—especially in congregationally-based groups like
the Baptists—to hinder the church majority in directing their theological evolution.
When this failed, when church tribunals could not contain internal disputes, and when
schismatic groups ignored or contested land-deed stipulations, opposing groups found
themselves in local and state courtrooms debating religious doctrine alongside the legal
and opening the door for judges to review ecclesiastical affairs.
In some ways this whole story is one of security. Moving across the mountains
and away from family and friends, Baptists constructed their own disciplined
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communities to thwart disorder and find refuge from a rather chaotic frontier experience.
As Baptists and Americans of all religious backgrounds encountered the expanding
market-economy of the post-Revolutionary period, they sought more rigorous, more
objective legal sites to secure their property claims and uphold their contractual
obligations. Rooted in churches’ member-relations, Baptist jurisprudence appeared
mired in faction and prejudice, an atmosphere exacerbated by the religious controversy
that gripped so many churches during the 1820s and 1830s. Campbell and Stones’
questioning of creeds, covenants, and articles of faith that had served to secure churches’
doctrinal boundaries upended many of these inclusive communities of believers,
engendering dissension, schism, and competition for both members and adherents. The
quest to secure land, to buttress a church’s claim to specific property, led some
individuals to inscribe their theological principles in state-backed legal instruments.
Others, of course, sought their property’s security through direct recourse to local and
state courts.
This is more than a story about Kentucky and Tennessee Baptists and their quest
to maintain their neighborhoods’ peace. It certainly demonstrates how religious men and
women adapt aspects of their doctrine and ritual to better fit the “usages of the times.”
But it is also about communities’ social-relations in flux under the pressures of legal,
economic, and cultural diversification, and how local authorities, whether they be within
churches, within homes, or among empaneled jurors, lost, and in some cases ceded
authority, to more expansive governing institutions. It is about individuals’ confronting,
reinforcing, and at times destabilizing traditional forms of regulation or social ordering.

275
In the end, it shows how individuals at once crafted and participated in a fluid
marketplace of authority.
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Churches Records Composing Data Set (unless otherwise noted):
Kentucky:
Cane Run Church, 1813-1853, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky (FHS).
Flat Rock/Pleasant Grove Baptist Church, 1805-1865, FHS.
Pleasant Run Church on McFarland Creek, 1827-1844, FHS.
Tick Creek Bethel Baptist Church, 1809-1816, FHS.
Buffalo Lick Baptist Church 1805-1838, FHS.
Beech Creek Church, 1825-1840, FHS.
Floyd’s Fork, 1834-1837, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary Archive, Louisville,
Kentucky (SBTL).
Harrod’s Creek Baptist Church, 1819-1832, 1837-1865, SBTL.
Long Run Baptist Church, Dec. 1803-May 1817, June 1832-Oct. 1858, SBTL.
Fox Run Baptist Church, Oct. 1803-June 1837, SBTL.
Frankfort Baptist Church, 1816-1834, Kentucky Historical Society, Frankfort, Kentucky
(KHS).
Bryan’s Station Baptist Church, 1786-1860, KHS.
South Elkhorn Baptist Church, 1822-1834, sporadic entries through 1857, KHS.
Mount Pleasant Baptist Church, 1790-1828, KHS.
Elk Lick Primitive Baptist Church, 1809-1818, 1823-1865, KHS.
Tennessee:
Nashville First Baptist, 1831-1845, Southern Baptist Library and Archives, Nashville,
Tennessee (SBLA).
Red River Baptist Church, 1791-1826, SBLA.
Fyke’s Grove Primitive Baptist Church, 1814-1850, SBLA.
Little Cedar Lick Baptist Church, 1815-1865, SBLA.
Big Cedar Lick/Mt. Olivet Baptist Church, 1801-1835, 1841-1865, SBLA.
Concord Baptist Church (Mill Creek), 1835-1865, SBLA.
Fall Creek Baptist Church Minutes, 1822-1865, Tennessee State Library and Archives,
Nashville, Tennessee.
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Types of Offenses/Disputes Coded:
1. FORNICATION
2. FIGHTING OR “RIOTING”
3. BREACH OF CONTRACT
4. GOING TO LAW W/BAPTIST
5. INTERACTION/JOINING WITH OTHER SECT/DENOM
6. INTOXICATION
7. DEBT
8. THEFT
9. SWEARING/PROFANE LANGUAGE
10. DISORDERLY CONDUCT/ MISCONDUCT
11. LYING/FALSE STATEMENT/Slander/FALSEHOOD
12. DANCING/FIDDLING (or permitting either)
13. THEATER ATTENDANCE or SECULARIZING
14. FRAUD
15. BREAKING THE SABBATH
16. NON-ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS
17. ADULTERY
18. DIVORCE/ SEPARATION/ ABANDONMENT
19. TRESPASSING
20. OTHER
21. UNKNOWN
Church Records Not Included in Data Set:
David’s Fork Baptist Church, http://davidsfork.org/history.html. Accessed March 27,
2015.
BullittsBurg Baptist Church,
http://baptisthistoryhomepage.com/bullittsbrg.minutes.index.html. Accessed
March 27, 2015.
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